



Evaluating the African Union’s Military Interventionist Role towards 
Conflict Management in Africa 
 
Source: Soomaaliweyn June 2nd, 2013 
 
By 
Ndubuisi Christian Ani 
(212510102) 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Social 
Science, in the Graduate Programme in Conflict Transformation and Peace 
Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa 
Supervisor: Mr Adeoye O. Akinola (36294) 
 




The prevalence of intra-state conflicts and state failures in Africa since the end of 
the Cold War has made Africa the epicentre of threats to human, national and 
international security. The inability of African states to combat the insecurities in 
their respective countries reinforces the discourse on the role of the African Union 
(AU) in enhancing peace and security across the continent. Since its establishment 
in 2002, the AU has responded to some security challenges in Africa. In situations 
of armed conflicts, especially where diplomatic and mediatory efforts fail, the AU 
has adopted military interventionist mechanisms to protect civilians and to restore 
peace and security in accord with Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
Drawing from the cases of Somalia, Sudan and Libya, this research evaluates the 
capacity of the AU to operationalize the idea of ‘African Solutions to African 
Problems’ and enforce peace and security especially through its military 
interventionist mechanisms. Limitations in terms of resources, expertise and funds 
as well as the poor commitment of member states constitute setbacks to the AU’s 
effort at conflict management. For the AU to perform effectively in conflict 
situations, it is imperative for the regional body to develop the required 
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1.1  Background of Research 
The increased rate of intrastate conflicts and state failures in Africa since the end of the Cold 
War has made Africa the epicentre of threats to human, national and international security 
(Osaghae 2007; Reilly 2008). State failure and intrastate conflicts have made the continent 
susceptible to problems such as local and international terrorism, organized criminal 
activities, arms and drug trafficking, refugee flows and the spread of diseases (Cusimano 
2000: 4). Terrorists and criminal syndicates carry out their clandestine and deleterious 
activities from (and in) the continent with global outreach. Intra-state conflicts in Africa are 
also notorious for metastasizing into regional conflicts
1
.  
Thus, aside from the loss of lives and properties in many states-in-crisis, political instabilities 
and armed insurrections have continued to impede peace, security and sustainable 
development in the African continent. The persistence of conflict in Africa defies the power 
of African states to provide security and hampers Africa’s goals and development. 
Internationally, the rampant conflict in Africa taints the continent’s image, and attenuates its 
right to self-determination and meaningful contribution to global debates (Hoeffler 2008; 
Ayittey 1994; Somerville 1990).  
The inability of states to combat the spate of violence and insecurities in their respective 
countries re-ignites the discourse on the role of the continent’s regional organization in 
enhancing peace and security across the continent. This raises interests around the efficiency 
of the African regional organization in tackling the security challenges in Africa via its 
conflict management role. The efficacy of the regional organization would create a safe and 
stable environment for Africa, as a geopolitical region, to materialize its political, economic 
and social aspirations. 
In their pan-African mindedness, African leaders, since independence, have always tried to 
adopt a multilateral approach to addressing the continent’s multifarious challenges (Parker 
and Rukare 2002: 365; Murithi 2009: 93; Poku et al 2007: 115). However, the Organization 
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 The conflict in DRC dragged in neigbouring states such as Rwanda and Uganda. The Somali conflict 
as well dragged in Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea into the crisis. 
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of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963 to address the continent’s problems, 
failed to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War realities of African states. The OAU’s 
strict allegiance to its policy of non-intervention prevented it from intervening in the internal 
affairs of member states to protect citizens from gross human rights violations and 
insecurities (Tieku 2007: 29; Kioko 2003: 814). Laporte and Mackie (2010: 15) note that ‘the 
OAU was little more than a secretariat whose main task was to support regular meetings of 
Heads of States’. Given its strong dedication to the non-interventionist principle, the  OAU 
was hamstrung in the face of internal conflicts, gross human right abuses, repressive regimes 
and crimes against humanity that have wracked the continent’s socio-economic and political 
aspirations (Apuuli 2012: 136).  
In a bid to redress OAU’s inefficiencies and limitations, the African Union was established in 
July 2002 as a replacement to appropriately shoulder Africa’s socio-economic and political 
challenges
2
. This comes in line with the notion of providing African solutions to African 
problems. The idea of African solutions to African problems derives from the need for 
Africans to attend to African problems alone. This would enable African states to lessen the 
risk of being abandoned by the international community in their times of need and to reduce 
the risk of ulterior external interventions in the continent
3
 (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365; 
Murithi 2009: 93). By pulling resources together, African states are expected to closely attend 
to the sundry challenges in the continent. Through the African Union, Africans are expected 
to confront the scourge of conflicts that has been the bane of political, economic and social 
development in the continent (Williams 2011: 3).  
In line with the contemporary challenges of Africa, the African Union stretched its notion of 
security beyond the state-centric concept to human security (Hanson 2009: 1; Poku et al 
2007: 1158). The Human security paradigm entails the provision and protection of the rights 
of individuals, groups and societies as against the state-centric model that focuses on the 
survival of state regimes (Kaldor 2007: 182). The human security paradigm in essence 
attaches more precedence to human rights than the existence of regimes, especially ones that 
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Tieku (2007: 28) notes that the pan-Africanists idea of AU is grounded on the concern for the 
challenges of ordinary Africans and the new security threats facing the continent. 
3
 The history of colonialism in Africa and the Cold War meddling of foreign powers in Africa coupled 
with the ulterior interests of foreign powers in Africa have made non-African interventions in the 
continent suspicious. The continent’s regional organization is constantly being relied on to adequately 
respond to African problems to prevent the dangers of external intervention and to ensure that 
African-oriented solutions that speak to the lived reality of Africans are used. 
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are inimical to ordinary people. The AU integrated human security ideas in its binding 
agreements, declarations, decisions, memoranda of understanding, policy, mission and vision 
statements, conventions and communiqués (Tieku 2007: 26; Sesay 2008: 6). In accord to its 
human rights security paradigm, the AU reserves the right to exploit military interventionist 
mechanisms in cases were diplomacy and non-military alternatives have gone unheeded. 
Since its establishment, the African Union has expectedly adopted military approach and sent 
peacekeeping missions to the following countries: Burundi – ‘AU Mission in Burundi’ 
(AMIB) from 2003 to 2004; Comoros in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008; Sudan – ‘AU Mission 
in Sudan’ (AMIS) from 2004 to 2007; Darfur – ‘AU-UN hybrid Mission in Darfur’ 
(UNAMID) from 2008 to present, Somalia –‘AU Mission in Somalia’ (AMISOM) from 2007 
to present (MØller 2009: 14). The African Union’s Commissioner of Peace and Security, 
Ambassador Said Djinnit, insists that:  
Africans cannot…. watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is 
the UN’s responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility. We have moved 
from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We cannot as 
Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people (quoted in Powell 
2005: 1). 
In the case of Sudan for instance, the African Union has been taking a leading role in the 
resolution of the violence that erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan in February 2003. The 
armed conflict began when two rebel groups; the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice 
and Equality Movement began an armed insurrection against the government. In turn, the 
Sudanese government in alliance with the pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed 
launched a high handed crackdown on the rebels and their affiliated tribes (Murithi 2009: 99). 
The armed insurrection led to grave atrocities against civilians, destruction of property, the 
loss of over thousands of lives, large number of internally displaced persons and refugee 
flows into neighbouring countries. When the AU’s facilitated ceasefire and peace agreement 
were violated by the warring factions, the regional body established a military mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) in December 2004 to protect the civilian population and restore stability in 
Sudan (Farmer 2012: 99).  
The African Union draws its right to intervene militarily in its member states from Article 
4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2001 which mandates AU to respond to war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order (African 
Union 2013; Kioko 2003: 807; Tieku 2007: 29). Moreover, chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
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enjoins regional organizations to take the first necessary step to resolve regional conflicts 
with the authorization of the UN Security Council (Peck 2001: 562; Williams 2011: 17). 
Hence, apart from the right bestowed on AU by its members to intervene, the international 
community also recognizes the pivotal role of regional organizations in addressing the 
conflicts within their region.   
The commitment of the African Union to containing conflicts in Africa raises both positive 
and negative criticisms. It becomes pertinent to probe how effective the AU has been in 
fostering peace and security in Africa. There are literatures which assess African Union’s 
interventionist role in the continent (Williams 2011; MØller 2009; Ado, 2011; Apuuli 2012; 
Murithi 2009; Poku et al 2007; Kioko 2003; Tieku 2007; Sesay 2008, Kerekou 2007; Shinn 
2012; Scanlon et al 2007, etc.). Such studies conflate African Union’s conflict resolution, 
transformation and management efforts with features such as mediation, negotiation, peace-
making, peacekeeping and peace-building.  
This research however, focuses on assessing the African Union’s military approach towards 
conflict management. Conflict management entails the international community’s measures 
to alleviate the dangers of conflict and lessen actual or potential suffering (Wallensteen 2011: 
5). This involves attempts to minimize suffering, prevent conflict from escalating and 
creating conditions for non-violent settlement of conflict. Unlike the ambitious nature of 
conflict resolution that extends to the transformation of social, political, economic and 
cultural institutions and practices that sustain conflict, conflict management has a narrow 
scope (Butler 2009: 15). Rather than aspiring to tackle underlying causes of conflict, conflict 
management has a clear, feasible and widely applicable aim of managing the deleterious 
effects of conflict without meddling with the internal structure and particularities of the host 
state. Conflict management aims not only to lessen the dangers of conflict for the community 
or nation directly involved in the conflict but also for communities that are not directly 
involved such as neighbouring states and the international community at large. It focuses on 
containing conflicts, protecting civilian populations, and creating a nonviolent environment 
for a political solution to take place (Wallensteen 2011: 3, 8).  
Based on the foregoing, this research restricts its analysis to the military peace operations of 
the African Union that are geared towards containing armed conflicts, protecting civilian 
populations and facilitating peace processes. Situated within the theoretical framework of 
liberal institutionalism, the research investigates the efficiency of the African Union’s 
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military interventionist role in achieving the aforementioned goals. The cases of AU’s 
intervention in the Darfur’s region of Sudan, and Somalia as well as its response to the 
Libyan revolution are used to examine the efficiency of the African Union’s response to 
conflict cases in Africa. Using the principles of Human Security and Responsibility to 
Protect, the study sets the criteria for an effective African Union in terms of enforcing its 
agenda of peace and security in the African continent. Most significantly, the dissertation 
assesses how the African Union has been able to operationalize the idea of ‘African Solutions 
to African Problems’
4
 through its conflict management efforts. The assessment goes a long 
way in estimating the regional body’s legitimacy and responsibility for African peace and 
security in a globalized world. It also identifies the strengths of AU that are sustainable and 
how best to constrain its failures. .  
1.2  Research objectives  
The primary objectives of the research are to: 
1. Examine the significance of the African Union as an institution committed to 
regional peace and security. 
2. Assess the achievements and failures of the African Union in terms of promoting, 
enhancing and enforcing peace and security via military intervention in Africa. 
3. Explore the challenges and prospects of an effective African Union’s military 
interventionist role. 
The research shall grapple with the following key questions: 
1. What are the motivations for an effective African Union with regard to conflict 
management in Africa? 
2. What are the African Union’s military mechanisms and measures for enforcing 
peace and security in Africa? 
3.  What are the achievements and challenges of the African Union’s conflict 
management efforts via military intervention in Africa? 
4. How can the African Union develop its capabilities for military approach to 
conflict management? 
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 A Pan-Africanist idea insisting that African issues should be addressed by Africans alone to guard 
against neocolonialism and other ulterior external interventions in the continent (Parker and Rukare 




Broader Research objectives and issues to be investigated: 
1. The study shall examine the concept of African solutions to African problems 
and how the African Union tries to operationalize the idea. 
2. The study will explore the effectiveness of multilateral approach to combating 
armed conflicts within a state.  
Broader questions to be asked: 
1. Does the African Union have the required institutional support, resources and 
political will to achieve the idea of African Solutions to African Problems? 
2. What is the significance and importance of African Union’s efficiency in 
terms of peace and security? 
 
1.3  Scope and Limitation of the Study  
The research restricts its unit of analysis to the African Union’s military operations in 
Somalia and Sudan as well as the contentious negligence to intervene during the Libyan 
Revolution. By using the terms military operation or approach, the study does not refer to 
military intervention
5
 as used in the classical sense. This study uses the terms military 





 missions including military intervention.   
The three case studies – Somalia, Sudan and Libya – that were employed for this study were 
strategically chosen to enable a genuine evaluation of the African Union’s interventionist role 
in Africa. Basically, the African Union has sent peacekeeping forces to Burundi, Comoro 
Islands, Somalia, Sudan and recently, the Central African Republic. For Burundi, the African 
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 Military intervention involves the use of military force without the consent of the host state to 
provide humanitarian aid to civilians, protect civilian population, prevent genocide and crimes against 
humanity and/or to coerce belligerents to engage in peaceful negotiations (Viotti and Kauppi 2001). 
6
 Peacekeeping involves the expeditionary use of police and/or military personnel to prevent armed 
conflicts as well as to enforce, observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace 
agreements (Williams 2010:2). 
7
 Peace enforcement entails a third-party military intervention in a violent conflict scenario in order to 
bring an end to the conflict with or without the consent of the belligerents (Butler 2011: 160) 
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Union intervention lasted for a year from 2003 to 2004 when the mission was replaced by a 
stronger UN peace mission.  An evaluation of the African Union’s interventionist role in 
Africa based on the Burundi’s one year experience would yield a limited understanding of the 
AU’s interventionist role. The African Union’s interventions in the Comoro Islands in 2004, 
2006 and 2007 to 2008 were basically for election observation, monitoring and support. 
Moreover, South Africa was the only main troop contributing country for the missions in the 
islands. The AU mission’s in the Comoro Islands would also provide lesser understanding of 
the African Union’s efforts at conflict management. Furthermore, the build up for the AU’s 
peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic which began in 2013 also provides less 
information of the African Union’s interventionist role. 
However, the African Union’s interventions in Somalia and Sudan stand out and are 
specifically important for analysis given the persistent nature of the conflicts and the African 
Union’s efforts to tackle it in a proactive and confrontational manner. In Sudan and Somalia, 
the African Union sent a peacekeeping mission to the countries to facilitate peace processes, 
contain the unrest and protect civilians. The interventions have also demanded immense 
financial and resource commitment of the African Union. In Sudan, the African Union has 
been involved in seeking a peace process in Darfur since violence erupted in the region in 
2003. Even after its sole mission – the AU’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – elapsed in 2007, the 
African Union continues to take the lead in resolving the conflict in Darfur under the hybrid 
UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In the case of Somalia, the African Union established 
a peacekeeping mission in the country in 2007 when the international community seemed to 
have given up hope on peace and state building in Somalia.  Up to the present time, the 
African Union’s continues to spearhead the peace and state building in Somalia with 
immense progress in recent times. The case of African Union’s interventions in Somalia and 
Sudan presents useful data for a better understanding and evaluation of the African Union’s 
military approach and role towards conflict management in Africa. 
Although the African Union did not intervene militarily in Libya, the study uses the case of 
Libya, on the other hand, to inquire into the options present to the African Union in the face 
of the crises that resulted in NATO’s intervention in the country. The study assesses the 
quality of the regional organization’s response to the Libyan crisis under the prism of conflict 
management. The use of Libya as a case study enables the research to consider arguments 
that favour the military approach to containing the conflict. The case of Libya raises complex 
debates about the African Union’s responsibility and genuine commitment to African peace 
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and security. The Libyan case is also useful in considering AU’s legitimacy and credibility in 
tackling regional issues in a globalized world.  Generally, the three case studies – AU’s 
responses to the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and Libya – enable a reasonable estimation of 
the African Union’s conflict management roles and capabilities with focus on the African 
Union’s military approach.  
The research faces some limitations in that it does not delve deeply into the diplomatic, 
preventive and mediatory aspects of the African Union’s interventions. Nevertheless, the 
focusing on the African Union’s military dimension to conflict management is to ensure the 
feasibility of the research and the concentration of the study on the most contentious aspect of 
third party intervention, which has to do with third-party deployment of military forces to 
conflict states. Furthermore, given that the research looks at three case studies of conflict 
cases where the African Union has responded to, the research shall not dwell so much on the 
historical details of the countries in question. The study shall present an overview of the 
situation that precipitated the response of the African Union in the conflict zones while 
concentration would be placed on examining the efficiency of the African Union’s 
interventions. 
1.4  Significance of the study  
The study contributes to the extant literature on conflict management and the role of the 
African Union in promoting peace and security. The research is timely with the increasing 
expectation for the African Union to address the continent’s ills especially the spates of 
conflict in the continent. Armed conflicts in the continent hamper initiatives and efforts at 
solving the socio-economic and political challenges facing Africa such as poverty, hunger, 
underdevelopment and lack of basic social services. The study stimulates renewed debates on 
the role of the African Union in addressing African issues and provides specialists, scholars, 
and policy makers with data on how to improve AU’s capacity to address the scourge of 
conflicts that has been the bane of stability and development in the continent. 
1.5  Research methodology and methods: 
The research elicits data from secondary sources. Due to the limited timeframe for the study, 
the absence of fiscal support to conduct interviews with prominent staffs at the AU 
Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as the precarious nature of the states used as 
case studies, the researcher could not obtain primary data from the conflict fields. Although 
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there is a paucity of exclusive literatures that evaluate the African Union’s military conflict 
management efforts, the researcher is aware of the availability of several materials that 
contain some information that are useful for the completion of this study. Hence, the 
researcher extracts relevant information from materials that deals with issues on the African 
Union’s military roles.  
The research makes critical use of secondary data from textbooks, journals, reports, 
newspapers and news commentaries. The researcher looks into the disparate materials 
discussing the conflict situations in Sudan, Somalia and Libya, as well as the African Union’s 
response to the crisis cases. As noted by Neuman (2011), secondary evidence may be 
problematic in terms of its accuracy in historical accounts. Secondary sources may also 
reflect the bias of the authors. Cognizant of such limitations, the researcher ensures that the 
data extracted from the secondary sources are verified across various scholarly sources and 
primary reports of the African Union to avert the problems of inaccuracy and distortion in 
historical accounts and to minimize the risk of reflecting the prejudice of the authors. This 
goes a long way to ensure the genuineness and validity of the research as it endeavours to 
present various views on the efficiency of the African Union’s interventions. The research 
information is corroborated with the primary data of the African Union such as the reports of 
the African Union Peace and Security Council and the information on the AU website. 
In line with the theoretical framework, objective of this research and method of data 
collection, qualitative methodology is employed to explicate and analyse the data relevant to 
African Union’s military approach to conflict management. Qualitative research methodology 
entails understanding some aspect of social life using words as currency for analysis (Patton 
and Cochran 2002: 2). Hence, the research contends with the what, how and why questions 
related to the assessment of the African Union’s conflict management efforts via military 
intervention. The data extracted from the secondary sources underwent an interpretative form 
of data analysis. This entails drawing meaning out of social phenomena (Cassidy 2013). 
Interpretive data analysis enables the researcher to assess and make judgements on the factual 
responses of the African Union in conflict situations.  
It is observed that based on the interpretive approach, different analysts could have different 
understanding of reality (Hammersley 1992). This may engender subjective and biased 
analysis of data as people’s interpretations are often affected by their different assumptions, 
world views as well as cultural, educational and geographical backgrounds. In line with 
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Cassidy (2013: 27), the cognizance of the forgoing limitation of interpretation ensures that 
one is not intoxicated with the conviction that one’s understanding and judgements are the 
best and are irrefutable. Through inter-subjectivity
8
, the researcher takes into account various 
assessments of the African Union’s efficiency so as to arrive at a more non-subjective 
conclusion for this research. Nevertheless, the study presents a unique interpretation of the 
efforts and capabilities of the African Union at conflict management.  
The findings and analysis shall be presented in an informational and discursive manner. The 
data garnered from the secondary sources shall be presented in an expository way with facts 
on how the African Union responds and operates in cases of conflict. At the same time, while 
putting forward the factual evidence of AU’s responses to conflict, the research shall be 
discursive to evaluate the achievements, challenges and prospects of the AU’s role in conflict 
situations. 
The study presents a case by case evaluation of some of the African Union’s conflict 
management interventions. Despite the criticism that a case study mostly employs 
inappropriate methods to make causal inferences, a case study has been identified as effective 
in conducting an intensive examination of a single case of a particular phenomenon 
(Perecman and Curran 2006: 21-23).
 
Relevant to this research, the case study approach 
enables the researcher to present a thorough understanding of a conflict situation and the 
particular response of the African Union so as to preclude the fallacy of generalization 
(Neuman 2011).  This also ensures that the research is focused and credible. The research 
avoids the risk of making a general conclusion from only one case study by looking at three 
case studies of the AU’s interventions. The three case studies being considered for this 
research help to identify recurring factors, issues and variances that epitomize the African 
Union’s interventionist role and capacity.  
1.6  Structure of Study 
To this end, the research is divided into six chapters. Chapter one gives a general introduction 
to the research paper by elucidating the background of the research, scope and limitation of 
the study, significance of the study, objective of the study, the research methodology and the 
structure of the study. The second chapter provides a review of the literature on the African 
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Union’s conflict management capabilities and considers the theoretical framework upon 
which the research objective is analysed. The chapter also goes further to clarify useful 
concepts pertinent to the research and sets the criteria for an effective and ineffective conflict 
management intervention. The third chapter assesses the legitimacy and responsibility of the 
African Union in providing African solutions to African problem in a global and 
interdependent world. This chapter also considers the institutional bodies and mechanisms of 
the African Union that are useful for effectively tackling the conflicts in Africa. Chapter four 
engages in a case by case examination of the African Union’s responses to conflict scenarios 
in Sudan, Somalia and Libya. Chapter five explores the prospects, research findings and 
challenges of the African Union’s conflict management endeavours. Chapter six culminates 















Literature Review, Theories and Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the context, and examines the theoretical framework and terminologies 
upon which the research is conducted. The first section titled ‘Literature Review’ began by 
exploring the security issues in Africa. The section culminated with an assessment of the 
African Union’s interventionist roles in Africa as contained in extant literature. The second 
section titled ‘Theoretical Framework’ frames the African Union’s interventionist role under 
the tenets of liberal instutionalism. The third section elucidates crucial concepts – conflict 
management, human security and the responsibility to protect doctrine – that are pertinent to 
the research. These concepts aided in setting the criteria for evaluating the African Union’s 
military interventionist role in Africa at the end of the chapter. 
2.2  Literature Review  
Based on related history of colonialism, shared experiences, culture and challenges, African 
leaders have always found it imperative to forge  greater cooperation and solidarity between 
African states to confront the socio-economic and political challenges facing their continent. 
In line with pan-African ideals
9
, integration, solidarity and unity among African states are 
considered as the necessary means for improving the living conditions of Africans, protecting 
(weak) African states from external meddling and asserting African ideologies in the global 
arena (Parker and Rukare 2002). Unfortunately, violent conflicts in the continent continue to 
be the main hurdle of African socio-economic and political development and aspirations. The 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was established in 1963 to drive the integration 
agenda of African states was crippled by the persistent violent conflicts, insurgencies and 
political instabilities in its member states. 
Since independence, Africa has become reputed for being a continent at war with itself as 
exhibited in the long litany of conflicts in the continent. Anyanwu and Njoku (2010: 21) 
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 Pan-Africanism has to do with the desire for a greater solidarity, unity and cooperation between 
African states to address domestic and global challenges (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365; Murithi 2009: 
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observe that out of the 141 wars fought worldwide between 1960 and 2000, 56 wars were 
fought in Africa
10
. Many African states have experienced, are experiencing or are prone to 
experience violent conflict  due to state failure, artificial colonial boundaries
11
, secessionist 
and irredentist struggles, inequalities, poverty, scarce resources, religious and ethnic 
differences, bad governance, elite corruption, post-election violence and political repression 
(Dersso 2011: 115; Somerville 1999). 
Significantly, the end of the Cold War introduced a new dynamism to the security challenge 
in Africa as evident in the predominance of civil wars, state failures, terrorism and heightened 
insecurities in the continent. The demise of the Cold War era in the late 1980s led to the loss 
of external protection and legitimacy by illegitimate regimes in Africa. Illegitimate and 
dictatorial African states had enjoyed external support and protection from the competing 
Cold War super powers who were seeking to promote their ideologies in the continent. 
African socio-economic, political and legal systems were determined and sometimes imposed 
on African governments by foreign powers under the threat of terminating support to the 
intransigent government
12
. Via state terror, some regimes in Africa maintained relative 
security in their states under the auspices of the military arsenals and financial backings from 
foreign powers (Reilly 2008: 18).  
With the abolition of the Cold War, latent opposition groups in various states were 
emboldened to challenge their unpopular state regimes that have lost external support even by 
the use of force. Besides, opposition groups, as well as unpopular governments, accessed 
weapons effortlessly to further their cause given that trans-national non-state actors have an 
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 The 2011 Armed Conflicts Report Summary notes that out of the 26 conflict worldwide in 2011, 
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 The colonial legacy of arbitrary constructed boundaries and the lack of national cohesion that 
resulted from such boundaries have engendered many African states to conflict. The arbitrary 
boundaries of the Berlin Act of 26
th
 February 1885 resulted in the indiscriminate conglomeration of 
different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups under one polity. Previously hostile and unrelated 
communities were housed together and expected to interact with each other without respect to their 
cultural, ethnic and religious differences. To aggravate the challenge of unification, the colonial 
administration subjected them to unsuitable forms of governance. The colonialists adopted a tactics of 
‘divide and rule’ by creating political and economic policies that favored one group at the expense of 
others. Consequently, the tactics of ‘divide and rule’ prevented national integration and fostered 
tribalism and ethnic hatred (Somerville 1999: 3). Generally, colonial misrule in Africa has been 
indicted for the experiences of state failure, ethnic conflict, secessionism, irredentism and border 
conflicts in the continent. 
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 For Keith Somerville (1990:1), peace and war in Africa, is determined by foreign powers. The 
African nationalists and elites who fought for self-rule turned out to be handmaids and agents of 




increasing hold on the proliferation of weapons at the end of Cold War (Ahmed 2010: 199; 
Reilly 2008: 18). Conflict in Africa became predominantly intra-state in nature. While armed 
conflict engulfed much of sub-Saharan Africa, northern African states remained relatively 
peaceful until recently. In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2010, northern African states that 
had enjoyed relative peace in the last two decades joined sub-Saharan African states in the 
experience of armed conflicts. Hence, conflict tends to be pervasive in Africa. 
Conflicts in Africa have resulted in serious human rights violations, large-scale displacement 
of people and refugee flows. In accord with the 2006 UNHCR report, Africa, being a home to 
about 12 per cent of the population of the world, has about 31 per cent of the world’s refugee 
population (cited in Hoeffler 2008). The continent also has over 42 per cent of the global 
IDPs
13
 in accord with the UNHCR report (cited in Hoeffler 2008). This shows that Africa has 
more refugee and IDP concern than the rest of the world. Besides, more people die of war-
related violence in Africa than the rest of the world. As noted by Hoeffler (2008), between 
1960 and 2002, about 1.55 million people were killed in civil war related-deaths in Africa out 
of the 3.86 million people killed globally in civil war related battles. Thus, war-related deaths 
in Africa account for 40 per cent of global war related deaths. Conflicts in Africa tend to be 
persistent in nature and have proven to be deadlier and more atrocious than those in other 
regions. 
Non-combatants, especially women, children, the disabled, the poor and the elderly, are more 
prone to the vicious effects of  armed conflicts (The United Nations Office of the Special 
Adviser on Africa 2005:8). The conflicts in the continent continue to engender problems such 
as hunger and malnutrition, lack of food production, famine, spread of diseases, disruption of 
trade, slow economic growth, poverty, unsafe water, lack of basic medical care, inadequate 
clothing and housing, unwanted pregnancies, early mortality and a host of other human rights 
abuses (The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa 2005: 8; Hoeffler 2008). 
Conflict in Africa has slowed down the development of most African states and has increased 
poverty rates. This entangles the continent in a vicious circle of conflicts precipitated by 
poverty and underdevelopment which in turn spawn further poverty and underdevelopment 
(Hoeffler 2008).  
Apart from making citizens vulnerable to human right abuses, the internal conflicts of 
particular states have also metastasized into regional problems. For instance, the conflict in 
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Somalia dragged neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea into the Somali 
crisis. With many stakeholders, the Somali crises turned into a complex and prolonged 
regional security conundrum. To further stress the metastasizing of intra-state conflicts into 
regional problems, the internal crisis of Somalia has also led to the problems of refugee 
flows, spread of diseases, trafficking, piracy, etc. Furthermore, the political instability and 
conflict in Libya and Egypt has also overflowed and affected the political situation of Niger, 
Mauritania, Chad, Sudan and Mali (Rupiya 2012: 178).  
Armed groups in post-conflict African states further sell out their weapons to rebel groups in 
other countries at affordable prices. Such practice leads to arms proliferation thereby making 
weapons accessible for rebel groups in other countries to further their interests via the use of 
force. This entraps Africa in a circle of conflict. With regards to Mali for instance, Malian 
Touareg and Salafist rebel groups accessed sophisticated weapons used during the 2011 
Libyan armed conflict to enforce their secessionist agenda (Rupiya 2012: 178). Hence, the 
internal insecurities of African states continue to jeopardize human and national security as 
well as international security. Conflicts in Africa have also encouraged terrorism and 
organized crime
14
 by providing a safe haven for criminals and terrorists to carry out illicit 
activities with far reaching impacts across the globe. The correlation between conflict/failed 
states and terrorism/international criminal networks has led to strong interventionist policies 
of foreign powers in Africa. Recently, the US government have carried out successful 
unauthorised raids in Libya and Somalia to arrest the leaders of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab 
respectively. Apart from such unsanctioned raids in Africa, conflicts and state failure in 
Africa continues to expose the continent to several unwanted external interventions.  
Basically, the conflicts and insecurities in Africa have attracted greater international 
community involvement and intervention in the continent. This has largely been done under 
the auspices of the United Nations Security Council. However, as noted by Ekeus (2001: 
519), the huge responsibilities of the UNSC across the globe as well as the UNSC’s abuse of 
veto power precludes the organization from effectively dealing with the security threats in the 
continent. The UN failures to respond properly to the continent’s predicaments (e.g. the 
Somali crises, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil war in the 
late 1990s and the numerous social and economic challenges in the continent) add to the  
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necessity for a strong regional organization to contend closely with African problems 
(Williams 2011: 4). 
Cognizant that the OAU and the United Nations
15
 could not adequately address the security 
challenges that Africans are faced with; African leaders thereby resorted to the formation of a 
strong institution that could confront the multifaceted continental and global challenges 
facing the continent (African Union 2013). In July 2002, the African Union was established 
as a panacea to its defunct predecessor OAU. Most importantly, the African Union is 
expected to materialize the political ideal of African solutions to African problems (Apuuli 
2012: 135). In view of the nexus between peace, security and development, the African 
Union is mandated to confront the scourge of complex conflicts that has been the bane of 
development in Africa.  
Having replaced the defunct OAU, the African Union committed itself to resolving African 
problems. As observed by Moise Kerekou (2007: 3), the African Union made a huge 
paradigm shift from its predecessor’s (OAU’s) insistence on non-interference in the affairs of 
member states to non-indifference to the internal affairs of member states. Under Article 4(h) 
of the Constitutive Act of 2001, AU endorses the right for humanitarian intervention as 
entrenched in the responsibility to protect
16
 principle (Tieku 2007: 29; Kioko 2003: 807). 
That is, in cases of humanitarian crisis, the African Union has the right and responsibility to 
intervene with or without the permission of the host state.  
Anthony Bizos (2011: 2) and Tim Murithi (2009: 93) argue that the African Union is 
arguably the only regional organization with institutionalized ideas of the responsibility to 
protect ingrained in its system. That was before the doctrine was popularized at the 2005 UN 
World Summit. The first Chair of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konare, maintains that 
African states cannot afford to be passive while atrocities are committed in neighbouring 
countries (cited in Murithi 2009: 95). While trying to reform and develop its institutions, the 
African Union has plunged itself deeply into addressing the continent’s travails (Hanson 
2009: 1).  
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 The doctrine of the responsibility to protect mandates the international community to protect 
civilians from genocide, war crimes and mass atrocities against civilians. See ICISS (2001). 
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Unlike the OAU, the African Union had been more active in condemning human right abuses 
and bad governance of its member states (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365). Informed by the 
1997 Harare Declaration that banned unconstitutional changes of government, the Union has 
actively condemned every overthrow of a democratically elected government by its military, 
mercenaries, or armed rebels and all unconstitutional changes of government in line with 
article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act (Williams 2011: 4). Since its establishment in 2002, 
the AU has condemned every successful coup on the continent for instance; the Central 
African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (2003), Togo 
(2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Ivory 
Coast (2010), Mali (2012), and Egypt (2013) (Williams 2011: 4; Shinn 2012: 3). 
Funmi Olonisakin (2007: 1) assesses the nature of conflict management in Africa and notes 
that African regional and sub-regional organizations are continually making considerable 
efforts in conflict management. The African Union has taken a more proactive stance in 
preventing, managing and resolving African conflicts (Sesay and Omotosho 2011: 3). Addo 
(2011: 90) argues that via its peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, the 
African Union has managed to make significant strides to contend with the conflicts in 
Africa. In conflict zones where diplomatic and mediatory interventions failed, the African 
Union has adopted military intervention to protect civilians as well as quell conflicts.  
The AU’s first adoption of military interventionist mechanism began with its peace operation 
in Burundi in April 2003 (Scanlon et al 2007). The conflict scenario that led to the AU’s 
peacekeeping intervention in Burundi is traceable to the ethno-political violence that ensued 
after the assassination of President Francois Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993. President Ndadaye, a 
Hutu Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), was allegedly assassinated by 
Tutsi-dominated forces. The violence that ensued led to the loss of over 300, 000 lives and 
the displacement of many civilians. In 2000, the government, seventeen political parties and 
the national assembly signed the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for 
Burundi.  
However, the Arusha agreement as well as a host of other peace agreements between the 
government and the armed parties failed to establish a comprehensive cease fire agreement to 
stop the fighting (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu, 2010: 68). In the absence of the 
political will of UNSC to establish a stabilizing peace mission in Burundi, the newly formed 
African Union took on the responsibility to intervene in Burundi from 2003 to 2004. With 
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force strength of 3,335 troops, mainly from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique, AU’s 
Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was mandated to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreements, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the armed factions and to 
stabilize Burundi in anticipation of a stronger UN peace operation (Murithi 2008). This 
marked AU’s first peace operation in Africa.  
Since then, the Africa Union has also sent peacekeeping missions to Sudan (AMIS) from 
2004 to 2007 and in 2008; Comoros in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008; ; and Somalia 
(AMISOM) since 2007 (MØller 2009: 14). The African Union has also supported other peace 
operations sponsored by the UN, NATO and powerful states such as in the case of the DRC 
and Mali. The AU has ongoing post-conflict reconstruction activities in Burundi, the Central 
African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, among others 
(Addo 2011: 91). MØller (2009: 16) observes that even when the outside world seemed 
indifferent to African problems, the AU and the sub-regional organizations have managed to 
considerably carry out peace building and peacekeeping operations. This depicts the regional 
organization’s commitment to the continent’s peace and security (Murithi 2009: 106). 
Williams (2011: 14) notes that in stark contrast to the OAU, the African Union has carried 
out a significant number of peace operations with relative success.  
The AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) contributed to the stabilization of the country, prevented 
the escalation of violent conflict and laid a foundation for reconciliation and reconstruction in 
Burundi (Scanlon et al 2007: 20-21; Murithi 2008). AMIB also created the conditions for the 
deployment of a UN peace operation in 2003 and subsequent elections in June 2005. The 
AU’s mission in Burundi reflects the continent’s will for self-reliance and responsibility for 
peace operations in the continent (National Model United Nations 2008: 20). The African 
Union has also been taking the lead in restoring peace and stability in Sudan since violence 
erupted in Darfur in 2003. The African Union was the first to intervene in Darfur before the 
UN and EU although this is a move expected of the regional organization in line with its 
commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. Between 2004 and 2007, the 
AU deployed about 7, 000 African Union force in Darfur and backed a stronger UN 
peacekeeping force in the region in 2008 (Scanlon et al 2007: 21).  
AU intervention in Burundi (AMIB), its missions in the Comoro Islands and sometimes, its 
mission in Sudan (AMIS) are adjudged as successes despite their shortcomings (National 
Model United Nations, 2008: 7; Shinn, 2012:2; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). Shinn (2012: 2) 
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observes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has also gradually attained 
considerable achievements in recent years leading to the establishment of a new Somali 
federal government since the collapse of President Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.  
However, the AU has been indicted severally for being incapable of meeting its expectations 
in terms of ensuring peace and security in the continent (Williams 2011: 1; Kerekou 2007). 
Williams (2011:5) observes that despite the paradigm shift from non-intervention to non-
indifference to the internal affairs of member states, the African Union, since its inception, 
never invoked Article 4(h) to justify military intervention against a member state. The Union 
was expected to act proactively in states like Cote d’Ivoire and Libya where mass atrocities 
were committed against civilians. Yet, it failed to intervene or react decisively when it was 
supposed to, thereby leaving the United Nations, NATO and other western powers to 
intervene directly in these countries. In accord with Williams (2011: 5), such failure is 
resultant from the AU’s lack of political will and inability to extricate itself from the non-
interventionist norm of its predecessor, OAU.  
Apuuli (2012: 136) contends that ‘the crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya exposed the 
hollowness of the AU being an African solution to African problems’. Apuuli (2012: 136) 
argues that the marginalization of the AU by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
during the Libyan revolution as well as the France-led UN intervention during the Cote 
d’Ivoire post-election crisis was self-inflicted. This was due to the failure of AU to take a 
strong united stance at the outset of the conflicts. The direct intervention of the United 
Nations and France in Cote d’Ivoire’s crisis as well as the NATO and UN intervention in 
Libya is consequent from AU’s passivity at the dawn of the crises. Its passivity and half-
hearted reactions led to its being sidelined and ‘relegated to a mere bystander to a game being 
played within its own backyard’ (Apuuli 2012: 136). Apuuli (2012: 135) notes that AU’s 
half-hearted measures and internal divisions on how to react to crisis situations have rendered 
the African Union incapable of attaining the expectations entrenched in the notion of African 
solutions to African problems. 
The African Union has proven its metier in terms of mediation and diplomacy. In the wake of 
conflict situations, the African Union has expectedly adopted a mediatory and diplomatic 
stance to address the causes of conflict via political negotiations. Via its Panel of the Wise, 
the AU has tried immensely to facilitate peace processes in conflict states such as in Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Sudan (Williams 2011:  48). The effort of Thabo 
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Mbeki, former president of South Africa aided in the negotiated secession of South Sudan 
from Sudan. However, Apuuli (2012: 151) notes that the Libyan crisis demonstrated the 
failure of AU’s diplomacy. The lack of power particularly economic and military power, 
impedes the African Union from ensuring that its diplomatic efforts are considered seriously. 
Rupiya (2012: 165) argues that the African Union’s mediatory efforts and sanctions on 
member states are negligible and incapable of achieving desired effects. Given the AU’s lack 
of economic and military power, its diplomatic efforts and sanctions
17
 only take on a 
symbolic posture of dissatisfaction with the recalcitrant state and are ineffective in achieving 
desired effects. 
MØller (2009: 16) maintains that there is a huge gap between the ambitions and 
accomplishments of the African Union. For Williams (2011: 1), the African Union is bent on 
making grandiose or rather ambitious projects that go beyond the bounds of its finance, 
political will and capacities. Kerekou (2007: 10) insists that the inability of the African Union 
to meet expectations is consequent upon its institutional weaknesses and inexperience. To 
buttress this claim, the 2011 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) monograph asserts that the 
capacity of the AU to undertake any conflict management initiative depends on the capacity 
of its various member states to provide necessary resources and influence (Sharamao and 
Ayangafac, 2011: 5). However, most African states are at the risk of state failure, civil wars, 
rebellion and instabilities. Hence, the AU – composed of such states – is hamstrung in its 
ability to meet up to expectations (Sharamao and Ayangafac 2011: 4).  
The weaknesses of AU are evident in the fact that the AU Standby Force (ASF) has not yet 
been operationalized since it was created in 2003. This shows AU’s inability to realize its 
ambitions as stipulated in its Constitutive Act and protocols. AU forces still rely on western 
powers for military support, training and assistance. The Union’s military operations and 
initiatives are greatly stymied by unpredictable and poor funding, the dearth of resources, 
inadequate logistic support, lack of transparency in the management of resources, and the 
delay and inadequate deployment of expected personnel and resources.  
Laden with these challenges, the AU is incapable of sustaining effective long-term 
peacekeeping operations. AMIS, for instance, was criticized for being understaffed, 
undertrained and under-resourced to cover the huge land mass of Darfur and to handle the 
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stigmatize the target, act as a substitute for armed conflict, and potentially change political behavior’. 
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complexity of the conflict in Sudan (Hanson 2009: 1; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). AMIS failed to 
stop the killings and displacement of civilians and it lost about sixty troops (MØller 2009: 15; 
Williams 2006). This prompted the call for a stronger UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. At 
the end of 2007, AMIS was subsumed into the African Union/United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur. 
On a mild position, Scanlon et al (2007: 7) note that while the African Union bears the 
responsibility for peace and security in the continent, the complexity of the conflicts in the 
continent thwarts its ability to contend with them. In accord with Williams (2011: 1), AU’s 
inefficiencies stem from its emergence at a time when conflict had engulfed much of the 
continent. As the organization makes grandiose declarations of intent, new and complicated 
conflicts as well as the lack of resources to handle the conflicts continue to cripple the 
organization. MØller (2009: 16) argues that ‘it would be surprising if the world’s poorest 
continent were able to solve the world’s most frequent and widespread as well as most deadly 
conflicts’. For MØller, the conflicts in Africa cannot be addressed solely by the African 
Union. They require a coordinated partnership between the African Union, the United 
Nations as well as other international organizations.  
In his assessment of the efficiency of the AU in terms of the responsibility to protect, Murithi 
(2009: 106) argues that it is premature to pass judgments on the AU’s efficiency because it is 
still an embryonic organization. The AU as an effective supranational organization is yet to 
gain expertise and adequate resources to face the complex challenges in the continent. The 
nascent life of the AU and its limited experience with conflict resolution in Africa are 
constraint on the regional organization’s efficiency at conflict management (National Model 
United Nations, 2008: 7). For Sesay (2008: 7) the principles, objectives and institutions of the 
African Union are dreams we hope will come true. It is commendable that the African Union 
did not wait to strengthen all its forces and mechanisms before confronting the continent’s 
challenges. From its successes and failures, the African Union has gained (and continues to 
gain) considerable beneficial experiences (MØller 2009: 15). Maasdorp (2010: 11) maintains 
that with time, the African Union would mature to adequately contend with the series of 
challenges impeding peace, security and development in Africa. 
The foregoing review has explored some extant literature on the achievements, failures and 
challenges of the African Union in terms of ensuring the peace and security in the continent. 
These literatures conflate African Union’s conflict resolution, transformation and 
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management efforts with features such as mediation, negotiation, peace-making, 
peacekeeping and peace-building. There remains a paucity of research materials that 
exclusively study the military efforts of the African Union without dwelling much on the 
Union’s mediatory and diplomatic measures.  
Against this backdrop, this research fills this gap by focusing on the military mechanism 
recurrently applied by the African Union. Moreover, for the African Union to effect changes 
in conflict situations and to pride itself as being committed to peace and security, the Union 
ought to possess a strong military power to coerce as well as coax warring parties to take its 
diplomatic, mediatory and military interventions seriously. Under the framework of conflict 
management, the research explores the African Union’s measures to contain conflicts, protect 
civilian populations, and creating a non-violent environment for conflict resolution to take 
place.  
The research restricts its analysis to the military peace operations – military intervention, 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement – of the African Union and assesses the efficiency of 
the Union in containing armed conflicts, protecting civilian populations and facilitating peace 
processes. Using the principles of human security and responsibility to protect as enunciated 
in the third section, the research investigates and assesses the Union’s reaction to three 
noteworthy cases of armed conflict situations in the continent – Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and 
Libya. By investigating the Union’s interventions, the study shall inquire deeply into the 
capacity of the African Union to enforce peace and security in the continent.  
 
The following key questions shall drive this research: 
1. What are the African Union’s mechanisms and measures for promoting, enhancing 
and enforcing peace and security in Africa? 
3. What are the achievements, failures and challenges of the African Union’s military 
interventionist role in Africa? 
4. Does the African Union have the required institutional support, resources and 
political will to achieve the idea of African Solutions to African Problems? 
5. How can the African Union develop its capabilities for conflict management? 
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2.3  Theoretical Framework: Liberal Institutionalism 
Central to this research is the evaluation of the military conflict management measures and 
interventions of Africa’s continental regional organization, the African Union. To this end, 
the tenets of liberal institutionalism are instrumental in scrutinizing the significance, 
capabilities, achievements, failures and challenges of the African Union’s effort to promote 
and enforce security within the African regional. In the face of the predominance of internal 
insecurities in African states and the concern for human, national, regional and international 
security, institutionalized cooperation between African states is deemed quintessential to 
attain peace, security and stability in the continent (Murithi 2009:  93). The claims of 
institutionalism shed greater light to the pan-Africanist longing for integration between 
African states in a bid to surmount the challenges facing the continent.  
An adequate conception and appreciation of the claims of liberal institutionalism, founded on 
the principles of idealism, is hazy without the comprehension of the basic tenets of its rival 
theory, realism. Realism has endured as a traditional tenet in political thought. Precursors of 
realism such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes among many others emphasize 
the anarchic, self-reliant and militaristic nature of the international order (Baldwin 1993: 11). 
The works of E. H Carr (1946: II) and Hans J Morgenthau (1948) shaped a coherent 
conception of the claims of realism.  
In accord with realists, the international system is composed of independent and atomic 
sovereign states selfishly seeking their narrow interests (Baldwin 1993: 11). This entails that 
the international system is defined by insecurities, uncertainties and tensions between states 
seeking to maximize their parochial interests. Devoid of any central authority to control state 
behaviour, the international system is deemed by realists to be inexorably anarchical and 
characterized by competition between states. Given their grim image of world politics 
(realpolitik), realists insist that cooperation between states is difficult to attain and sustain 
(Baylis 2005: 304). 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, liberal institutionalism emerged to mount a strong 
challenge to realist claims
18
. Proponents of institutionalism such as Robert O. Keohane, 
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 The tenets of institutionalism could be traced to the claims of ancient Stoics who saw themselves as 
citizens of the world and early Christian philosophers who maintain that all humans are children of 
God, and in unity and love, people create a strong world society with different people sharing and 
learning from their different limited capabilities (Baldwin 1993: 11). 
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Arthur Stein, Charles Lipson, Robert Axelrod, and Joseph Nye hold that institutions
19
 are 
imperative for the attainment of cooperation, security, stability and development in the 
international system (Keohane and Martin 1995; Udombana 2005; Abbott and Snidal 2001). 
Contrary to the realist emphasis on anarchy, military alliance, balance of power mechanism, 
competition between states, institutionalists dilute the realist notion of anarchy by 
emphasizing the interdependent nature of the international system (Baldwin 1993: 12).  
Advocates of institutionalism observe that states have mutual interests and challenges. 
Significantly, states have come to realize that the challenges of security, human rights 
violations, refugee flows, disease control, trafficking, weapon proliferation, climate change, 
inter alia, go beyond unilateral state efforts irrespective of how powerful a state is (Powell 
2003: 1). Particularly, security threats such as intra-state conflicts demand the cooperation of 
the international community to manage the conflict, protect civilians and restore peace and 
security. It is not certain that conflicting parties would cease hostilities without a third-party 
intervention. If left unchecked, intrastate conflicts could metastasize into regional conflicts 
and provide grounds for refugee flows, spread of diseases, international criminal activities, 
terrorism, nuclear and drug trafficking, (Cusimano 2000: 4). These challenges nudge states 
towards interstate cooperation (Baldwin 1993: 12). 
Robert Keohane (1984), a staunch advocate of institutionalism, contends that the rationality 
and self-interests of states in the anarchic international system are sources of cooperation. To 
tackle significant common interests, states – acting out of rationality – cooperate with other 
states to satisfy their narrow interests (Keohane and Martin 1995: 39). Multilateralism and 
institutionalism are highlighted as ways of tackling issues of common interests. 
Multilateralism and institutionalism both emphasize the need for cooperation between many 
states to contend with common challenges.  
However, while multilateralism places emphasis on governing and organizing principles and 
rules to guide cooperation regarding a particular common interest (Powell 2003: 5), 
institutionalism emphasize a regularized and perpetual cooperation between states in an 
institutional environment (Slaughter 2011). Institutionalists observe that ad hoc multilateral 
co-operations between states that are not regular and institutionalized are not reliable as one 
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 It is worth noting that the term ‘institution’ is a vague concept because it could be used to refer to 
organizations, structures, systems and practices. This study however limits the concept of institution 
to formal organizations of state and non-state actors with ‘related complexes of rules and norms, 
identifiable in space and time’ (Keohane 1988: 383). 
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party may cheat or renege on the agreement (Keohane 1988: 393). Multilateralism merely 
espouses the cooperation of many states through some organizing principles without 
specifying how the cooperation should be achieved. However, institutions– described 
narrowly as international organizations with customs and rules – provide an epicentre where 
states meet and engage in coordinated cooperation regularly to confront diverse challenges 
(Keohane 1988: 383; Slaughter 2011).  
Annie-Marie Slaughter (2011) notes that institutions create extended time-frame of 
interaction between states. Thus, knowing that they have to cooperate with each other for a 
longer period of time repeatedly and on varied interests, states abide by the rule of an 
institution and reap the benefits of cooperation over an extended period. Thus, via 
institutions, cooperation is more trusted, reliable and efficient and the fear of unequal gains 
from cooperation is alleviated (Keohane 1988: 380; Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). 
In institutional settings, individual states hardly renege or cheat on agreements because they 
are involved in a habitual chain of cooperation. As an institution that goes beyond mere 
multilateral cooperation, the African Union seeks to confront Africa’s social, economic and 
political challenges. In this institutional environment, every member state considers its peace, 
security and development as contingent on the peace, security and development of fellow 
member states. Hence, in cases of internal crisis in one member state, other members do not 
remain indifferent. Rather, under the norms and customs of the institution, fellow member 
states seek to address the problems of their affected fellow member.  
For realists such as Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffman and John Mearsheimer, despite the 
growth in interstate cooperation, states remain fearful that some states will renege on any 
agreements reached and attempt to gain greater advantages over them (Baylis 2005: 304). 
Even when cooperation occurs via supposed institutions, states tend to gain more by 
exploiting others (Baylis 2005: 304).  In such situations, powerful states tend to gain more 
benefits at the expense of others. For them, international institutions are mere instruments 
used by dominant states to advance their power, interests, and welfare. For instance, after the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, U.S., Russia and other nuclear powers continue to maintain 
their nuclear weapons. The same nuclear powers mount campaigns to prevent other states 
from developing nuclear weapons while they hold on to their weapons. For realists, every 
state is eventually left with the responsibility to provide for their survival and security 
because no state can be trusted.  
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Keohane and Martin (1995: 42) however argue that the uncertainties in the international 
system are overcome by institutions as they allay the fears of member states by disclosing the 
military capabilities of member states. States then have the capability to predict and foresee 
the responses of other states. As such, competitions and tension between states due to the 
security dilemma are mitigated and state relationships are driven by the positive awareness of 
each state’s capacities (Udombana 2005: 2). Here, states engage in mutual and reciprocal 
relationship.  
In accord with Mearsheimer (1994), an unwavering advocate of realism, the capabilities and 
ambition of states to satisfy their narrow interests are not influenced by institutions. In his 
The False Promise of International Institutions, Mearsheimer (1994) argues that the self-
interests and power capacities of individual states making up institutions is responsible for 
the achievements of an institution not the institutions as such. For instance, the success of 
NATO in preventing World War III and its role in the demise of the Cold War is seen by 
Mearsheimer as the success of the individual powerful states that make up the institution. In 
tandem with Mearsheimer, institutions have marginal power in the international system 
(Slaughter 2011).  
Contrary to neorealist claim that institutions have marginal power, as success is only attained 
through the power capacities of individual states that make up an institution, liberal 
institutionalists insist that institutions per se make significant difference in the international 
system (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). Institutions harness and shape the behaviour of 





international institutions define, regulate, coordinate and constrain the individual behaviour 
of different states (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 346; Udombana 2005: 1). Institutions provide 
forums for leaders of member states to share ideas, discuss common problems and offer ideas 
on how issues can be addressed theoretically and practically. Institutional mechanisms are 
also created from such forums to address issues raised and the decisions and standards agreed 
upon are enshrined in declarations, conventions, or treaties (Peck 2001). Institutions provide 
incentive, mechanisms and structures to encourage and ensure the compliance of member 
states to institutional standards and norms (Peck 2001).  
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 Standards are central mechanisms used by international governance to coordinate and constrain 
individual behavior of different states (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 346). 
21
 International governance is the formal and informal bundles of rules, roles and relationships that 
define and regulate the social practices of state and non-state actors in international affairs (Abbott 
and Snidal 2001: 346). 
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Significantly, institutions also coordinate the power capacities of member states and make 
meaningful impacts in international order. In response to intra-state conflict for instance, 
institutions put pressure on conflict states to resolve their issues peacefully and they place 
sanctions on defaulting states. Unlike the collective security paradigm in international 
relations that is concerned mostly with the peace and security of states and that sees 
aggression against one member state as an aggression to all (Butler 2009: 15), institutional 
approach sees any form of aggression against or within one member state as a threat to 
national and international peace and security – a threat that demands the response of the 
institution.  
In this regard, institutions are concerned not only about protecting its member states from 
external aggression as espoused by the principle and practices of collective security; it is also 
concerned with ensuring peace and security within member states. Besides, by virtue of 
belonging to an institutional setting, states bind themselves to standards and norms that 
involve institutional demands and sanctions in cases of a breach in agreement. When 
institutional diplomatic measures fail, institutions sometimes intervene with or without the 
permission of the host state. Put together, the power capacities of member states forces 
recalcitrant states to comply with institutional mandates. Thus, institutions per se attain 
successes (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42).  
The United Nations as a widely recognized global institution has made considerable efforts in 
contending with global social, economic and political challenges. The number of member 
states of the United Nations has grown from 51 when it was established in 1945 to 193 
member states today. In a bid to contend with contemporary security threats, the UN as well 
as other international organizations like NATO has retrofitted to tackle new tasks beyond 
their initial objectives and mandates
22
 (Cusimano 2000: 302). In terms of peace and security, 
the United Nations has tried considerably to prevent and manage the scourge of conflicts 
across the globe. Without international institutions such as the UN, it is unimaginable 
conceiving a non-chaotic post-1945 international order. Keohane (1988: 393) notes aptly that 
without international cooperation the future of humankind is dim and gloomy.   
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 The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet and the end of the Warsaw Pact did not see 
to the end of NATO as predicted by John Mearsheimer in 1990 (cited in Keohane and Martin 1995: 
40). Rather, NATO and other international institutions like the UN mutated and become much 
influential in the international system. 
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The tenets of liberal institutionalism are particularly useful for the understanding of the 
African Union as an interstate initiative for tackling common challenges in Africa. As an 
interstate institution, the African Union aims at tackling common challenges faced by African 
states. Given that conflict is a major challenge to African states, the African Union is 
expected to confront the security challenges of African states. Here, each state recognizes the 
fact that their security is greatly tied to the security conditions of other states within the 
African continent. The common challenge involved in intrastate conflicts is evident in the 
fact that Internal conflicts in Africa raise concerns around refugee flows, arms proliferation 
and the growth of organized international criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations. 
Moreover, the crisis in the DRC for instance has spread its malevolent tentacles across 
Central Africa. The Somali conflict as well affects the security situation of Kenya, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea. These highlight some instances were internal conflicts in Africa has metastasized 
into regional conundrum. In accord with the rewards of liberal institutionalism, African states 
could gain greater security benefits by seeking to confront the challenges of conflict in the 
continent through the regional body, the African Union.  
The challenge with the tenets of liberal institutionalism lies in the fact that some influential 
states in the continent may pursue their national interest under the banner of the African 
Union. The interventionist role of South Africa in the Central African Republic at the 
immergence of the 2013 conflict in the country tended to highlight South Africa’s quest to 
confront the a security challenge that challenged its investment initiative in the country. 
Nevertheless, the institutional background of the African Union serves to ensure that member 
states do not take advantage of other states. The African Union as an institution could 
continually grow at coordinating the power capabilities of member states to tackle Africa’s 
problems particularly the conflict challenges in the continent. As an institution, the African 
Union has established measures to promote, enhance and enforce policies geared towards 
making the continent violent-free. With the support of its member states, the Union has been 
able to intervene diplomatically and militarily in the internal affairs of member states to 
restore national and international peace and security (Bizos 2011: 2).  
In line with liberal institutionalism, the study further investigates how the African Union, as a 
regional institution, influences and intervenes in the internal and interstate affairs of member 
states in an attempt to manage the conflicts in the continent through its military approach. 
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2.4  Conceptualizations 
This section aims at elucidating important concepts pertinent to militaristic intervention on 
which the research is conceived and analysed. The section goes further to set the criteria for 
evaluating African Union military interventionist role in Africa. 
2.4.1  Conflict Management 
As noted by David Weeks, ‘conflict is an inevitable outcome of human diversity and a world 
without conflict is not desirable because it would mean a world without diversity’ (quoted in 
Agada 2008: 23). Though conflicts are inevitable, violent conflicts that threaten national and 
international peace and security raise international concerns. This concern is noticeable in the 
international community’s direct intervention in the internal affairs of states in crisis since the 
end of the Cold War era. Interventions entails third party effort to address conflict challenges 
in a conflict state. Such interventions are geared towards protecting civilians, creating 
conditions for non-violent solution to conflicts and establishing peace, stability and order in 
conflict and post-conflict regions (Whyte 2009: 5). International interventions in conflict 
regions are predominantly assessed under the concepts of conflict resolution and conflict 
management. 
Conflict resolution deals with how third parties strive to facilitate negotiations, agreements 
and the resolution of conflicts between warring parties (Wallensteen 2011: 3). Conflict 
resolution does not only help to resolve conflicts and ensure the ending of armed struggle, it 
also entails agreement between warring parties to respect and cooperate with each other and 
deal with their differences through non-violent means (Wallensteen 2011: 10). Thus, conflict 
resolution encompasses broad attempts at peacemaking and peacebuilding.  
Peacemaking has to do with the international community’s diplomatic effort to create 
conditions for conflicting parties to end violence through negotiated settlements (Abdi 2012: 
61). It involves mediatory efforts to contain a violent conflict through the brokering of a 
ceasefire agreement and the facilitating of negotiations between belligerents so as to avoid or 
end conflict (Dawson 2004: 2, Murithi 2008). Peace-building entails reconstructing a society 
to ensure binding peace agreements and to develop a society that is less likely to resort to 
conflict in the future (Henrard 2002: 18). Peace-building measures entails altering structural – 
social, economic and political – contradictions, improving relations between the conflict 
parties and changing individual attitudes and behaviour so as to ensure lasting peace (Abdi 
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2012: 62-64). Generally, conflict resolution attempts to resolve the root causes of conflict and 
develop conditions to prevent the resurgence of conflict (Fearnely and Chiwandamira 2006: 
10). 
On the other hand, conflict management, which serves as the framework for this research, 
entails third party measures to alleviate the dangers of conflict, lessening actual or potential 
suffering as well as  containing, controlling and ending on-going conflict (Wallensteen 2011: 
5; Viotti and Kauppi 2001: 196; Butler 2009: 1). This involves attempts to minimize 
suffering, prevent conflict from escalating and creating conditions for non-violent settlements 
of conflict. Unlike the ambitious nature of conflict resolution that extends to the 
transformation of social, political, economic and cultural institutions and practices that 
sustain conflict, conflict management has a narrow scope (Butler, 2009: 15). Rather than 
aspiring to tackle underlying causes of conflict, conflict management has a clear, feasible and 
widely applicable aim of managing the deleterious effects of conflict.  
Conflict management enjoys greater justification given its aim of not only lessening the 
dangers of conflict for the community or nation directly involved in the conflict. Rather, it 
also aspires to lessen the dangers of conflict for communities that are not directly involved 
such as neighbouring states and the international community at large. Its narrow scope of 
protecting civilians and containing conflicts makes conflict management pragmatic and 
widely accepted in international relations unlike conflict resolution which seems to interfere 
in the deep issues and structures of sovereign states to end conflict and restore peace and 
security (Butler 2009). Apart from being a one track form of international intervention, 
conflict management is also instrumental in creating non-violent and stable environment for 
conflict resolution to take place. Thus, there are conceptual thin lines between conflict 
management and conflict resolution as both can (often) take place at the same time. As 
conflict management measures create stable and violent-free or less violent environment, 
conflict resolution measures takes place (Viotti and Kauppi 2001). 
In terms of conflict management, third parties could seek to contain conflicts via the use 
and/or the threat of the use of force; the use of legal, normative and extra-legal institutions to 
enable belligerents settle their differences legally; and the use of other diplomatic measures to 
enable aggressors to broker agreements (Butler 2009: 14). As noted by Butler (2009: 22), 
conflict management involves mediation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Mediatory 
efforts of conflict management are manifest in the attempts to attain ceasefire agreements and 
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peace agreements between warring parties to facilitate peacemaking (Wallensteen 2011: 8). 
The ceasefire and peace agreements often bind warring parties to the cessation of all violent 
action against each other to facilitate negotiation and diplomatic resolutions of conflict 
(Wallensteen 2011: 9).  
In cases where ceasefire agreements are reached, the international community may establish 
peacekeeping missions to ensure adherence to the terms of the agreement, alleviate tension, 
stabilize hotspots and protect civilian populations. In this regard, peacekeeping involves the 
expeditionary use of police and/or military personnel to prevent armed conflicts as well as to 
enforce, observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements as 
delineated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Williams 2010: 2). Butler (2011: 70,162) 
observes that peacekeeping operations unlike military intervention are not meant to forcefully 
end or alter a conflict, restore order or arrest war criminals by force (Butler, 2011: 70). 
Significantly, peacekeepers are deployed to conflict zones after the cessation of widespread 
armed violence so as to maintain or encourage a non-violent environment, to monitor 
ceasefire agreements and to enable peace processes to take place (Butler 2011: 70; Abdi 
2012: 61).  
Peacekeeping missions are contingent on the permission from the governments (and warring 
parties) of directly concerned states. This shows that peacekeeping upholds the principle of 
state sovereignty and respects the principle of non-intervention. Central to peacekeeping 
effort is impartiality as peacekeepers are expected to be impartial to the warring parties 
(Dawson 2004: 1). Peacekeepers are supposed to possess deterrent capacities to prevent and 
forestall warring parties from engaging in violent actions. Peacekeeping helps to contain and 
stabilize conflict situation until negotiations produce lasting peace. It helps in facilitating a 
transition from conflict to peace (Dawson 2004: 1). Thus, peacekeeping could run 
concurrently with peacemaking and peace-building efforts. 
Peace enforcement is another least highlighted form of conflict management. Peace 
enforcement as defined by Butler (2011: 160) entails a third-party intervention in a violent 
conflict scenario in order to bring an end to the conflict as mandated in Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.  This involves the use of military coercion to ‘create or impose, by force, a 
cessation in hostilities so as to provide the conditions amenable to the negotiation of a cease-
fire or peace agreement (or to help maintain that cessation)’ (Butler 2011: 160). The mandate 
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for peace enforcement can occur when the international community has determined that 
peace or its conditions is only attainable by a third party intervention.  
Peace enforcers reserve the mandate to defend non-combatants who are under attack or threat 
of attack or to militarily engage with armed combatants who are impervious to the calls for 
peace (Butler 2011: 162). This mission unlike peacekeeping requires only an imperfect 
consent as it can be carried out with the permission of the parties involved as well as when 
the parties involved express no desire for peace (Butler 2011: 163). Thus, the enemy for 
peace enforcers is the persistent aggression, not the warring parties. The mission is also 
required to be centred on the principles of impartiality and neutrality as the mission is not 
aimed at helping or targeting any party to the conflict. The failed US led UN intervention in 
Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is sometimes considered as an example of peace 
enforcement mission because the intervention was taken without the consent of a Somali 
government given the lack of a Somalia central government to seek consent from and the 
perpetual nature of the conflict.  
While the foregoing peace operations – peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement – require some form of consent from host states, the international community 
may intervene militarily in conflict situations without any consent of the host state (Dawson, 
2004: 1). This intervention dubbed ‘military intervention’ is also referred to as humanitarian 
intervention. It involves the use of military force to provide humanitarian aid to civilians, 
protect civilian population, prevent genocide and crimes against humanity and/or to coerce 
belligerents to engage in peaceful negotiations (Viotti and Kauppi 2001). Military 
interventions are expected to come as a last resort to conflict scenarios (Powell, 2005: 8)
23
. 
Unlike peace enforcement, military intervention is carried out without a prior attempt to seek 
the consent of the host government/or belligerents. Military interventions aim primarily to 
protect civilian population from egregious human right abuses and to provide humanitarian 
aid to the civilian population without necessarily imposing peace or its conditions on the host 
state as in the case of peace enforcement (Powell, 2005: 8).  
Generally, third party interventions – especially military/humanitarian interventions – in the 
internal affairs of member states continue to raise concerns in international relations. When 
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 While some analysts deem humanitarian intervention to refer solely to armed interventions by third 
parties, others consider humanitarian intervention to include both military and non-military 
interventions. This dissertation however uses humanitarian intervention to refer to interventions that 
are military in nature. 
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humanitarian interventions occur as in the case of Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Ivory Coast and Libya, questions arise around its legitimacy and commensurability with the 
principle of sovereignty (ICISS, 2001; Kaldor, 2007). Yet, when it is neglected as witnessed 
in Rwanda in 1994 and currently in Syria, the international community’s commitment to 
human rights and global peace and security is questioned.  
The controversy around humanitarian interventions has to do mainly with its contradiction 
with the principle of sovereignty, and the fear of abuse of weaker states by powerful states 
under the guise of protecting civilians (Gottwald, 2012: 10; Bellamy, 2008: 616). 
Humanitarian intervention contravenes the right to sovereignty established in the 1648 Treaty 
of Westphalia and the principle of non-intervention as endorsed in Article 2.4 of the United 
Nations Charter (Kioko, 2003: 809). The principle of sovereignty entails that states have the 
right to self-determination and self-rule without external interference. Thus, under what 
circumstances should other states or non-state actors violate the dominant principle of 
sovereignty? 
 
2.4.2  Rhetoric on Security: From State to International Security 
Prior to the end of Cold War era, national security dominated the idea of security in world 
politics (Baylis 2005: 300). Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the international political 
system has been dominated by the sovereign form of political arrangements. By virtue of 
being an internationally recognized state, a state possesses the right to sovereignty, an 
‘exclusive and final jurisdiction over territory, as well as resources and populations that lie 
within the territory’ (Cusimano 2000: 2). Emerging from western political thought, the 
principle of sovereignty gradually spread all over the world as the right form of political 
organization. Sovereign states had the right to be internally organized into different forms of 
government; autocracy, theocracy, monarchy, dictatorship, democracy, etc. Sovereign states 
were entitled to relate with its citizens as it pleases and contend with its internal affairs 
without interference from external forces (Cusimano 2000: 2). With the dominance of realism 
in global politics, the state is conceived as the major actor in the international system. 
Under the paradigm of an anarchical international system, states bear the onus of providing 
for their security and survival (Butler 2009: 27). State governments pride themselves as the 
providers of security to their citizens as well as the bearer of the onus to ensure citizen’s 
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security from external forces. The international community saw its role as mainly preserving 
the sovereignty of states and protecting states against attacks from external forces. The 
United Nations emerged in 1945 with the commitment to maintain international peace and 
security via the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of its 
member states as endorsed in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter (ICISS 2001: 13).  
National security (sometimes regime security) was considered primary to any other form of 
security prior to the demise of the Cold War era. As noted by Cilliers (2004: 8) the dominant 
theories of international legal practice prior to end of the Cold War era recognize that both 
individual and international security is dependent on national security. However, in 
contemporary discourses in international relations, the idea of security has shifted from 
national security to human security – individual, societal, ethnic and group security (Kaldor 
2007; Cilliers 2004; Gottwald 2012: 8). The foregoing paradigm shift in the concept of 
security was precipitated by the post-Cold War turn-out of events across the globe.  
After the end of the Cold War, the United States and European powers enjoyed unrivalled 
influence in global politics. Western values of democracy and market economics were sold to 
both willing and unwilling states (Destradi 2010). This precipitated the globalization of the 
international system, the expansion of market and networking forces, and the universalization 
of democratic tenets which placed more value on individual and civil rights than the state 
more than before (Ekeus 2001: 519). Added to this is the fact that after the Cold War, 
regionalism gathered momentum and hence the power of domestic governments to do as they 
please was pitted against mounting opposition (Lehmann and Steinhilber 2006: 2). Informed 
by globalization and democratic principles, individuals and civil groups became more 
assertive of their interests in their respective states even if it means using force to achieve 
their aim.  
Cusimano (2000: 4) is informative in noting that since the demise of the Cold War era, the 
world recorded more intra-state conflicts, decline of inter-state conflicts and decline in state 
power. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, illegitimate regimes lost external 
protection and legitimacy and were left in the cold. Latent opposition groups quickly felt 
emboldened to fight for their cause relentlessly even with the use of force. Besides, given that 
trans-national non-state actors have an increasing hold on Cold War-proliferated weapons, 
opposition groups as well as unpopular governments accessed weapons effortlessly to further 
their cause (Reilly 2008:18). As observed by Butler (2009: 51), 30 out of 33 main armed 
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conflicts between 1991 and 2009 are intra-state conflicts
24
. In the post-Cold War World, 
intra-state conflict predominate international agenda and threaten the collapse of states.  
Significantly, technological advancements as well as the development of the media industry 
led to a generous coverage of the gruesome nature of intra-state conflicts. Increasingly, the 
domestic issues of states whether political, economic or social is made available to people 
across the globe (Gottwald 2012: 6). The awful images of conflict and the sufferings of 
people within a particular sovereign state provoke the sympathy of citizens in other sovereign 
states. Due to the media coverage of events in conflict states, the horrific sight of violence 
and bloodletting in states undergoing civil war and armed conflict seem as though it is 
happening to citizens of other sovereign states and it reinforces the idea of our common 
humanity. Particularly, the horrendous images of the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnians by the 
Serbs and the 1994 Rwandan genocide challenged the international community’s exclusive 
conception of security from the perspective of the state.  
Apart from the universality of the right of all people to live in a peaceful environment as 
against the associated anguish resulting from conflict, the international community is 
cognizant of the threats posed by intra-state conflicts to world peace and security. Intra-state 
conflicts have turned many states into failed and crisis states. Such states have provided 
grounds for international criminal activities, terrorism, piracy, nuclear and drug trafficking, 
refugee flows, the spread of diseases, etc. (Cusimano 2000: 4). Intrastate conflicts on the 
other hand are notorious for metastasizing into regional conflicts thereby disrupting free trade 
and international peace and security. Cusimano (2000: 12) notes that ‘when sovereign states 
collapse, the international system feels the shock waves’. Thus, there seems to be a strong 
correlation between human security and global peace and security.  
The 2004 UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change maintains 
that any threat to a state and to human life en masse constitutes a threat to international 
security. This new security paradigm of the post-Cold War world entails that the well-being 
of citizens within states takes more precedence than national security. Human security turned 
into everyone’s business and has become the pillar of national and international security 
(Cusimano 2012: 11). The traditional conception of national security became dislodged to 
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human security. The concept of human security focuses on the security of individuals, groups 
and societies rather than state security. In its 2003 report entitled Human Security Now: 
Protecting and Empowering People, the Commission on Human Security, launched at the 
2000 UN Millennium Summit, underscores that human security encompasses human 
protection and human development and interconnects peace, security and sustainable 
development.  
The notion of human security was first propagated in the 1994 Human Development Report 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Kaldor 2007: 182). The UNDP 
Report identifies seven elements of human security: economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security 
(Kaldor 2007: 182). The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report shifted the discourse on 
security from its state centric-militaristic terms by defining human security as the the freedom 
from fear and from want. Drawing on the 1994 UNDP’s notion of human security, 
subsequent debate about human security was either based on minimalist or on maximalist 
perspectives. On a minimalist sense, human security is narrowly approached as ‘freedom 
from fear’. This human security concept has to do with the safety of each individual from 
direct physical threat and the satisfaction of basic needs. On a maximalist a base, human 
security is broadly viewed as ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ comprising the 
seven security dimensions observed by the UNDP (Gottwald 2012: 8). 
Critics of the maximalist/broad notion of human security identify the difficulty involved in 
ascertaining where to draw the line between what should be on the list of human security and 
what should not especially (Gottwald 2012: 8). It is also a dilemma ascertaining if a single 
state necessarily bears the onus of satisfying all the security dimensions as listed by the 
UNDP (Gottwald 2012: 9). In our interdependent world, a state’s effort alone can hardly 
assure economic security, food security, environmental security, health security, among 
others.  Even political stability and security cannot be realized by one state alone. The 
political, economic and social conditions of external actors have sway in the internal security 
conditions of states. The insecurities caused by armed conflicts in a particular state, for 
example, threaten human lives and could pose enormous threats to international peace and 
security in the form of refugee flows, spread of diseases, terrorism and the extension of 
internal conflict into regional crises. Thus, there is no state that could claim to be unaffected 
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by external factors. This implies that no state could provide full security to its citizen on its 
own. 
In tandem with Buzan (1991), the broadening of the concept of security as espoused by 
UNDP leads to a greater platform for external involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign 
states. Based on realist framework, Buzan in his work People, States and Fear, insists that 
the state bears the primary and ultimate prerogative to satisfy the conditions of human 
security (Buzan 1991). For Buzan, in the anarchic international system, citizens are more 
secured within the state and the political goods and services it offers. In cases of state 
weakness, failure or crisis, Buzan insists that states ought to be empowered to grow strong to 
protect and provide security rather than being dislodged as the primary referent of security 
(Naidoo 2001: 3).  
Nevertheless, in our contemporary world where no single state can ensure security of its 
territory, multilateral state organizations are increasingly being relied on to coordinate and 
enforce security initiatives especially when states fail to provide security. In fact, based on a 
postmodernist framework, states should be dislodged as the primary referent in the discourse 
of human security (Naidoo 2001). Based on the postmodernist framework, it is somewhat 
problematic to rely on the state to provide security to its citizens as states can be the 
precipitants of human insecurities. The Postmodern approach begins with the premise 
emphasizing the decline in state power and the increasing inability of the state to perform 
traditional state function in the face of globalization (Naidoo 2001: 6). With state sovereignty 
under severe challenges due to the increasing interdependent nature of the international 
system, other systems should be relied on for the provision of security. For postmodernists, 
non-state actors ‘such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and just about 
all humankind’ are expected to play primary roles in enhancing human security (Naidoo 
2001: 3). 
 
2.4.3  The Doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
As intra-state conflicts soared in the post-Cold War world, the international community 
continued to look for justifications for humanitarian interventions to promote human security 
as well as world peace and security. In any consideration of humanitarian intervention, 
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several questions arise around its legitimacy, compatibility with the principle of sovereignty, 
its successes and consequences as well as the justness of the operation (ICISS 2001; Kioko 
2003: 809; Kaldor 2007). Yet, the failure of the international community to intervene to avert 
the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the massacre of thousands of people seeking shelter in 
UN-supposed ‘safe areas’ in Srebrenica in 1995 raised questions around the extent of the 
international community’s respect and concern for human security. Generally, when 
humanitarian intervention occurs as in Somalia, Bosnia, etc. and when it is neglected as in the 
case of Rwanda, it is always a controversial issue in the international realm. In a world 
organized around the principle of sovereignty, it remains contentious to respond to intra-state 
conflicts. Under what circumstances should third parties violate the dominant principle of 
sovereignty to respond to intra-state conflicts? From whence does the right to humanitarian 
intervention lie? 
As discussed in the previous section, the nexus between human security and global peace and 
security entails that states cannot afford to sit and watch while other states are destroyed by 
internal conflicts. The international community continues to express growing intolerance to 
severe human insecurities within conflict states. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace report argues that the time for sacrosanct 
sovereignty has passed (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 3). Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-
General, in his 20
th
 September 1999 Report to the United Nations General Assembly, argues 
that despite the limitations and imperfections of humanitarian intervention, ‘it is testimony to 
a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do 
more, and not less, to end it’ (cited in Kaldor 2007: 16). Nevertheless the conditions for 
humanitarian intervention and the authority to authorize the intervention remain vague and 
contentious (Evans 2006: 703). 
In his landmark article in 1999 to the United Nations General Assembly, Kofi Annan argues 
in line with Francis Deng’s claim
25
, that the principle of sovereignty contained in the UN 
Charter be interpreted as a responsibility to adequately carry out both domestic and external 
duties (cited in Gottwald 2012: 9). In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in the 
subsequent year (2000), Annan made compelling pleas for the international community to set 
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up a commission to bridge the gap between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention given 
the lack of legal document and cohesive doctrine that justify and authorize humanitarian 
intervention. 
In 2001, the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS)
26
 was set up to investigate the chasm between sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention. After its inquiry, the ICISS 2001 report stresses that state 
sovereignty entails responsibility. In line with the traditional view of security, the state 
possesses the primary responsibility to protect its people. States are expected to use soft 
power instead of military power or state terror to foster cooperation and development in their 
respective states. However, in situations where a state is unwilling or unable to protect its 
citizens, the international community, the broader community of states, assumes the 
responsibility to protect citizens in the state. This international norm known as the 
Responsibility to Protect entails that the international community come to the aid of 
populations ‘suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it’ (ICISS 2001).  
The ICISS pioneering report espouses three core responsibilities embedded in the notion of 
the responsibility to protect: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the 
responsibility to rebuild (ICISS 2001). The responsibility to prevent demands addressing the 
direct and root precipitant of conflicts that expose civilian populations to human insecurity. 
The responsibility to react has to do with responding to human insecurities by using measures 
that range from sanctions, international prosecution to military intervention (ICISS 2001). 
Lastly, the responsibility to rebuild charges the international community to provide recovery, 
reconstructive and reconciliatory assistance to a post-conflict state that has undergone 
military intervention (ICISS 2001).  
In the necessity of exercising the responsibility to react via military intervention, the 2001 
ICISS recommends that the intervention must fulfil six criteria with pedigree on the ‘Just War 
Principles’: just cause, right intention, last resort, proper authority, proportional intervention, 
and reasonable prospect of success. In terms of just cause, the ICISS insists that there must be 
grave and severe harm occurring to human beings such as large scale loss of life and large 
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 ‘Co-Chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, the ICISS comprised 12 Commissioners 
from both the North and South and was charged with the task of confronting key questions 
surrounding intervention for human protection purposes’ (Powell 2005: 7). 
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scale ethnic cleansing to warrant military intervention. The commission envisages the right 
intention for humanitarian intervention to be aimed at averting human suffering
27
.  Military 
intervention should come only as a last resort when non-coercive measures have failed. In 
terms of proportional intervention, the ICISS proposes that the intensity, duration and scale 
of the military intervention should be in proportion with the primary mandate of human 
protection. Before any military intervention, the international community should also 
ascertain if there are reasonable prospects of success. Finally, all military intervention ought 
to be rightly authorized by the United Nations Security Council (ICISS 2001). 
In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN member states agreed on three main 
components of the responsibility to protect as submitted by the ICISS (Gottwald 2012: 10). 
Firstly, every state formally recognizes the responsibility of sovereigns to protect their own 
citizens. Secondly, UN member states pledge to develop institutional capacities and 
mechanisms to prevent mass atrocities and genocide and to help states meet the challenge of 
providing security to its citizens (Gottwald 2012: 10). Thirdly, when deemed necessary, the 
UN Security Council bears the authority to intervene or authorize intervention when a 
particular state in question fails or is unwilling to protect civilians in line with Chapter VI and 
VII of the UN Charter (Bizos, 2011:6)
28
. After the 2005 UN World Summit, the doctrine of 
the responsibility to protect gained widespread international recognition and acceptance. 
Critics accuse the 2001 ICISS commission for infiltrating the concept of human security into 
the principle of sovereignty to justify external meddling in internal affairs of states. In 
situations of intrastate conflict, some experts like Micheal Walzer have argued that the right 
to self-determination enshrined in the principle of sovereignty demands that states should sort 
out their internal crises without external interference (cited in Calhoun 2001: 5). Article 2.1 
of the UN Charter recognizes the sovereignty of states under the international law as the most 
important aspect of the international system.  Sovereignty tends to be sometimes the only line 
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 Kofi Annan contends that intervention must be cosmopolitan in nature (cited in Calhoun 2001: 5). 
For him, what matters is the ‘overall good of humanity; every life is equal to every other life’. 
28
 However, during the 2005 World Summit, members states failed to adopt the six criteria for 
exercising the responsibility to react. Rather, the summit recommended an ongoing review and 
consideration of the criteria. Bellamy (2008: 626) notes that ‘Whereas several African states endorsed 
the view that criteria were essential to making the Security Council’s decisions more transparent, 
accountable (to the wider membership) and hence legitimate, the United States, China and Russia 
opposed them—though for very different reasons: the United States because it believed that criteria 
would limit its freedom of action, the others because they feared that criteria might be used to 
circumvent the Council’. 
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of defense for most states in an anarchical international system marked by differences and 
inequalities in power and resources (ICISS 2001).  
Besides, it is difficult for outsiders to adequately understand the dynamics of internal 
conflicts. External intervention may turn out to become one-sided and un-strategic given the 
limitedness of external diagnosis of the deep-seated internal issues involved. The 2011 
NATO intervention in Libya is sometimes seen as a one-sided intervention against Gadhafi’s 
regime. This goes against the principle of impartiality which military interventions ought to 
champion. External interventions may also lead to the escalation of internal conflicts and a 
prolonged conflict resolution measures aimed at resolving the crises (Crocker, 2001: 231). 
The US led UN intervention in Somalia is an example were some analysts adjudged external 
intervention to fuel and intensify conflict.  
In The Curse of Inclusive Intervention, Edward Luttwak (2001) argues that wars should be 
allowed to follow their natural course which is an end. For Luttwak (2001), intervening in 
war situations only ends up prolonging the war. When wars are stopped via ceasefire 
agreements or international peace operations, warring parties regroup, retrain and rearm 
themselves for a reinvigorated conflict. In support of his claims, Luttwak (2001) adduces the 
example of the Arab-Israel War of 1948 – 1949 where (as he claimed) the intervention of the 
UN Security Council gave the belligerents the opportunity to rearm and continue the arms 
struggle which could have ended in few weeks. In line with Luttwak (2001), wars should be 
allowed to ripen and warring parties should be allowed to attain victory, reach a mutual 
exhaustion or lack the necessary arms to further their armed struggles. 
However, experiences like the 1994 Rwandan genocide have shown that international 
involvement in conflict situations when necessary is crucial. There is no guarantee that 
internal conflicts will ebb away if left alone. At times, internal conflicts metastasize to 
become regional conflicts like the case of Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda 
and Congo. The foregoing conflict states dragged other neighbouring states into the conflicts 
as well. For instance, the conflict in Somalia dragged other countries like Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Eritrea into the conflict. The nature of conflict turned into a complex and prolonged 
regional security conundrum. The internal crisis of Somalia also led to the problems of 
refugee flows, spread of diseases, trafficking, piracy, etc. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict has 
also overflowed into neighboring states such as Turkey and Lebanon. The ICISS argues that 
the principle of non-intervention entails that states should solve their own internal problems 
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to avoid the conflict spilling over to neighbouring countries as well as becoming an issue of 
international peace and security (ICISS 2001: 31). Hence, issues that pose actual and 
potential threat to international peace and security demand international responses
29
 (ICISS 
2001: 13).  
In justification of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the ICISS observes that Article 
24 of the UN Charter charges the Security Council with the responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security. Thus, the UN has the mandate to intervene in the internal 
affairs of member states for the sake of world peace and security. By virtue of being a 
member of the UN, sovereign states bind themselves voluntarily to the responsibilities 
demanded by the UN Charter. The human rights law as endorsed in UN Charter, 
Conventions, Treaties and Declarations demands adherence from member states. Hence, the 
doctrine of the responsibility to protect is not merely a fabrication to provide leeway for 
powerful states to dominate and undermine the sovereignty of weaker states as espoused by 
critics of humanitarian intervention (Gottwald 2012: 10; Bellamy 2008: 616).  
To add to the credibility of external intervention, sources from Non-Governmental 
organizations like the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), High 
Commissioners for Human Rights and for Refugees, human rights groups, etc. provide useful 
information about the nature of conflicts. These humanitarian aid institutions sometimes call 
for urgent intervention in affected states to protect civilians from gross human atrocities 
(Anderson 2001). Their view and recommendation for military intervention somehow 
justifies political decisions for intervention and shows that it is not (always) an ulterior 
political action to invade another state
30
. 
In its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS deliberately avoided the use of 
the terms ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘military intervention’ thereby shifting the attention 
from the right to intervene to the responsibility to protect citizens (Kioko 2003: 809; Bellamy 
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 Some observers are keen to note that in a globalized world bedevilled by threats to international 
security, the current notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is narrow as it only makes reference to 
worst case scenarios (Scanlon et al 2007: 7). Must the international community wait for worst cases to 
intervene in order to promote human and international security? However, proponents of the 
responsibility to protect argue that adding broader mandates that encompass the concern for human 
security would only end up making the concept vague and difficult for consensual response when 
need arises (Scanlon et al 2007:18). However, with the scope of the responsibility to protect, the 
international community has a clear principle and guide for action. 
30
 NGOs are sometimes criticised for picking sides with a political group and calling for international 





. Alex Bellamy (2008: 618) contends that the responsibility to protect is well 
placed to reduce the appeal for policy-makers to dwell exclusively on military responses by 
providing them with other non-coercive forms of interventions. Moreover, in the necessity of 
intervention, the protection of human lives is the actual and vivid mandate of interveners and 
nothing more.  
Additionally, Bellamy (2008: 630) argues that the broad measures of the responsibility to 
protect prevent ‘moral hazards
32
’ that may result from opportunists purposefully inciting 
intra-state conflicts and seeking external intervention for their narrow interests. Opportunists 
only seek to replace prevalent leaderships for selfish reasons without any meaningful 
alternative to the kind of rule that they seek to topple. For instance, it is difficult to see any 
meaningful alternative proffered by the M23 rebel group if they should replace the incumbent 
government of the DRC. According to Bellamy (2008: 632), the responsibility to protect 
actually allows the use of force by a state against supposed rebels unless the force amounts to 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Most significantly, 
responsibility to protect doctrine places the individual at the centre of security analysis. 
Criteria for Evaluation 
Based on the theoretical framework and concepts considered in this chapter, the evaluation of 
the African Union’s interventionist role shall be based on the following: 
Civilian protection: This criterion of evaluation requires that an effective African 
Union in terms of the military approach to conflict management would be based on 
the regional body’s capacity to provide protection to civilians. This criterion has its 
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 The excessive reliance on military force for the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 as 
well as its poor planning, coordination and execution gives little support for humanitarian 
intervention. The intervention ended up fuelling the Somali conflict as evident in the increased armed 
conflict between the UNOSOM forces and the various warring factions in Somalia. The poor 
reception of the external forces and the killings and desecration of US and UN forces tended to show 
that aversion of the predominantly Islamic Somali society towards foreign influences. In terms of the 
proportional force used, the alleged excessive interventions in states like Kosovo and Libya tend to 
undermine humanitarian intervention.   
32
 Alan Kuperman used the term ‘moral hazard’ to refer to the phenomenon whereby the provision of 
protection against risk encourages or enables risk-taking behaviour. For example, Kuperman argues 
that talk of military intervention in Kosovo in 1998 emboldened the Kosovo Liberation Army, 
encouraging it to use violence to provoke Serbian reprisals and take an uncompromising political 
position to secure NATO intervention. The reality is often more tragic: in most circumstances, having 
inadvertently encouraged violent rebellion by promises of intervention, international society does not 




pedigree on the objective of conflict management which is centered around lessening 
the dangers of conflict for civilians. Moreover, the human security principle accords 
greater security to individuals and charges the international community to protect 
civilians against gross human violations through the responsibility to protect doctrine. 
This criterion serves as one of the main standards for estimating the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of the African Union in terms of conflict management. 
 
Capacity: This criterion entails the assessment of the African Union’s capacity – in 
terms of will, commitment and resources – to engage in conflict management. This 
criterion goes in line with the responsibility to protect doctrine which mandates third 
party interveners to have the required will, commitment and resources to attain 
success. To evaluate an effective intervention, the African Union ought to 
demonstrate a considerable willingness and commitment to wrestle with the conflict 
of its member state. The regional body ought to provide required troops and commit 
resources for its missions. 
 
Planning and execution: This criterion entails that the African Union’s interventions 
ought to be timely with clear and well-planned mandate and precision in terms of 
implementation.  The regional body ought to show that its intervention on the ground 
was well planned with clear objectives. This criterion also requires the African Union 
to display considerable responsibility, control and ownership of its missions in 
conflict states. This is to explore whether the regional body has been able to 
adequately operationalize the political ideal of African solutions to African problems. 
Finally, this criterion helps to estimate the current achievement of the African Union 
in mission areas. 
 
Conclusion  
In the first section of this chapter, relevant concepts useful for the understanding of the 
context of the study on the African Union were considered. This section examined the 
concept of conflict management and its features – peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and 
military intervention – which are geared towards containing conflicts and protecting civilian 
populations and establishing non-violent environment for political solutions to take place. It 
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goes further to look into the principles of human security and the responsibility to protect 
doctrine which places more value on individual rights and the responsibility of the 
international community to protect civilians when states are unwilling or unable to.  
The second section of this chapter reviews the relevant literature that examines the efforts of 
the African Union at promoting and enforcing peace and security in Africa. From the review, 
this study outlines its pertinence by looking into the African Union’s military approach to 
conflict management as against most reviews that conflate AU’s conflict resolution and 
conflict management interventions. The third section on the other hand explores the 
theoretical framework (liberal institutionalism) upon which the research is conceived. The 
tenets of liberal institutionalism provide a suitable platform for the assessment of the African 
Union as an institution with a mandate to promote and enforce peace and security. The 
subsequent chapter shall expound the grounds favourable for the establishment of the African 
Union and how the regional body intends to confront African problems particularly the 











African Union’s Responsibility to Protect 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter establishes the political and institutional legitimacy and responsibility of the 
African Union to respond to the conflicts in Africa. Section one explores the basis for 
institutional cooperation between African states to respond to the continent’s security 
problems. The second section examines the rationale behind the emergence of the African 
Union to replace its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. The chapter goes further 
in the third section to consider the African Union’s institutional bodies that are responsible 
for contending with issues of peace and security in Africa. 
3.2  Motivations for pan-African Regional Security 
In light of the continent’s insecurities, the international community has intervened severally 
in the African continent. As the primary agent coordinating international peace and security 
agenda as endorsed in Chapters IV and V of the UN Charter, the United Nations via the 
Security Council has made efforts to contain security threats in Africa. In cases of armed 
conflict, Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates the UN Security Council to take 
enforcement measures to restore international peace and security (Agada 2008: 2). Pan (2005: 
1) notes that there have been over fifty-four UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa since 
1948
33
. As noted by the Human Security Brief 2007 the peace operations in Africa have led to 
the 60% reduction of the number and magnitude of conflicts in Africa since the mid-1990s 
(Williams 2010: 1).   
However, the huge responsibilities of the UN Security Council across the globe constitute a 
huge challenge to the organization’s efficiency (Ekeus 2001: 519; Franke 2006: 1). It has 
become increasingly clear to the UN that it cannot effectively tackle the conflicts and security 
threats across the globe all by itself. Rof Ekeus (2001: 519) notes that the UN is faced with 
the challenges of lack of political will, abuse of veto power, legitimacy, financial constraints 
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 50,000 of the 65,000 UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide in 2005 were deployed to Africa (Pan 
2005: 1). Williams (2010: 1) notes that the United Nations has spent over $32 billion on its 12 
peacekeeping operation in Africa since 2000. From 2000 to 2010, there have been over 40 United 
Nations-sponsored peace operations in 14 African states (Williams 2010: 1). 
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as well as the preponderance of intractable conflicts across the globe. These preclude the 
organization from effectively dealing with the security threats in Africa. Bergholm (2010: 6) 
notes that UN peace operations in Africa reduced drastically from a 51% uniformed 
personnel of about 40, 000 forces present in Africa out of 78,400 personnel deployed in 1993 
to a 16% presence in Africa out of the worldwide 10,000 deployed uniformed UN 
peacekeepers in 1999. This drastic reduction did not correspond to a reduction of conflict 
levels in Africa as major wars were fought in Africa between 1993 and 1999 in countries like 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Besides this reality, about 16 conflicts were going on in 
Africa in 1999 (Bergholm 2010: 6)
 34
. UN expenditures for peace operations also reduced in 
Africa from around $3 billion in 1993 to 1.3 billion in 1999 (Bergholm 2010: 6).  
These reductions expose the UN’s dwindling capacity to handle the problems of a continent 
infected by complex conflicts and challenges. One of the most recounted failures of the UN 
in Africa is its failure to stop the massive killings of people during the Rwandan genocide in 
1994. Beside the passivity of the UN during the Rwandan genocide, the failure of the UN to 
respond appropriately to the state collapse and crisis in Somalia, the armed conflicts in DRC, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s as well as other socio-political and economic 
challenges in the continent adds to the imperative for a strong regional organization to 
contend closely with African problems (Williams 2011: 4). Moreover, most African states 
were undergoing the hardship of insurgencies, political instabilities, poverty, 
underdevelopment and state failure without any coordinated international effort to confront 
such challenges.  
Cognizant of its limitations, the United Nations recognizes the pivotal role of regional 
organizations to the peace and security of their regions (Peck 2001: 562). The UN Charter 
expresses great need for partnership with regional organizations to attain international peace 
and security (Ekeus 2001: 522). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter enjoins regional 
organizations to take first necessary steps to resolve regional conflicts. To coordinate peace 
initiatives, regional organizations are expected to keep the UN Security Council informed in 
their decisions for peace and security and their interventions should be authorized by the 
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 The UN/US failed intervention in Somali crisis between 1992 and 1995 had tended to discourage 
foreign powers from intervening in African conflicts until the twenty-first century. The crises in 
Somalia – if not the whole conflicts in Africa – was deemed hopeless situations in western eyes in the 
1990s. UN and foreign interest in African conflicts was only re-ignited with the war against terror 
inspired by the 9/11 terrorist attack in US. 
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Council in line with Chapter VIII, Articles 52, 53 and 54 (Williams 2011: 17; Peck 2001: 
562).  
Peck (2001: 562) argues that the advantage of regional organizations is that they are more 
conversant with issues within their regions than the United Nations. Regional members who 
are neighbours to a state in conflict are also affected by the conflict. Hence, they are urged to 
find solutions to solve the problems of their neighbouring states (Bizos, 2011: 9; Franke, 
2006: 6). Neighbouring states are able to influence the resolution of conflict in a state in 
conflict due to the importance of maintaining a good relationship with neighbours
35
.  
Moreover, given the history of colonialism as well as the suspicious external meddling in the 
African continent by Western powers, interventions from non-African forces have come 
under severe criticism from political leaders, academics and most significantly, the people or 
regimes for whom the intervention and efforts are meant for. Even after independence, 
African states continue to witness several external interferences due to the weak and 
vulnerable nature of African states. For some scholars, post-colonial African states are 
artificial, weak or even failed states ab initio (Osaghae 2007: 696; Brown 2001).  
Taking advantage of the weakness of African states, foreign powers during the Cold War era 
meddled in African affairs by trying to promote their political ideologies on the African 
continent and to exploit its resources. The demise of Cold War era did not translate into the 
freedom of African states to determine their goals. The intra-state conflicts that predominates 
the security concerns in post-Cold War Africa provided grounds for an even greater meddling 
of foreign powers in Africa. Even if it is well intended, external intervention in Africa 
conjures up images of colonialism, imperialism and the blatant display of superiority by 
Western powers in particular (Somerville 1990: 1). Foreign interventions tarnish the dignity 
and pride of Africa as it portrays Africans as being savage and incapable of articulating and 
solving their own issues and must await external powers to come to their rescue (Ayittey 
1994; Somerville 1990: 1).  
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 Nevertheless, the familiarity of neighboring states to the conflict in nearby states could have a huge 
implication to the principle of impartiality as they may tend to favour one conflict party than the 
other. Neighboring states could also use the conflicts in nearby states for their own narrow interests as 
in the case of the DRC were Rwanda and Uganda were accused of aiding in the perpetuation of the 
conflict so as to illegally tap the country’s mineral resources diamonds. Regional organizations also 




Worryingly, the parochial interests of foreign powers with regard to African mineral wealth 
make the continent vulnerable to external meddling from foreign powers. For its high-
technology industries, France, for instance, is dependent on a number of raw materials and 
energy resources in the African continent (Renou 1999).  Its need to access African cheap 
materials on a permanent basis has informed its friendly and interventionist policies mainly in 
its erstwhile colonies in West Africa. In reference to French policies in Africa from 
independence till the late 1990s, Xavier Renou (1999) notes that under different forms of 
agreements, there are about 38 African countries engaged in cooperation with France. On its 
own part, France supplies the regimes with weapons, logistic supports, training of soldiers 
and officers and the protection of the regimes from aggressions. On the other hand, France 
gains the favour of African leaders who are willing to ensure that France has the monopoly to 
the raw materials in their countries
36
. 
The interest of the U.S. and other Europeans in Africa is continually growing as more 
resources are discovered in Africa. Williams (2011: 1) is instructive in noting that Africa 
‘offers profitable business opportunities, especially in the energy, telecommunication, and 
minerals sectors’. In the face of the growing Chinese and Indian influence in the African 
continent, USA and European powers with strategic interests in Africa are engaging in a new 
scramble for African resources. As such, it is possible for the continent to experience more 
external meddling under the guise of responsibility to protect and human security 
justifications. For Ayittey (1994), the complexities of local particularities cannot be solved by 
impulsive and ulterior foreign solution and strategies. Because of the suspicious nature of 
external intervention, any long-term solution to the recurring conflicts in Africa ought to 
come from Africans.  
The foregoing challenges which range from the UN’s inability to contend with Africa’s 
security issues to the questionable nature of external interventions makes it imperative for 
African states to engage in a stronger cooperation and integration to confront the common 
challenges that they face (Murithi 2009: 93; Williams 2011: 3; Farmer 2012: 95). This is in 
line with the African political ideal of providing African solutions to African problems. 
While arguing for the notion of continental jurisdiction, Ali Mazrui in his 1967 work entitled 
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 Renou (1999) observes that in 1998, 50% of French Official Development Aid of about 18 billion 
Francs was dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa with a bigger share to francophone African states. Using 




Towards a Pax Africana had insisted on African solutions to African problems at a time when 
newly independent states sought to rid themselves from external meddling (cited in Scanlon 
et al 2007: 13). Based on the notion of racial sovereignty, Mazrui deemed foreign 
interventions to be illegitimate. He argues that only inter-African interventions are legitimate 
in the African continent. Building on Mazrui’s arguments, the concept of African solutions to 
African problems turned into a slogan used often by African scholars, policymakers and 
politicians seeking a solution to Africa’s myriad problems (Scanlon et al 2007). 
The notion of African solutions to African problems hinges on the desire of African states to 
be masters of their own destiny. This will firstly help Africans to drive their desire for self-
determination without external interference which re-lives the experience of colonialism in 
Africa (Scanlon et al 2007:13). Here, the analysis, understanding and solution to African 
problems would no longer be based on the view of external powers, views that are imposed 
on Africans and their conditions (Dersso 2012: 22). By decolonizing the understanding and 
solutions to African problems, Africans would then be able to define their challenges, lead 
and drive the effort to remedy the maladies plaguing the continent. It is hoped that African 
problems can truly be solved only when the attempts at ensuring that the solutions to African 
problems are African-oriented and of African provenance.   
Secondly, providing African solutions to African problems empowers Africans to take 
responsibility and readily confront the political, economic and social challenges in the 
continent without suspicious external assistance. By drawing resources together, African 
states with their weaknesses are expected to be able to respond to the challenges of their 
respective states (Parker and Rukare, 2002: 365). Nevertheless, the idea of African solutions 
to African problems does not isolate the involvement of the international community. Rather, 
the idea of African solutions to African problems espouses minimal external involvement
37
 in 
African affairs. It accords Africans the central role in addressing African issues.  
Against this backdrop, the continent’s regional organization seems to be better suited to 
tackle African problems legitimately and credibly. Apuuli (2012: 135) argues that ‘the 
formation of the African Union (AU) was precisely aimed at finding African solutions for 
African problems’ wherever possible. The regional institution mirrors the prevalent idea of 
Pan-Africanism – a desire for a greater solidarity, unity and cooperation between African 
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 The external involvement in African affairs notes the fact that African problems are at times 
precipitated by external factors 
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states to address domestic and global challenges (Parker and Rukare, 2002: 365; Murithi, 
2009:93; Williams, 2011: 3). This is reflected in AU’s vision of ‘an integrated, prosperous 
and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global 
arena’ (African Union, 2013). 
3.3 Evolution of the African Union 
The nature, shape and function of African regional organization have been subjects of 
controversy among African leaders since independence. African leaders such as Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt argued 
that the boundaries that differentiate African states as drawn by colonial powers in 1885 
during the scramble for Africa are quasi and arbitrary (Murithi, 2008). Thus, they argue 
beyond a mere cooperation of African states to a political unification of African states. 
However, other African nationalist leaders express misgivings about a political unification of 
African states which would entail having a political head of Africa. For such leaders, it is 
better to retain national independence based on the state system created by the colonial 
powers. After the failed debate on a political unity of African states (United States of Africa) 
espoused passionately by former President Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana, the first continental 
regional organization was established on the 25
th
 of May 1963 and was called the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU).  
The OAU was expected to drive the then contemporary pan-African agenda of the continent 
which was centred on limiting external involvement in the continent’s affairs and upholding 
the sovereign and territorial integrity of the newly independent states in Africa. Article II of 
the OAU’s 1963 Charter which served as a crucial Article in the Charter has the defence of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa as the 
core objectives of the regional organization. The OAU cherished and upheld the principles of 
non-intervention and anti-imperialism.  
Unfavourably, the OAU’s insistence on the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of 
member states was exposed by its inability to contend with the security threats in the 
continent. The non-interference principle enshrined in the OAU Charter made it incapable for 
the organisation to influence the politics of member states and intervene in the internal crisis 
of member states to prevent gross human right violations (Apuuli, 2012: 136; Tieku, 2007: 
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29). Although the OAU was not primarily formed to combat security problems in Africa, it 
failed to adapt to the post-Cold War insecurities of African states. 
MØller (2009: 6) notes that the non-interventionist norms of OAU led it to be a guardian of 
incumbent state regimes at the expense of the rights of civilians. Moreover, most members of 
OAU came to power via unconstitutional and illegal means and they were notorious for 
human rights abuses. The principle of non-intervention served as a conducive principle for 
them to prevent the interference of other states in their internal affairs and to ensure their 
regime survival and absolute control over their territory. OAU’s intervention in member 
states was only carried out under the custom of a complete consensus by the host state and in 
solidarity with the government (Tieku 2007: 29).  
The intervention of OAU member states in troubled African states was also based on 
solidarity to state regimes. Thus, OAU as well as individual African states were unable to 
contend aptly with conflicts, secessionist struggles and human right abuses in the continent. 
OAU was notorious for ignoring the oppression and sufferings of civilians in repressive states 
and conflict states. The political, social and economic security of citizens seemed to be 
trifling issues for the OAU. The atrocities committed by illegitimate and repressive regimes 
against civilians were left un-criticized, unpunished and unsanctioned by OAU
38
.  
In such situations, dictators and illegitimate regimes thrived (Kioko 2003: 814). The military 
dictatorships of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia, Emperor 
Bokassa 1 of Central Africa, Samuel Doe of Liberia, Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, and Yakubu 
Gowon of Nigeria among many others were left unchecked by OAU. Kioko (2003: 813) 
recounts President Museveni of Uganda’s maiden speech to the Ordinary Session of Heads of 
State and Government of the OAU in 1986. Museveni charged the OAU and its non-
interference principle for overlooking the massive massacre of Ugandans by Idi Amin. In his 
words, Museveni states: 
Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of 
governments that should have protected their lives (…) I must state that Ugandans (…) 
felt a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent (…) the reason for not 
condemning such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of a Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the 
United Nations. We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there are 
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 This earned the OAU Assembly a derogatory name “Heads of State Club” were African leaders 
meet for fun (Kioko, 2003: 814). 
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explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life (quoted in Kioko 
2003: 813). 
Poku et al (2007: 158) note that the 30 years existence of OAU was characterized by 
nonchalance to the domestic affairs of member states thereby entertaining the excesses of 
dictatorial regimes. In accord with MØller (2009: 6), OAU is adjudged to have failed at most 
levels of its objectives politically, economically, militarily and socially. Although OAU 
arguably championed the decolonization and anti-apartheid struggles against the colonialists, 
it lost relevance and effectiveness in a post-Cold War world where intra-state conflicts and 
state failures became rife. In the light of OAU’s constraints in the post-Cold War world, most 
African states faced the jeopardy of failure, civil wars, rebellion and instabilities.  
Osaghae (2007: 691) is instructive in noting that ‘while the image of fragility is historically 
associated with the Third World in general, the focus here is mainly on Africa’. In the failed 
state index, many African states unfortunately tend towards the pinnacle of state failure and 
collapse. State failure and intra-state conflicts bedevilled the bounds of OAU’s objectives, 
principles, institutional mechanisms, political will, financial strength and capabilities (Sesay 
2008:11). The Somali state collapse, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the armed conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC as well as the on-going fighting in Angola and Sudan in the 
1990s exposed the impotence of OAU and highlighted the need for Africans to rise up to the 
challenges in the continent. 
The constraints and inefficiencies of the OAU Charter and objectives in the 1990s meant that 
a more efficient regional organization was long overdue (Apuuli 2012: 136). Moreover, 
OAU’s objective of eradicating every form of colonialism in Africa was arguably attained 
with the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and the attainment of independence from 
colonial powers by all African states. The focus for African leaders redirected to ridding the 
continent of the protracted underdevelopment and conflicts that has wracked African states 
(Laporte and Mackie 2010: 49). 
Contrary to OAU’s non-interference principle, African leaders, since the end of the Cold War 
era, became more conscious that no state can unilaterally address the issues of conflict, the 
massacre of civilians, refugee flows, conscription of child soldiers, illicit small arms trade, 
drug trafficking, and underdevelopment that constitute common threats in the continent 
(Murithi 2009: 95). Poku et al (2007: 1155) observe that African leaders have become 
increasingly aware of the need for a proactive and cooperative approach towards confronting 
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the multiple challenges in the continent. In the late 1990s, it became imperative for African 
leaders to establish a strong regional organization with relevant principles and objectives to 
play an active role in the continent as well as in the global arena (Kioko 2003: 810; Sesay 
2008: 10; National Model United Nations 2008: 5). 
During the Sirte Summit on the 9
th
 of September 1999, Muammar Gaddafi proposed the 
establishment of the United States of Africa (USA model) or alternatively, the Union of 
African States (Soviet Union model)
39
 (Kioko 2003: 811). These entailed a political 
unification of Africa under a federation or confederation system. Having discussed the 
proposal, African leaders jettisoned the federation or confederation proposal given the 
misgivings and divided opinions about the political unification of African states. During the 
same Summit, nevertheless, they agreed on the formation of a stronger and vibrant regional 
organization to accelerate ‘the process of integration in the continent and to enable it play its 
rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and 
political problems compounded’ (African Union 2013).   
As a way of making a major policy and structural shift from OAU’s limitations and 
inefficiencies, African leaders deemed it wise to create a new pan-African organization called 
‘African Union’
 
as a panacea to its predecessor, the OAU (Kerekou 2007:3). At Lome Togo 
in 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted and signed, and was put into 
force in 2001 (African Union, 2013). In July 2002, the African Union was formally 
inaugurated in Durban, South Africa. In concord with the idea of providing African solutions 
to African problems, the African Union is expected to confront the scourge of conflicts that 
had been the bane of political, economic and social development in the continent.  
The move by African leaders to change the name of OAU to AU or rather the move to create 
a new pan-African organization under a new name (African Union) raises concerns among 
some analysts. For Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 10), the organizational change of name 
brings up crucial questions around the significance of a name change on the new organization 
which has the same members, same resources and political will as its predecessor. The 
African Union is still made of the same African leaders that comprise the OAU. They still 
have the challenges of funding, poor political and security record of member states and low 
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 Kwame Nkrumah was a powerful proponent of a politically and economically united Africa as 
evident in his book ‘Africa Must Unite’. Since his unsuccessful argument for the unification of 
African states prior to the formation of the OAU in 1963, the idea of a united Africa lingers on in pan-
African political debates.  
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political will of member states. Would it have been beneficial for African leaders to 
restructure the OAU to contend with contemporary challenges by reviewing its policies and 
institutional mechanisms? What is clear is that the adoption of the new name or rather the 
establishment of a new organization under the name African Union tends to have had positive 
effect on the incumbent continent’s regional organization. As noted by Dersso (2011: 116), 
the transformation from OAU to AU could be considered as a regime change in Africa’s 
regional organization, a normative and institutional change. 
Going with the tide of times, the African Union extends the notion of security beyond the 
state-centric concept to human security (Hanson 2009: 1; Poku et al 2007: 1158). The 
constitutional, institutional and policy objectives of the African Union adopted a more 
holistic human security perspective that commits member states to promote and respect the 
sanctity of human life as endorsed in Article 4(o) of the 2001 Constitutive Act. Article 3(g) 
further commits member states ‘to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance’. In Article 3(h), the African Union enjoins member states 
to ‘promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’ (AU Constitutive 
Act, 2001). In cases of infringements to human security, the AU is mandated to mete out 
political and economic sanctions against the recalcitrant state as etched in Article 23(2). 
Bizos (2011: 2) argues that the African Union is arguably the only regional organization with 
institutionalized ideas of the responsibility to protect ingrained in its system. African Union 
had already incorporated the idea of the responsibility to protect in its 2001 Constitutive Act 
prior to the popularization of the doctrine by the 2005 UN General Assembly. Moving away 
from the old OAU norm of ‘non-interference’, the AU was grounded in a new norm of ‘non-
indifference’ to the internal problems of member states (Kioko 2003: 819). Despite 
recognizing and endorsing the inalienable right of states to sovereignty and non-interference 
from external forces as ratified in Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act, the African Union 
stresses its right and responsibility to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in cases 
of gross human rights violations as well as those that threaten international peace and 
security. The first Chair of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konare, maintains that African 
states cannot afford to be passive while atrocities are committed in neighbouring countries 
(cited in Murithi 2009:95). 
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In tandem with the responsibility to protect, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 2001 
mandates the AU to respond to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as well as 
a serious threat to legitimate order
40
 (Kioko 2003: 807; Tieku 2007: 29). The last clause of 
Article 4(h) ‘as well as a serious threat to legitimate order’ gives the AU the power to 
intervene pre-emptively at any stage of a conflict to quell an emerging conflict before it 
deteriorates
41
. When deemed necessary, the African Union Assembly wields the power to 
authorize military intervention with or without the consent of the host states and even prior to 
the UN Security Council’s authorization as endorsed in Article 4(h). This contradicts Article 
53 of the UN Charter which insists that all humanitarian military interventions must be 
authorized by the UN Security Council (Williams 2011: 4).  
Recent peace operations in Africa by regional and sub-regional organizations since the late 
1990s are often carried out prior to seeking authorization from the UN Security Council (De 
Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 15). This tends to challenge the role of the 
UNSC in overseeing matters of international peace and security. Though Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter emphasizes the paramount role of regional organizations in addressing regional 
conflicts, regional interventions in conflicts are expected to be authorized by the UNSC. In an 
interdependent world with the United Nations serving as a legitimate global organization, the 
African Union is expected to cooperate with the UN. Moreover, the AU is quite dependent on 
the funding and assistance of the UN and other international bodies to enable it to carry out 
its peace operations.  
It is based on the foregoing, that members of the African Union, during the February 2005 
Ezulwini Consensus on UN reform, recognized that the African Union and African sub-
regional organizations should intervene with the approval of UN Security Council
42
 (cited in 
Scanlon et al 2007: 7). Nevertheless, there seems to be some form of understanding between 
the AU and the UNSC based on the fact that the UNSC has provided official authorization of 
AU missions after the regional body’s mission had begun (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and 
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 Article 4(h) was amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act, which was 
adopted in February 2003 and “as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and 
stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security 
Council” was added at the end of the sub-paragraph. (Kioko 2003: 807) 
41
 The African Union Constitutive Act bestows member states to request for AU’s Intervention 
through Article 4(j) (Kioko 2003: 808).  Here, any member state of the African Union can request for 
intervention in its state or in another member state in need of humanitarian intervention. 
42
 In a like manner, African sub-regional organizations must seek AU’s authorization before 
intervention (Scanlon et al 2007). 
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Okumu 2010). The AU interventionist role in Africa is expected to ensure that African 
problems are resolved by Africans using African solutions. This would also go a long way to 
prevent the ulterior and ill-suited solutions of foreign bodies. However, the question remains, 
does the African Union have what it takes to actualise the notion of African solutions to 
African problems? 
3.4  The African Union’s Conflict Management Institutions and Mechanisms 
Under the coordination of the African Union, the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is 
Africa’s structure for promoting and enforcing peace and security. Williams (2011: 6) notes 
that ‘the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) denote a complex set of 
interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at the continental, regional, and 
national level’. At the national level, member states are expected to ensure the security and 
stability of their respective states as well as respect the norms enshrined in the AU 
Constitutive Act. Member states are also envisioned to possess the relevant resources and 
power needed for conflict management in the continent. At the regional level, the regional 
economic communities (RECs) – the Economic Community of West African States 
ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) – are expected to drive the peace and 
security agenda of their regions (Williams 2011: 6; Mathiasen 2006: 2; Murithi 2009: 92)
43
. 
Nevertheless, the RECs are expected to be accountable to the African Union in matters of 
peace and security. 
At the continental level, the African Union serves as the overseer and enforcer of peace and 
security in the continent. As members of the African Union, African states as well as the sub-
regional economic communities (for instance ECOWAS and SADC) they belong to are 
subordinate to the African Union (Williams 2011: 6). Via its peace and security mechanisms, 
the African Union coordinates and harmonizes the peace and security agenda of member 
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 Each of the five African regions – North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and 
Southern Africa – have regional organizations committed to economic development. However, 
Regional economic communities have realized that economic development and growth is contingent 
on peace, security and stability of member states (Mathiasen 2006: 2; Peck 2001: 563). Given the 
predominance of conflict in the continent which has been the bane of development in the continent, 




states and RECs which is made effective mainly by the AU Assembly, and the Peace and 
Security Council. 
The African Union Assembly, composed of Heads of States and Governments, is the supreme 
organ of the African Union
44
. It is expected to convene at least twice a year and its decisions 
should ideally be based on consensus or by a two-thirds majority of member states eligible to 
vote (Kioko 2003: 816; Udombana 2005: 10). In terms of conflict management, the 
Assembly is charged with deciding whether or not to intervene militarily in a member state in 
response to grave circumstances namely: war, crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. The Assembly also has the power to 
determine the sanctions to be imposed on recalcitrant member states. 
At the heart of African peace and security architecture is the AU Peace and Security Council. 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was entered into force on the 26
th
 of December 2003 
and was officially launched in May 2004 to tackle the issues of peace and security in the 
continent (African Union, 2013; Scanlon et al, 2007: 20). The Peace and Security Council is 
made up of a fifteen-member elected forum without permanent members or veto rights like 
the UN Security Council (Mathiasen 2006: 5-6). The PSC is based on the principle of 
equitable regional representation and rotation in such a way that the members are 
representative of the north, south, central, east and western regions of the continent (Williams 
2011: 7; Sesay 2008: 25). The regions are expected to present candidates that are in good 
standing and willing to shoulder the required tasks for membership
45
. Ten members of the 
PSC are elected for a two years term and the other five members are elected for a three years 
term. This is a built-in mechanism to ensure that the workings of the PSC do not discontinue 
and start anew with the election of new members into office. The decision of the PSC is 
supposed to be based on general consensus. However, in the absence of a consensus, the 
decision is based on majority vote or two third majority vote (Maasdorp 2010: 5). 
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 AU is made up of the following key institutions: African Heads of State and Government 
(Assembly); the Executive Council; the Permanent Representative Committee; the Pan-African 
Parliament (PAP), the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council; the Pan-African Court of 
Justice; the Economic, Social and Cultural Councils (ECOSOC), the African Central Bank, the 
Investment Bank, and the Monetary Fund (Tieku 2007: 29).  
45
  However, it is often difficult to find members with good records in their internal state affairs. The 
inclusion of regimes with records of human rights abuses and bad governance somehow attenuates the 
legitimacy of the PSC in terms of enforcing peace and security programs (Williams 2011:8). 
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Poku et al (2007: 1164) argue that the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
marked AU’s commitment to peace and security. The PSC takes care of the day-to-day 
conflict management in the continent and it coordinates the peace and security agenda of the 
APSA. The Council is mandated to enforce peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building 
operations across the continent (Murithi 2009: 92; Poku et al 2007: 1164; Williams 2011: 7). 
Unlike the UN Security Council, the Peace and Security Council recommends the adoption of 
Article 4(h) to the AU Assembly in situations that require military intervention in the internal 
affairs of member states (Kioko, 2003: 816)
46
.  
Nevertheless, PSC holds the responsibility to enforce and monitor the interventions in 
member states in response to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as 
the threats to legitimate order. For effectiveness, the PSC is expected to cooperate with the 
UN Security Council
47
 and the continent’s sub-regional organizations in matters of peace and 
security (Murithi 2009: 92, Møller 2009: 13). The PSC is complemented by its subsidiary 
bodies namely: the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee, the Continental 
Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development, and the Peace Fund (Murithi 2009: 92; Scanlon et al 2007: 20).  
The African Standby Force (ASF) was created in May 2003 in accord with Article 13 of the 
PSC Protocol to serve as the operational arm of the AU poised to be deployed to crisis 
regions across the continent (AU PSC 2010; Tieku 2007: 29; Williams 2011: 10; MØller 
2009: 13). The ASF is envisioned to respond rapidly – within 30 days – to crisis situations 
once a decision has been made by AU. In line with Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol, 
member states are expected to institutionalize the ASF by making pledges of military, police 
and civilian personnel (Dersso 2011: 124). When the personnel are identified by member 
states, the names are submitted to their Regional Economic Communities/Regional 
Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) which are responsible for coordinating the forces within their 
region. Afterwards, the RECs/RMs forwards the full data of their regional force to the AU. In 
their home countries, the identified personnel remain on standby poised to be deployed to 
mission when a decision is reached (Dersso 2011:124).  
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 The UNSC on the other hand could establish a military intervention without a decision by the UN 
Assembly. 
47
 The PSC is expected to cooperate with the UNSC and to make recourse to the United Nations for 
necessary financial, logistical and military support. 
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The African Standby Force comprises five brigades from each of Africa’s sub-regions: The 
Southern, Eastern, Central, West and Northern regions (AU PSC 2010; Murithi 2009: 93). 
Maasdorp (2010: 6) notes that the force generating regions are; 
Northern African Regional Capability (NARC) with the Regional Headquarters located 
in Tripoli, Libya.• East African Standby Forces (EASBRIG) with the Brigade 
Headquarters located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the planning element in Nairobi, 
Kenya.• Central African Standby Forces (ECCAS) with the Regional Headquarters 
located in Libreville, Gabon.• West African Standby Forces (ECOWAS) with their 
Regional Headquarters located in Abuja, Nigeria.• Southern African Standby Forces 
(SADC) with their Regional Headquarters located in Gaberone, Botswana. 
The five brigades are expected to be composed of 3000 to 4000 troops, 300 to 500 trained 
military observers, 240 individual police officers and about 500 light vehicles (National 
Model United Nations, 2008:17). The total of the five brigades of 5000 personnel each 
amount to 25,000 personnel. The personnel go through training under the auspices of the 
REC. RECs also provide the operational headquarters for ASF missions (Dersso, 2011: 136). 
The ASF is expected to have a few centralized forces situated at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 
about 50 military observers, 240 civilian police and some civilian specialists (Mathiasen 
2006: 9).  
The ASF is designed to take up monitoring and observing missions; aid in containing conflict 
from overflowing into neighbouring states and protecting civilians; engage in peacekeeping 
and peace-building operations; engage in military intervention in the affairs of member states 
as well as engage in post-conflict reconstruction (AU PSC 2010; Bozis 2011: 11). The PSC is 
expected to control, coordinate and direct ASF missions. It is no doubt that the ASF will 
serve as a crucial element of African Union’s conflict management capabilities. However, 
although the ASF was anticipated to reach full operational capacity by June, 2010, it remains 
a figment of imagination in the APSA to date. African leaders continue to have difficulties 
operationalizing the ASF. 
The Military Staff Committee is another subsidiary body of the PSC that is supposed to serve 
as an advisory body to the PSC on military matters (Williams 2011: 13). The Military Staff 
Committee consists of senior military officers from the PSC member states and they are 
expected to meet regularly to discuss peace and security issues (Maasdorp 2010: 4). 




The Continent’s Early-Warning System (CEWS) which was established under Article 12 of 
the PSC protocol has its central observation and monitoring centre known as the ‘situation 
room’ in Addis Ababa (AU PSC 2010; Williams 2011: 9). The Continental Early Warning 
System collates and receives data from the various Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) 
and other independent means (Maasdorp 2010: 3). With the assistance of external donors and 
the UN’s situation centre in New York, the African Union CEWS situation room collects and 
analyses data and feeds the PSC with indicators of risks, threats and vulnerabilities (Williams 
2011: 9). The CEWS helps the AU to make an informed decision about the deployment of 
AU forces. The CEWS remains yet to reach its full potential to support conflict prevention 
and management in Africa (AU PSC 2010). 
One of the vital and functioning parts of the African Union peace and security initiative is the 
African Union Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the Wise was officially inaugurated in 
December 2007 under Article 11 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Williams 2011:12). The Panel of the Wise 
is composed of five members – appointed by the AU Assembly – with outstanding profiles of 
past contributions to peace, security, and development. The panel is representative of the five 
regions in Africa. Based on their reputation, members of the Panel of the Wise are expected 
to use their expert knowledge and moral influence to resolve conflicts peacefully via 
diplomacy and mediation as well as provide advice to the PSC (MØller 2009: 13; Williams, 
2011: 12).  
In conflict situations, the Chairperson of the AU Commission has the power to deploy the 
Panel of the Wise or appoint a member of the Panel as a Special Envoy to get conflicting 
parties to negotiate an end conflict. The Panel has been very instrumental in contending with 
issues of electoral-related violence, justice, impunity, reconciliation and the situation of 
women and children in armed conflict. Notably, Thabo Mbeki, a member of the Panel, was 
instrumental in negotiating the peace agreements in Sudan including the agreement that 
facilitated the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in a bid to end the protracted conflict 
between north and south Sudan. 
To drive the Union’s responsibility to rebuild, the Post-conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD) framework was developed at the 7
th
 Ordinary Session of the Executive 
Council in Libya in July 2005 (Addo 2011: 91). The PRCD is expected to contend with post-
conflict reconstruction in post-conflict states. The PCRD is envisioned to establish conflict 
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management mechanisms and reliable institutions based on democratic principles as well as 
strengthening institutions capable of addressing conflicts to avoid the resurgence of conflict.  
Another indispensable organ driving the peace and security agenda of the African Union is 
the AU Commission. The Commission is the executive/administrative arm of the African 
Union and is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners 
and Staff members (African Union, 2013). The Commission is responsible for the daily 
management of the African Union. It coordinates and implements high-level decisions of the 
African Union. In terms of peace and Security, the AU Commission facilitates, coordinates, 
and monitors AU’s progress towards its overall vision of peace and security (William, 2011: 
8). In line with its mandate for conflict prevention, the AU Commission is also responsible 
for popularizing the doctrine of human security to AU member states (Tieku, 2007: 26).  
To emphasize its commitment to the continent’s peace and security, the AU Commission 
allocated $144 million out of it is overall expenditure of $784 million for the Union’s peace 
and security issues in the continent for 2009-2012 (William 2011: 8-9). Moreover, to ensure 
that enough resources are available to drive AU’s peace and security efforts, the AU Peace 
Fund, under the Peace Support Commission, makes funds available for peace and security 
operations according to Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. The Peace Fund is expected to 
acquire funds via the ordinary budget funds, voluntary contributions from member states, and 
other sources like external donations (Mathiasen 2006: 6). 
3.5   Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the arguments conducive for the establishment of the African 
Union in 2002. The first section examined the limitations of the United Nations and non-
African interventions in Africa which makes it imperative for a strong regional body to 
contend with African problems. The second sections looked into the shortcomings of the 
OAU in the post-Cold War reality of Africa, a shortcoming which led to the formation of the 
African Union. The third section inquired into the institutional bodies and mechanisms 
introduced by the African Union to tackle conflict challenges in Africa. As noted by Hanson 
(2009), while striving to reform and develop its institutions, the African Union has invested 
an estimable amount of resources in addressing the continent’s ills. The following chapter 
shall explore and assess African Union’s conflict management responses particularly in 




African Union’s Military Interventionist Role 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter assesses the African Union’s interventions in Sudan, Somalia and Libya. This 
chapter is of great importance for this research because, apart from making general analyses 
of how the AU has performed, it undertakes the task of considering and assessing the efficacy 
of the AU’s in specific case studies. The first case study evaluates the AU’s performance in 
Sudan’s Darfur region after a civil war erupted in 2003. The second part of the essay 
addresses the AU’s intervention in Somali. The third section estimates the African Union’s 
response to the Libyan revolution of 2011. By looking at these three case studies, this 
research aspires to give a balanced review of the AU and its curative potential for Africa’s 
conflicts. 
 
4.2  The Case of Sudan 
In February 2003, violent conflict erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan between the 
Sudanese government in alliance with a pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed
48
, 
and two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) (Murithi 2009:  99). The conflict led to grave atrocities committed against 
civilians, a large number of internally displaced persons and refugee flow into neighbouring 
countries thereby causing a huge worry for the international community. Prior to the 2003 
violent eruption of conflict in Darfur, Sudan has been a home to humanitarian crisis for 
decades even before independence.  
Prior to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, Sudan was basically divided based 
on religious lines, ethnicity, economic activity (sedentary or nomadic) and tribal loyalties 
(Dunne 2009: 1). Along religious lines, Sudan is composed of about 70% Muslims, 25% 
Animists and 5% Christians. Based on ethnicity the country is divided between the Arabs 
who predominated the northern region and are mainly Muslims, and Africans who 
predominated the South and are mainly Animists and Christians. Though Sudan witnessed 
                                                          
48
 Janjaweed is the popular name for the Popular Defence Force (PDF) 
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various forms of internal insecurities and violence across the country, conflict in Sudan is 
predominantly between the Arab/Muslim-North and the Animist/Christian-South (Brosché 
2008: 1). 
Sudanese violent conflict dates back to 1955 at Tort when Southern Sudanese soldiers 
mutinied from the military in fear of the domination of the southerners by northerners after 
independence (Luqman and Omede 2012: 61). As part of colonial legacy, south Sudanese 
were deliberately marginalized and neglected in the political and socio-economic 
development of the country. Unlike their Northern counterpart, Southern Sudan and the 
Darfur inhabitants lacked infrastructural development and education schemes. The discontent 
of southerners marked by the 1955 mutiny of south Sudanese soldiers led to a widespread 
violence against the northerners residing in the southern region.  
By 1956, the violence was curtailed to pave way for the united Sudanese independence in the 
same year (Dunne 2009). Nevertheless, successive Sudanese regimes in Khartoum who were 
predominantly from the Islamic north failed to heed the developmental needs of the 
southerners (Osaore Aideyan 2010: 42; Luqman and Omede 2012). Sudanese military 
regimes dominated national politics with their Islamic ideologies and oppressed southerners 
(Dunne 2009: 3).  This neglect engendered civil war between the government and the 
liberation movements from the south. 
The first phase of the civil war began in 1962 and was spearheaded by the southern based 
rebel group Anya Nya who fought for the independence of southern Sudan. The war was 
resolved via negotiation and the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. The 
agreement conceded a single regional government to the South to control regional trade, 
education and language (Osaore Aideyan, 2010: 42). In the early 1980s, President Nimeiri’s 
dictatorial tendencies and quest to secure power led him to abandon the peace agreement of 
1972.  
In 1983, a second civil war broke out in the country following Nimeiri’s imposition of Sharia 
law across the country, declaration of Arabic as the official Sudanese language, introduction 
of northern troops into the south and the policy for the redefinition of the borders between the 
north and south due to the discovery of oil in Bentiu (as southern region) by Chevron (Osaore 
Aideyan, 2010: 42). The civil war was initiated by the southern based Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM). The civil war which began in 1983 ended in 2005 with the 
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signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
49
 on the 9
th
 of January 2005 (Brosché 
2008: 1). Prior to the eruption of the 2003 armed insurgency in Darfur, much of the civil war 
took place in the southern part of Sudan and the fighting was relatively limited.  
4.2.2  The War in Darfur  
Situated in western Sudan, Darfur has 6 million people of different ethnic groupings (Dunne 
2009: 2). Like the southern region, Darfur’s non-Arab population was neglected and 
marginalized by successive Sudanese governments (Dunne 2009: 3). Generally, Darfur had 
poor infrastructure, health and education systems, and lacked basic social amenities. 
Khartoum and the regions close to the capital city enjoyed better standards of living at the 
expense and dismay of peripheral regions. Worse still, non-Arab people of Darfur felt less 
than citizens than their Arab counterparts. The Arab government had reportedly led several 
attacks on non-Arab villages in Darfur to oppress and repress the non-Arab population. The 
feeling of being discriminated, marginalized and oppressed by the Arab regime in Khartoum 
coupled with political, economic and human injustices led to the 2003 armed insurrection in 
Darfur (Luqman and Omede 2012: 62).  
Though there had been low-scale communal fighting in Darfur before 2003, large-scale 
conflict and bloodletting began in 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) initiated an offensive on the historic capital of Darfur, El-Fashir (Luqman and 
Omede 2012: 62). The SLM soldiers attacked government targets, destroyed aircrafts at El-
Fashir airport and looted the armoury. The war against the government was later joined by an 
Islamic sect called the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) – made up of non-Arab Muslims 
from Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups – which was averse to the Arab government’s 
excesses and injustices against non-Arabs. Despite their differences, the SLM/A and JEM had 
on occasions launched joint offensives against the government. The government in turn 
embarked on a high handed reprisal of the opposition groups as well as the non-Arab ethnic 
groups which the rebel movements sprang from. The government carried out aerial 
bombardments and attacks on the rival movements as well as civilians.  
Moreover, the Sudanese regimes in Khartoum are notorious for recruiting tribal militias to 
oppress and terrorize rival groups as well as civilian populations. When it was not directly 
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committing atrocities, the government provided assistance to Arab militias that are keen to 
defend Arab supremacist ideology (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007). Given that the government 
had sent much of its military forces to south Sudan were the second civil war was coming to 
an end and to the east were rebels were threatening a newly constructed oil pipeline, the 
government was unable to squash the rebellion in Darfur.  
In a bid to stop the opposition movements, the government provided support to the pro-
government Janjaweed militia that is notorious for attacking non-Arab civilians (Kangwanja 
and Mutahi 2007). The government provided Janjaweed with financial support, arms, 
equipment and support (Dunne 2009: 13). The state-sponsored Janjaweed militia quickly 
gained more grounds than the rebel groups. The state military and Janjaweed militia attacked 
non-Arab villages accused of harbouring rebels (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007; Dunne 2009: 
5). Significant number of non-Arabs villages of was terrorized and many were displaced by 
the pro-government Janjaweed militia (Dunne 2009: 12). This was reportedly considered as a 
move to depopulate non-Arabs and replace the people populating non-Arab villages with 
Arabs (Dunne 2009). The attacks by the Arab Janjaweed militia on non-Arabs were likened 
to the events of the Rwandan Genocide. The armed insurrection led to the destruction of lives 
and properties, looting, rape and forced displacement. Thousands of lives were lost while 
others raped, maimed and assaulted. More than 2 million people were displaced as refugees 
or as internally displaced persons. 
Being directly affected by the upsurge of Darfur refugees pursued into their territory by the 
Janjaweed militiamen, Chad took the initiative to initiate a peace process to seek a political 
solution to the conflict. The peace process known as the 2003 ‘Abeche Mediation’ was 
facilitated by the Chadian President Idress Derby (Murithi 2009: 99). The mediation led to 
the signing of the Abeche Ceasefire Agreement on the 3
rd
 of September 2003, an agreement 
that failed to prevent the signatories from continuing their hostilities.  
4.2.3    The AU’s intervention in Sudan 
When the Chadian-mediated ceasefire agreement failed, the African Union took on the 
arduous responsibility and leadership in tackling the complex conflict of Darfur in tandem 
with its commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. The African Union 
conducted series of mediated talks between the government and the rebel groups that led to 
the signing of a ceasefire agreement known as the N’djamena Agreement on humanitarian 
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Ceasefire in April 2004 (Hanson 2009: 1; Farmer 2012: 99). The agreement was followed up 
with series of peace talks between the parties so as to strengthen the ceasefire agreement and 
facilitate a resolution to the conflict (Luqman and Omede 2012: 64).  
To enforce N’Djamena Agreement on humanitarian Ceasefire, the African Union established 
the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) with the consent of the government of Sudan. AMIS began 
with the establishment of a ceasefire verification commission and deployment of 60 AU 
Military Observers (MILOBS) in June 4 2004. A 300-strong Armed Protection Force was 
later sent to provide security to the MILOBS and AU members who were overseeing the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement in the region. Notwithstanding, the belligerents 
continued to carry out violent acts with huge tolls on the civilian population.  
Due to the violation of the ceasefire agreement and the continued violence, the Armed 
Protection Force was impotent in stabilizing the country. On 20 October 2004, the AMIS was 
expanded to 3,320 soldiers and police (Aboagye 2007: 4; Farmer 2012: 99). The force 
reached its full strength only in April 2005 six months after the decision was reached. On the 
28
th
 of April 2005, AMIS was approved to be extended to 7,731 personnel to be deployed by 
the end of September
50
 (Luqman and Omede 2012: 64; Hanson 2009: 1). Thus, the mission 
metamorphosed and grew from a ceasefire monitoring mission of a few personnel to 3,320 
troops in 2004 and 7,731 in 2005.  
AMIS was mandated to protect civilians
51
 as a priority, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, monitor the ceasefire agreement, and restore peace and stability in Sudan under the 
traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality and neutrality (Farmer 2012: 99). As 
AMIS forces sought to defuse  the armed insurrections in Darfur, the ceasefire agreement was 
followed by further negotiations geared towards addressing the issues of power sharing and 
political representations, wealth sharing, reparation for the victims of conflict, reconstruction 
of Darfur, inter alia (Luqman and Omede 2012:64). Despite the ceasefire agreements and the 
intermittent peace talks, fighting continued in Darfur (Dunne 2009: 12). 
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At the onset, AMIS tended to be effective in reducing the violent attacks on the civilian 
population. Scanlon et al (2007: 21) notes that AU’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been 
adjudged as a major step depicting the regional organization’s commitment to the 
responsibility to protect. As observed by Franke (2006: 10), with limited capabilities, AMIS 
has remarkably helped ‘in the alleviation of widespread suffering and containing a conflict in 
which no one else was prepared to intervene’. However, the situation later became worsened 
as the conflict parties found AMIS forces less effective to make them comply with the terms 
of the ceasefire agreement and to deter them from violence (Luqman and Omede 2012).  
The incomprehensiveness of the ceasefire agreement also created grounds for a weak and 
incoherent mandate with which AMIS operated under (Murithi 2009: 99). AMIS was unable 
to intervene in the fighting or disarm warring factions so as to vigorously protect civilians. 
AMIS became hamstrung in the face of the violent attacks and gross atrocities on civilians 
(Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 7). AMIS resorted to dealing with soft security operations like 
monitoring, liaison, protection of high dignitaries and verification (Dunne 2009: 17). 
Besides, AMIS lacked the capacity, resources and operational will to enforce the protection 
of civilians and achieve its mandate (Aboagye 2007: 4). The mission lacked personnel, 
expertise, logistics and resources to protect citizens as well as restore order in a region as 
large as the size of Darfur. In comparison to the warring parties, AMIS was under-armed, 
outnumbered and outgunned (Luqman and Omede 2012:64). On the 5
th
 of May, 2006, the 
government of Sudan and the Minni Minnawi led SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) after years of intense negotiation. But because the DPA was not signed by 
the JEM, the Abdul Wahid al Nur-led SLM/A and other small factions, conflict continued in 
Darfur. The DPA failed to ensure the disarmament of the Arab militias; facilitate a wealth 
and power sharing deal;  it also failed to receive the support of other Darfur rebels that were 
not signatories to the agreement (Dunne 2009: 25).  
The government remained adamant to the call to disarm the pro-government Arab militias as 
the DPA stipulated. To compound the crisis, Darfur experienced fierce rivalry and infighting 
within the SLM/A and the JEM forces as well as other faction groups. For instance, the 
infightings between the Minni Minawi led SLM/A and the Abdul Wahid Nur led SLM/A 
forces in 2006 made peace efforts difficult. Darfur Arabs as well began a rebel movement 
known as the Popular Forces Troops against the government in late 2006 thereby defying the 
simple explication of Darfur conflict as between Arabs and non-Arabs. Arab tribes such as 
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the Terjem and Mahria also fought against each other. Meanwhile, the increased illegality 
and criminality across the country compounded the challenges of the already overstretched 
AMIS (Dunne 2009: 19).  
There was mixed feelings towards the activities of AMIS. Civilians and rebels somehow 
nurse the feeling that AMIS was biased towards the Sudanese government (Luqman and 
Omede 2012: 64). This was further supported by the failure of the AU to enforce the arrest of 
President al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as 
mandated by the ICC. The failure of the AU to implement the arrest of President Bashir 
challenges the Union’s political will and commitment to confront the ills of its members. 
Moreover, the AU PSC had allowed the government of Sudan to play a leadership role in 
drafting the mandate of AMIS and setting the bounds of its deployment (Jibril 2010: 12). The 
government of Sudan was given veto powers in situations that call for the amendment of the 
mandate of AMIS. By allowing the government of Sudan to have a huge influence in 
mandating and the deployment of AU forces, the AU PSC tended to be biased in favour of 
the government.  
Moreover, the Sudanese government had on several occasions interfered with the operations 
of AMIS thereby undermining the power of the African Union. For instance, the government 
in 2005 delayed the delivery of 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers of AMIS for three months. 
The carriers were only allowed into the country after an attack on AMIS that led to the killing 
of four AMIS troops allegedly by the pro-government Janjaweed militia (Dunne 2009: 19). 
With Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenades and doshkas, the Janjaweed armed 
militias, in the same period, destroyed farms and households in Darfur while attacking non-
Arab villages (Dunne 2009: 21). In the same year, the government also refused to allow six 
AMIS helicopters to enter Sudan for five months demanding that the helicopters should not 
be used for offensive purposes (Dunne 2009: 19). The government also imposed curfews on 
AMIS which was supposed to be overseeing and enforcing peace processes in Darfur (Dunne, 
2009:19). As observed by Bergholm (2010: 25), the Sudanese government imposed a curfew 
on AMIS and denied them freedom of movement between 8pm and 8am daily. Thus, the 
mission operated under the dictates of Khartoum. AMIS police were also prevented from 
entering rebel regions as well as visiting people in detention facilities.  
In fact, aside from being unable to adequately protect civilians, the troops and personnel of 
AMIS became targets of belligerents (Luqman and Omede 2012: 61). In 2005, September 19, 
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an AMIS patrol team deployed to investigate the attacks on the Harafa area (were 10 civilians 
were killed and 7 000 people were displaced) were attacked by Janjaweed militias (Kagwanja 
and Mutahi 2007: 8). In the same year, two AMIS soldiers from Rwanda were shot. In an 
attack on AMIS forces near the Kourabishi in South Dafur on 8 October 2005, five AMIS 
soldiers from Nigeria and two AMIS civilian personnel were killed and three peacekeepers 
were wounded. Rebel SLM/A fighters were blamed for the attack. The following day on  9 
October, a fragment group of JEM in West Darfur abducted ‘an entire 18-strong AMIS patrol 
team, including the American Monitor team advisor, and a rescue team of 20’ (Kangwanja 
and Mutahi 2007: 8). The patrol team was later released in the same month.  
Brosché (2008: 71) claims that the bloodiest attack on AMIS was the 29 September 2007 
surprise attack on AMIS base allegedly by SLM/A rebels in the Haskanita area of Northern 
Darfur State. The attack led to the killing of 10 soldiers and wounding of seven soldiers 
(Jibril 2010: 11). Generally, AMIS lost over 59 troops to the fighters in Sudan (Brosché, 
2008)
52
. Meanwhile, the need to secure weapons also encouraged militias and rebel groups to 
attack AMIS facilities in order to commandeer weapons, armoured vehicles and heavy 
machine guns (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007: 9). 
The inability to protect its personnel and facilities undermined AMIS’s credibility in the eyes 
of the population seeking its protection. Belligerents were largely undeterred from violence 
and attacks on the civilian population. Inadequate training and lack of expertise and 
experience led to a lacklustre performance of AMIS. AMIS forces continually grew 
demoralized and inefficient in the face of humanitarian abuses in the country. Cases of rape 
and abduction of civilians were rampant in southern Sudan and Darfur. As AMIS struggled to 
secure their personnel, IDPs and humanitarian agencies came under increasing attack from 
the belligerents (Dunne 2009: 20). This prevented the safe and expedient delivery of 
humanitarian aid. The praises which the African Union received for its initial efforts gave 
way to negative criticisms of its inefficiency. The increased insecurity in Darfur in 2006 
revealed the incapability of AMIS to deal with the crisis in Darfur. 
Murithi (2009: 100) argues that the Darfur situation was a huge test for an institution (AU) 
that is under-resourced and ill-equipped to effectively manage conflicts. Even with logistic 
assistance by NATO in 2005, the AU remained unable to maintain a significant and effective 
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presence in Sudan (Farmer, 2012: 99). For Murithi (2009: 100), AMIS only ended up 
enhancing and prolonging the carnage and destructive conflict between the warring parties. 
Luqman and Omede (2012: 64) note that AMIS was inefficient due to the limited fund 
available for it to carry out its mission in Darfur. AU needed about $40 million to sustain its 
Darfur mission on a monthly basis (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007: 9). Most of the funds used 
to run the mission came mainly from foreign donors such as the United States, European 
Union, G8, Canada, NATO, Arab League and other bilateral donors. AU has also been 
accused of not making proper use of the donor funds (Aboagye 2007: 4). The inefficiency of 
AMIS precipitated the call for a United Nations intervention
53
.  
Given the increased limitations and in capabilities of AMIS, the UNSC passed resolution 
1706 in August 31, 2006 to deploy a UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to take over from AMIS 
after the lapse of its mandate  (Murithi 2009: 100). However, the Sudanese president declined 
any form of non-African intervention in the country (Lopez, 2004: 7). Khartoum threatened 
war against UN forces if the UN deployed its forces without Sudan’s consent (Kangwanja 
and Mutahi 2007: 10). Due to the intransigence of the Sudanese government, the UN adopted 
UNSC resolution 1769 and established a Joint AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) on the 31 July 2007 (United Nations 2013). Several analysts have noted that the 
UNAMID paradigm is an emerging model of burden sharing and pulling of resources 
together by international and regional bodies to tackle security challenges in Africa (Luqman 
and Omede 2012: 65; Franke 2006: 1).  
UNAMID was mandated to protect civilians, ensure the security of its personnel and 
humanitarian workers, monitor the implementation of peace agreements, monitor Sudan’s 
borders with Central African Republic and Chad and facilitate the restoration of law and 
order in Darfur (United Nations 2013). The peacekeeping forces were deployed in 2008. 
While subsuming AMIS personnel, UNAMID forces by 2013 consist of 14,481 troops, 347 
military observers, 4,720 police (including formed units) bringing UNAMID forces to the 
total of 19, 548 uniformed personnel (United Nations 2013). Alongside uniformed forces are 
1,064 international civilian personnel, 2,910 local civilian staff and 424 United Nations 
Volunteers (United Nations 2013). Unlike AMIS, UNAMID is well funded, proactive, and 
more effective in protecting civilians and ensuring a safe environment for the provision of 
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. UNAMID has also been able to protect its bases, equipment and 
personnel unlike AMIS (Luqman and Omede 2012: 60). 
However, UNAMID faces similar challenges faced by AMIS. As noted by Murithi 
(2009:101), considering its force strength, resources and logistic capabilities, UNAMID has 
performed less than expected (Luqman and Omede 2012: 67).  Cases of insecurities, 
abduction, and targeted attacks on peacekeepers and aid workers continued largely unabated. 
Civilian populations and IDPs remained victims of gross human right abuses. In 2008, about 
317, 000 people were rendered internally displaced by militia attacks, tribal fighting and 
military operations (Jibril 2010: 5). To compound the challenges of UNAMID, the SLM and 
JEM forces are continually fragmenting. Thus, it becomes difficult to maintain peace 
agreements as different rebel factions keep breaching them.  
UNAMID also fell victim of attacks from Sudan belligerents. On the 7 of January 2008, a 
UNAMID supply convoy was attacked by government troops in West Darfur which lead to 
the severe wounding of one of the drivers (Brosché 2008: 72). In July 8, 2008, UNAMID 
convoy was ambushed by about 200 attackers at the southeast of El-Fasher in Northern 
Darfur leading to the death of 7 UNAMID personnel and 19 casualties (Diop et al, 2012: 2; 
Jibril 2010: 8). Significantly, UNAMID forces fell victim of attacks in regions under the 
control of government forces and Janjaweed militias.  
The AU/UN forces were continually accused of being partial in favour of the government. On 
the 25
th
 of August 2008, more than 30 IDPs in Kalma camp near Nyala in Southern Darfur 
State were killed and over a hundred people were wounded by an attack by the government 
forces. The government military source held that the attack was tolerated by UNAMID to aid 
in the clean-up of the camp from alleged elements that were inciting unrest Darfur (Jibril 
2010: 7). UNAMID is also accused of being controlled by the government of Sudan. As 
noted by Jibril (2010: 16), the government of Sudan has on several occasions prevented 
UNAMID from investigating some areas in Darfur especially when the investigation has to 
do with the government or Janjaweed’s attacks.  
The government also hinders relief materials from being delivered to the needy people in 
Darfur by restricting aid workers or expelling relief agencies from the country without the 
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intervention of UNAMID (Jibril 2010: 5). 13 international relief agencies were expelled from 
northern Sudan and 3 national human rights and relief agencies were closed down in March 
2009 (Jibril 2010: 18). These relief agencies were mainly working in Darfur and were 
responsible for providing food, water, sanitation and health services to more than 1.5 million 
people in Darfur (Jibril 2010: 18). To compound the suffering of Darfur’s IDPs and the needy 
population in Sudan, a staggering number of 26 relief organizations were expelled from the 
country in 2010. When not denied, the travel permits for aid workers were delayed 
indefinitely. Hence, aid agencies that were tolerated in Darfur lacked adequate personnel to 
deliver necessary services and assistance to the needy people. Moreover, aid agencies were 
denied access to some needy regions of Darfur that are under the control of rebel forces.  
Yet, UNAMID rarely challenges the government’s actions that prevent or restrict the 
operation of humanitarian relief agencies in the country. In fact, UNAMID’s operations were 
also restricted by the government in terms of delivering humanitarian assistance to the needy. 
Particularly, UNAMID was prevented from delivering humanitarian assistance to the people 
in the region of Jebal Marra where more than 100,000 IDPs were in desperate need of 
humanitarian assistance (Jibril 2010: 19). With the inability of UNAMID to provide 
necessary security in Darfur, civilian population who do not fall victims of direct attacks 
from the government and its proxy as well as rebel groups became victims from the lack of 
food, clean water, medicine, sanitation and shelter which was engendered by the conflict. 
Generally, the African Union has exhibited huge commitment at tackling the conflict in 
Sudan.  However, the seeming favouring of the government of Sudan by the African Union 
tends to undermine AU’s credibility and operation in Sudan. Moreover, the inadequate 
training and poor resources of AU forces made the regional body deficient in its response to 
the crisis in Darfur. Even under the joint AU/UN mission, the Darfur region continues to pose 
a huge concern for the international community. The failures of UN mandated UNAMID 
forces in Darfur tend to provide reasonable grounds for a better understanding of the 
challenges faced by AMIS. AMIS performed arguably well for a force of its size and 
potential. This is supported by the fact that a well-supported UNAMID did not make any 
major headway in Darfur. However, it could be argued that despite the UN involvement in 
the peacekeeping operation in Sudan, AU continues to play the leading military and 
diplomatic role in Sudan (Farmer 2012: 99). UNAMID forces are mainly from African states 
and the leaders of the mission are military officers from African states (Jibril 2010: 16). 
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4.3  The Case of Somalia 
Until recently in 2011, Somalia was without a central government since state collapse in 
1991. Bandits, warlords, terrorists and armed thugs roam the country, plundering, pillaging 
and seeking control of the capital city, Mogadishu. Although there presently exists a central 
government in Somalia, the country remains a humanitarian crisis zone. Several reasons have 
been adduced to explicate Somali state collapse and instabilities. Makhubela (2010: 40) 
highlights that although ‘the sources of Somali conflict dates back to the imperial partitioning 
of the country in 1897, the modern day Somali conflict is driven by a plethora of issues and it 
remains mostly intra-Somalis in character’. Inasmuch as the global system as well as 
historical factors such as colonialism and external meddling could be adduced to explicate 
Somali state collapse, domestic actors play pivotal role in the ills of Somalia. From 
independence in 1960 until state collapse in 1991, Somalia was governed by corrupt, 
incompetent and oppressive governments. Notably, President Major General Siad Barre who 
came into power via a coup in 1969, was directly culpable for plunging the state into collapse 
due to bad governance, political repression and elite manipulations (Ismail 2010: 86).  
Barre’s regime sponsored terror, the military and elite security forces to oppress rival clan 
members and opposition movements (Ismail 2010:97). During Barre’s rule, several Somalis 
fled their homes seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Moreover, Barre ran the state using 
his Darod sub-clans specifically the Marehan sub-clan of his paternal relations; the Ogaden 
clan of his maternal kin; and the Dulbahante clan of his principal son-in-law Ahmed 
Suleiman Abdulle (Emathe 2006:12). Non-Darod clans that were not in alliance with Barre 
were marginalized, oppressed and repressed. This bred deep-seated clan animosity and 
distrust for the Darod clans. In the 1980s, opposition groups such as the Isaaq Somali 
National Movement (SNM), Hawiye dominated United Somali Congress (USC) and the 
Ogadeni-led Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) emerged aggressively in opposition against 
Barre’s regime. In December 1990, fierce civil war broke out in Mogadishu which led to the 
collapse of Somalia states. The collapse of Somalia was marked by Muhammad Siad Barre 
and his son-in-law General Siad Hersi Morgan’s escape from Mogadishu to the South-west of 
the country in the Gedo region, Siad Barre’s home area on the 26
th
 of January 1991 
(Department of State 2011).  
Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia was left in ruins and anarchy. 
The fall of Barre’s regime created a political vacuum and cataclysmic civil war between 
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clans, warlords, religious opportunists, nomads and pastoralists. There was no formidable 
political entity that could unify Somalia or claim control of the capital city. In the state of 
anarchy and lawlessness, several armed bandits, warlords and armed thugs plundered, 
pillaged and battled for the control of some interest areas in Somalia (Ayittey 1994). Somalis 
resorted to the traditional clan and lineage solidarity divisions to safeguard their lives and 
properties. Pham (2011: 160) notes that post-Siad Barre’s Somalia turned into ‘a land of clan 
(and clan segment) republics where the would-be traveler needed to secure the protection of 
each group whose territory he sought to traverse’. 
Menkhaus (2006: 75) notes that the extended period of Somali state collapse led to the 
complication of the interest of several Somali actors. Leaders of different clans and factions 
including defeated Siad Barre’s generals turned into warlords vying for the control of major 
Somali cities (Makhubela 2010: 48). To protect their economic interests in the anarchic 
society, businesspeople formed militia gangs. Instead of funding warlords to protect them, 
businessmen hired and recruited militias and became warlords themselves (Menkhaus 2003: 
411). By 1996, warlords proliferated in Somalia. As various leaders and rebels make profits 
from war situation, they derive more incentives to perpetuate violence to ensure the 
instability of the state. Because of the lack of central leadership, the drought of 1992 was 
more devastating as there was no proper way of dispensing aid to acutely affected peoples. 
The drought and famine that ensued amidst the heavy fighting introduced a new dimension to 
the conflict that further compounded the Somali crisis.  
Given the devastating civil war and the escalating food crisis in country, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 794 of  1992 which instituted the  deployment  of 30,000 
U.S. troops to Somalia under the name UNOSOM (United Nations operations in Somalia) 
(Makhubela 2010: 62). A study by Life and Peace Institute (1995:4) observes that the 1992 







 activities. The mission vacillated from protecting the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, maintaining a secure environment, capturing a leader of the factions and 
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encouraging negotiations with the leaders of the factions. With such vague mandates,  UN 
forces became party to the conflict as  they tried to rein in the excesses of the different 
factions (Ahmed, 1995: 249).  
Ayittey (1994) stresses that Somalis resent the fact that the solution to their problems would 
come from outside forces whose agendas were suspicious. In 1993, 18 U.S. Army Rangers 
were killed and some of their bodies desecrated while others were paraded on the streets of 
Mogadishu. Following this carnage, U.S.-led forces abandoned the mission and withdrew 
from Somalia in 1993. Other UN forces (mainly Pakistani soldiers), nonetheless, remained in 
Somalia until 1995 when they withdrew from the state in realization of the futility of their 
military effort in the state. Moreover the UN has organized over ten highly publicized and 
costly reconciliation conferences to address the Somali crises since 1993. However, the 
reconciliation efforts failed to yield peace and order in Somalia (Menkhaus 2006: 94).  
To compound the Somali crises, radical Islamic movements emerged in the mid-1990s with 
political aspirations. The collapsed and anarchic nature of Somalia created a vacuum for 
Islamic fundamentalism to fester (Tadesse 2001). At a time when clan struggles tended to 
destabilize the country and plunge it further into anarchy, some Islamists reckoned that 
political Islam is the remedial movement for a country sharing the same Islamic faith. Islamic 
fundamentalists exploited the opportunity to form radical Islamic movements alien to the 
traditional moderate Islam peculiar to Somalia (Taarnby and Hallundbaeki 2010; Abdullahi 
2008). Prominent was the Islamic Court Union (ICU) that emerged in the mid-1990s with 
political intentions. By 2006, the ICU became a force to reckon with and in June 2006,  it 
ICU defeated a US-backed coalition of warlords and business leaders (a coalition known as 
the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism) and took control of much of 
Mogadishu (Makhubela 2010: 62). However, on the eve of Christmas 2006, heavily armed 
and well-trained U.S. backed Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia, defeated and routed the ICU 
forces. 
After the demise of the ICU, Harakat al-shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Warrior 
Youth known as Al-shabaab) a militant group of the ICU grew and became one of the fiercest 
militant Islamist movements domestically and internationally (Pham 2011: 170). The 
movement encompassed both local and international interests. Al-Shabaab’s initial campaign 
against the Ethiopian backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) gained ostensible 
support among Somalia. However, like the ICU, its extreme Islamic stance diminished the 
84 
 
initial support it enjoyed. In a bid to purge all western influence in Somalia, Al-Shabaab 
imposed stringent Sharia law on Somalis without regard to traditional values and system of 
Somalis. Al-Shabaab battled with the TFG to control the Capital City and different parts of 
Somalia.  
The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in October 2004 after the Nairobi 
peace accords and raging external pressure (Menkhaus 2008). However, the TFG was defiled 
by internal divisions, defections, unpopularity among the populace and lack of power. The 
TFG was weak and incapable of uniting the state or effecting any change in the security 
situation of Somalia.  
4.3.1  The AU’s Mission in Somalia 
Faced with UN reluctance to solve the Somali conflict, the African Union established a 
peacekeeping mission known as African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. 
AMISOM replaced Ethiopian forces that were enjoined to withdraw from the country given 
the intolerance of Ethiopian forces in Somalia (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). The mission came after 
over 10 years of continued unrest in Somalia since the termination of UNOSOM
58
 in 1995. In 
tandem with its mandate of contending with African problems, the African Union took on the 
burden of contending with Somalia’s crises with an approval from the UNSC on the 20
th
 of 
February 2007 in line with UNSC Resolution 1744. 
AMISOM began with a limited mandate to protect the TFG officials in Baidoa from rebel 
forces (Agada 2008: 51). Later on, AMISOM was mandated to protect the TFG and 
important infrastructures in Mogadishu such as the port and airport, to provide support for 
humanitarian assistance as well as stabilize the security situation in Somalia (Cilliers et al 
2010). With limited resources and personnel as well as the complex and unpredictable nature 
of Somali crises, AMISOM was limited in its ability to attain its envisaged mandate  (Cilliers 
et al 2010: 3). Until recently, the mission was mainly efficient in providing security for TFG 
officials. AMISOM was also ill-equipped and lacked the financial resources and manpower 
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 The UN and US intervention in Somalia that ended in a debacle in the mid-1990s discourages the 
international community’s political will to intervene again in Somalia’s crises. The crises in Somalia – 
if not the whole conflicts in Africa – was deemed hopeless situations in western eyes in the 1990s. 
This somewhat explains the failure of the western powers to intervene in Rwanda in 1994, and Seirra 
Leone and Liberia in the late 1990s. It was only after the 9/11 terrorist attack in U.S that the 
international community grew concerned about the plight of failed and crises states given their link 
with international terrorist organizations. 
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to mitigate the humanitarian insecurities in the country. AMISOM could not protect the 
civilian population and quell the unrest (Agada 2008: 51). Besides its inefficiency, AMISOM 
forces came under direct attack from better-armed rebel forces. For instance, soon after its 
deployment, four Ugandan peacekeepers were attacked in May 2007. In October 2008, 
Burundian forces were attacked soon after their arrival. Between 2009 and 2012, AU forces 
lost over 500 troops in Somalia (Crisis Group Africa Briefing 2012). 
Al-Shabaab battled relentlessly with the AMISOM-backed Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in a bid to control significant parts of the country. Al-Shaabab soon engaged in 
international terrorist activities to register their displeasure with regional intervention. In July 
2010, Al-Shabaab carried out a suicide bomb attack in Ugandan capital Kampala – an attack 
that killed 79 people. The terrorist group claimed the attack was a retribution for Ugandan 
and Burundian involvement in Somalia given that AMISOM is made up of military forces 
mainly from the foregoing countries (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). This raised AU’s attention to the 
need to wrestle properly with the Somali conflict that has become a security problem for the 
horn of Africa.  
During the AU Summit in Kampala in July 2010, few days after the suicide bomb attack in 
the Capital City, AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping called for the reinforcement of 
AMISOM, which continued to operate with 6300 troops – mainly from Burundi and Uganda 
– instead of the targeted 8000 troops that was mandated since 2007. It was agreed that the 
mission should be reinforced with about 2000 troops, a move that would increase the size of 
the force from 6300 to more than 8000 troops. The complex, unstable and violent nature of 
the Somali crisis deterred African states and UN members from making effective military 
commitments to Somalia (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). While UN members only provided financial 
assistance to AMISOM, African states lacked the will to make commitments to reinforce 
AMISOM. Since the 2010 call for the reinforcement of AMISOM, the mission remained with 
a force strength of less than the 8000 required troops until 2011 when AMISOM began to 
make considerable progress.  
Until 2011, AU’s efforts in Somalia were analysed with pessimism. But in 2011, Al-Shabaab 
was weakened politically and financially by the devastating famine that plagued the country 
and AMISOM took advantage of this to launch an offensive to bring Mogadishu and much of 
Somalia under the control of the TFG (Pham, 2011: 184). On 6 August, 2011, Al-Shabaab 
abandoned Mogadishu under immense pressure from AMISOM. Between September and 
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October 2012, AMISOM captured Merka, a port at the south of Mogadishu, and key areas in 
Kismayo that used to be a stronghold of Al-Shabaab. Since then, the security situation in 
Mogadishu has improved and Somalia has recorded a decrease in violence and even pirate 
activities (Back 2012: 1).  
The recent successes of AMISOM have engendered hope for the stabilization of Somalia 
since state collapse in 1991 (Back 2012: 1). AMISOM oversaw the September 2012 elections 
that led to the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President by the 275-member 
parliament (Back 2012: 1). This election marked a significant transition in Somalia as power 
was transferred from the TFG to the Federal Government of Somalia. The transition was 
made possible by the huge commitment and effort of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). The AU’s effort in considerably stabilizing Somalia raises the regional 
organization’s status and role in the continent as mediator and peacekeeper.  
The UNSC in February 2012 approved the boosting of AMISOM forces due to its recent 
progresses. Presently, AMISOM has about 17,000 troops. Though AMISOM has made 
crucial achievements, consolidating recovered areas remains a challenge. The lack of air 
assets and understrength force constrained AMISOM from expanding its area of operations 
(AU PSC, 2013). To recover the territories still under Al Shabaab’s control and adequately 
consolidate recovered areas, AMISOM requires a well-equipped force to subjugate the 
strategic resources of Al-Shabaab (AU PSC 2013). Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep the 
pressure on Al-Shabaab so as to forestall conflict relapse and heightened insecurity in the 
country. AMISOM has the responsibility of contributing to the development and training of 
Somalia’s Security forces. These would go a long way in enabling the Federal Government of 
Somalia to weaken and neutralize Al-Shabaab in a bid to bring much of Somalia under 
government control.  
To this end, it will be beneficial for the international community to enhance the capacity of 
AMISOM forces to take up a more important role in shaping the future of Somalia. It remains 
contentious whether it would be most helpful for AMISOM to be reinforced, or to establish 
an exclusive UN mission or a joint AU-UN mission in Somalia parallel to that of Sudan. 
Given the aversion of external  influence in Somalia, an exclusive UN mission may drag 
Somalia backward in terms of its present security situation
59
 even though AMISOM was 
                                                          
59
 Experience has shown that the more international parties get involved in the conflict, the more 
terrorism is fueled (Cilliers et al 2010: 6). In contrast to Agada (2008) call for an international 
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primarily mandated to hand over to a stronger UN mission when its mandate expires. Even if 
a hybrid mission of AU and UN (UNASOM) – replicating the scenario in Sudan – is to be 
recommended in Somalia, caution needs to be taken to ensure that the mission is largely 
under the control of Africans to allay Somali fears of foreign/western influence. In line with 
Vines’ (2013: 100) submission, this entails an active African leadership and ownership of the 
peace processes in Somalia (Vines 2013: 100). 
 
4.4  The Case of Libya 
During the wave of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, Arab states in North 
Africa that operated under autocratic regimes remained unaffected. When Aziz Bouziz, a 
destitute student in Tunisia set himself on fire in demonstration against Tunisian leadership, 
Tunisia embarked on a radical move towards democracy – a radical move that spread across 
Northern Africa and other Arab states in the Middle East (Rupiya 2012: 173). Thus, North 
Africa joined the rest of Africa in a bid to transform from one-party state system to full 
democracies (Rupiya 2012: 180). Between January and February 2011, Tunisians and 
Egyptians deposed Presidents Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak’s regime respectively. 
Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, some masses of the Libyan population began 
an uprising against the 42 year-old regime of Colonial Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar 
al-Gaddafi who had seized power in 1969. The revolution began on the 15
th
 of February 
2011. Gaddafi’s 42 year of repressive, arbitrary and autocratic governance was challenged to 
a level more militant than ever before (Apuuli 2012: 139). Using social networks such as 
Facebook and Twitter to mobilize the larger population, opposition groups summoned people 
to stage protests against the government. A revolution which started in a nonviolent and 
peaceful manner turned into an armed rebellion and civil war when Gaddafi embarked on a 
high handed military suppression of protesters. Gaddafi’s forces carried out several attacks on 
protesters which compelled opposition groups to adopt the use of force to drive their 
revolutionary agenda.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
intervention in Somalia that is championed by the US and UNSC, it will be will be beneficial to 
ensure an active AU engagement with the Somali crisis albeit with external assistance. 
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By not providing security for its population and proving to be a dictatorship, Gaddafi’s 
regime failed in its primary responsibility to protect its citizens. On the 23
rd
 of February 
2011, a week into the violence, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) condemned 
the indiscriminate attack on peaceful protesters and civilians, and urged the Libyan 
government to uphold the primary responsibility to protect its citizens (Dembinski and 
Reinold 2011: 10). AU PSC spelt out its intent to send a fact-finding mission to Libya
60
 
(Apuuli 2012: 139). However, the AU was indecisive; it failed to send a fact-finding mission 
timely and took no major action to stop the gross abuses against civilians. The UNSC sprang 
into action on 26 February 2011 by adopting Resolution 1970 that called for an arms 
embargo and targeted sanctions on Gaddafi and his aides. The sanctions were implemented 
by the US, EU, Arab League and other international organizations. However, the sanctions 
and embargoes failed to stop the Gaddafi’s onslaught on his people. The resolution also 
demanded the ICC to look into the Libyan situation. The ICC gave a warrant for the arrest of 
Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and the Intelligence Chief for the wilful killing of 
civilians and crimes against humanity (Rupiya 2012: 174).  
Meanwhile, AU opposed any use of force against Gaddafi’s regime and the ICC’s arrest 
warrant for Gaddafi (Gottwald 2012: 22). Instead, AU insisted that Libyans should be 
allowed to choose their leader without external assistance. On 10 March, the AU PSC 
established an Ad Hoc High Level Committee – consisting of five heads of state – charged to 
seek diplomatic solutions to the Libyan conflict
61
. In a meeting at the Mauritanian Capital 
Nouakchott, the Ad-Hoc High Level Committee reiterated the AU’s stance that Libya’s unity 
and territorial integrity must be respected (Winston 2011). Through the Ad-Hoc High Level 
Committee, the African Union submitted a Proposal for a Framework of Agreement on a 
Political Solution to the Crisis in Libya. The proposal called for ‘an immediate and complete 
cessation of hostilities, to be followed by the formation of an inclusive transitional 
government, the establishment of a constitutional framework and the organization of 
elections’ (Dembinski and Reinold 2011:11).  
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 As part of its mandate for the continents collective security and early-warning arrangements, the 
Council is expected to send fact-finding missions to trouble spots to assess potential crisis zones to 
facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict situations in Africa (Williams 2011: 7; Murithi 
2009: 92). 
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 With the enforcement of Resolution 1973 by NATO forces, the effort of High Level Committee 
was frustrated as they had to seek permission from NATO forces to go into the country (Dembinski 
and Reinold 2011: 11). 
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In line with AU’s idea of an inclusive transition government, Gaddafi was expected to be part 
of the transitional process in Libya against the demand of the protesters and rebel groups. 
Gaddafi in turn, was not willing to compromise by giving up power as president. The 
National Transitional Council (NTC), representing the rebel movement on the other hand did 
not find AU’s proposal practical and viable due to the NTC’s insistence for a settlement 
without Gaddafi in power or involvement in the transition process. Besides, the NTC found 
AU as an unreliable third party actor due to AU’s apparent favouring of Gaddafi and the 
Union’s opposition to any use of force against Gaddafi’s regime (Apuuli 2012: 149). 
Nevertheless, the AU failed to take swift and crucial action to resolve or spearhead the 
resolution of the conflict thereby creating room for the UNSC to take a leading role. Given 
the timidity and reluctance of the AU PSC to act on time and the increasing threat by 
Gaddafi’s forces to crush the rebellion, members of UN Security Council voted for the 
establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and the protection of civilians under the light of the 
UNSC resolution 1973 that was adopted on the 17
th
 of March 2011
62
. Among the 15 
members of the UN Security council, ten members voted for the adoption of the UN 
resolution while 5 members – China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India - abstained. Three 
African members of the Security Council, South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria, voted for the 
adoption of the resolution thereby exposing the lack of unity within the African Union 
(Winston 2011).  
The UNSC resolution 1973 set an invitation for a coalition of the willing to enforce the will 
of the UN as captured in the UNSC Resolution 1973. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) offered to carry out the mandate of the resolution. The Libyan case became the first 
instance where the doctrine of responsibility to protect was put into practice after its 
acceptance during the 2005 UN World Summit. Spearheaded by France and Britain, NATO 
forces embarked on a bombing campaign focused at first on incapacitating Libyan air defence 
and destroying heavy weapons of Gaddafi’s forces in embattled zones within hours of the 
adoption of UN resolution 1973 (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 7).  
As soon as NATO began enforcing the no-fly zone in Libya, a chorus of criticism greeted the 
air strikes carried out by NATO forces that were acting under the approval of the UN 
(Winston 2011). Notably, Russia, Turkey, AU, and the Arab League which supported the no-
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 Outraged by the turn out of events in Libya, the Arab League set the motion for the adoption of the 
UNSC resolutions 1973 on Libya (Rupiya 2012: 173). 
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fly zone before criticized NATO’s military assault on Libya and indicted it for going beyond 
the scope of the UNSC resolution 1973. The Western forces were accused of enthusiastically 
embarking on the campaign of regime change to secure Libya’s vast oil supply (Dembinski 
and Reinold 2011: 13). Amid the barrage of criticism NATO did not relent. After 
successfully stopping the advance of Libyan forces on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, 
NATO changed its campaign to one of regime change. This was an improvement from the 
prior campaign which did not openly call for comprehensive removal of the powers that be. 
Gaddafi’s track record of being eccentric and obstinate as well as his alleged historic ties with 
terrorism induced western forces to seek a Libyan state without Gaddafi in power
63
. 
Moreover, Gaddafi’s call for the random killing of all rebels and opposition groups raised 
significant international doubt about the possibility of a peaceful or negotiated settlement that 
involved Gaddafi and somewhat legitimized the actions of NATO. 
To spearhead the revolution, the NTC was officially considered as the legitimate governing 
authority in Libya in July 2011 by the Libya Contract Group under the leadership of former 
Justice Minister Mustafa Mohamed Abud Al Jeleil. The NTC received widespread 
recognition by Libyans and rebel forces thereby providing grounds for western states to push 
for the deposition of Gaddafi’s unpopular regime. Alain Juppe, the foreign minister of 
France, points out that it is obvious that the aim of NATO’s mission in Libya ‘is to allow the 
Libyan people to choose its own government’ (Godoy 2011). This made it clear that the real 
motive of NATO was to overthrow Gaddafi. NATO attacked vital military installations of 
Libya and Gaddafi’s former compound in Tripoli that housed major military equipment 
thereby providing grounds for the advancement of rebel forces. Dembinski and Reinold, 
(2011: 4) argue that the broad idea of the UNSC resolution 1973 created room for the military 
intervention in Libya that led to a bid to topple Gaddafi’s regime. This runs athwart to the 
responsibility to protect doctrine is primarily for the protection of civilians and not for regime 
change.  
As NATO’s bombardments grew in momentum, AU’s voice grew insignificant. AU became 
a spectator in the events going on in Libya to the extent that it had to seek permission from 
the UN and NATO to enter Libya. This attests to the fact that the AU became more 
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 The American ambassador to Libya Gene A Cretz describes Muammar Gaddafi as “mercurial and 
eccentric” (Muaddi, 2011). In a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 2009, Qaddafi made 
an erratic speech where he wondered whether swine flu was a manufactured weapon, demanded that 
Security Council be renamed “terror council” and called for the investigations into the assassinations 
of John F Kennedy and Martin Luther King (Muaddi 2011). 
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insignificant in Libya’s revolution
64
. Worst of all, the UNSC regulated the entry of the AU 
Ad Hoc Committee into Libya to meet the rebel leaders and Gaddafi (Apuuli, 2012: 149).  
For instance, due to NATO’s intensive offensive against Libyan air defences, AU Ad Hoc 
Committee meeting with Gaddafi and other stakeholders in Libya which was planned for 19 
March 2011 was delayed till the 11
th
 of April (Tungwara 2011: 3). NATO’s intervention in 
Libya was criticized by AU for not giving Africa the opportunity to deal with its issues before 
the consideration of a non-African coercive means of resolving the conflict. However, Apuuli 
(2012: 147) argues that if the AU had sent the fact finding mission
65
 urgently to Libya, the 
UNSC would not have ignored or marginalized the Union’s role and effort.  
The AU was too divided to make any decisive resolution about the Libyan crisis. Moreover, 
at the outset of the conflict, some African leaders downplayed the carnage (Dembinski and 
Reinold 2011: 11). This was because President Muammar Gaddafi had been a leading actor 
in the AU and he had a huge influence in AU’s reforms and operations (Hanson, 2009:1). 
Besides, as noted by Williams (2012: 12), Libya had allegedly paid the dues of poorer 
African states
66
. Gaddafi also supported many controversial leaders in Africa such as 
Zimbabwe’s Mugabe who called the Libyan uprising a mere ‘domestic hiccup’ and Uganda’s 
President Museveni who referred to Gaddafi as a ‘true nationalist’. (Dembinski and Reinold 
2011: 12). Gaddafi’s financial and ideological bearing on AU and its predecessor, OAU, over 
a long period of time made AU hamstrung in making a speedy response to the Libyan 
conflict. Hence, AU, like its predecessor OAU, tended to favour regime security and 
consolidation at the expense of human security.  
Despite the belief within the camp of African leaders that Gaddafi had been too brutal due to 
the massive destruction of lives and properties by the government forces and the associated 
bloodshed, they still could not spearhead the immediate resolution of the crisis. Instead of 
reacting decisively to the Libyan conflict, AU ended up condemning NATO’s intervention 
for taking sides with the insurgent group. However, Handy contends that AU’s criticism of 
NATO’s airstrikes were confusing as there was no firm position on the issue because 
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 As part of its Early Warning System, the African Union is supposed to send a fact finding mission 
composed of military operatives to assess risk levels in conflict regions to enable them make informed 
decisions on how to intervene. 
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different African states seemed to have different opinions for and against NATO’s 
intervention (quoted in Winston 2011). South Africa, for instance, voted for a no-fly zone in 
Libya in contrast to AU’s insistence on non-intervention in Libya. When NATO’s 
intervention began, South Africa turned out to be one of the ardent critics of NATO’s 
intervention.  Moreover, contrary to the will of AU, 17 African countries including Nigeria 
and Ethiopia recognized the National Transitional Council during the revolution (Rupiya 
2012: 174). This further mired the Union’s unity and commitment to addressing issues in the 
continent. 
After a decisive offensive by the NATO-backed Libyan rebel forces in Tripoli, Gaddafi’s 
regime was defeated. With the capture and eventual death of Gaddafi in October 2011, the 
Libyan conflict came to an end (Apuuli 2012: 140). The expectation was that AU would 
seriously be involved in Libya’s post-conflict peacebuilding. But, the reverse was the case. 
The AU still failed to provide cohesive policies to guide the transition efforts of the National 
Transition Council and recognize the NTC as the legitimate Libyan government. This was 
case until the AU capitulated in light of widespread international acceptance of the NTC as 
the de jure government. The turnout of events during the Arab spring in North Africa, 
especially in Libya, somewhat undermined AU’s relevance and significance as an institution 
committed to African peace and security.  
Taking the cue from the turnout of events in Libya, AU has been challenged to swiftly take 
proactive stance in the continent to guard against hidden and undeclared agendas such as that 
which NATO was accused of habouring. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that AU’s 
interventionist strategy would have been successful, given Gaddafi’s obstinacy and the hard 
resistance of the Libyan rebels. Perhaps, if the African Union had been more proactive in 
taking the responsibility of finding a truce with a possible option of military intervention, the 
Union would have facilitated Libya’s transition to democracy as it deems best. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has interrogated the responses of the African Union to the internal crisis of its 
member states. The first section examined how the African Union through AMIS tried to 
wrestle with the conflict in Darfur with its limited resources, as well as its few undertrained 
staff. Initially, the AU was also praised for its proactive measures to resolve the conflict. Due 
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to the limitations in arms and resources as well the AU’s apparent favouring of the Sudanese 
government, AMIS failed to have deterrence effect on the belligerents. Fighting and violence 
against the civilian population continued. After the mandate of AMIS expired in 2007, the 
African Union continued to take leading role in resolving the conflict in Darfur under the 
joint AU/UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Darfur crisis continues to pose an immense 
challenge for the African Union.  
The second section looked at the African Union’s intervention in Somalia, a peacekeeping 
intervention that moved from poor achievements in the first three years of its establishment to 
a significant progress in recent times. Since AMISOM led a successful campaign against Al-
Shabaab in 2011, it has continued to make immense progress in Somalia by gradually 
restoring stability and facilitating in the establishment of a new Somali government in 2012. 
In the third section, the African Union’s response to the 2011 Libyan crisis was estimated. It 
was observed that if the African Union had being more decisive, it would have spearheaded 
the Libyan revolution.  
In a highly competitive international security environment, the African Union ought to be 
more proactive in making itself relevant in a region under its direct jurisdiction. This would 
go a long way in ensuring that the needs, demands and fears of its member states are met in 
line with the notion of African solutions to African problems. The next chapter shall engage 
in an analysis of the prospects and challenges of AU’s interventionist role especially in the 








Prospects and Challenges of the AU Interventionist Role 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the prospects and challenges of the African Union’s efforts at conflict 
management. Section one of the chapter considers the crucial aspects of commitment and 
political will of the African Union in contending with the problems of conflict in Africa. The 
second section examines the financial, expert and resource capability of the African Union to 
carry out peace operations. Section three explores the status of AU member states which are 
detrimental to the regional body’s efficiency.  
5.2  The Question of Commitment and Political Will 
It is true that the African Union was not formed out of a vacuum; it inherited the members, 
infrastructures, institutions, resources and external donors of the Organization of African 
Unity. Nevertheless, the changes made to establish the African Union were epic and 
demanded huge financial and resource commitment as well as political will. Members of the 
African Union have demonstrated huge commitments to confronting the scourge of conflicts 
in Africa through AU’s complex peace and security institutional mechanisms. While still 
trying to develop its institutional mechanisms, the African Union soon after its establishment 
quickly embarked on the task of wrestling with the conflicts in Africa. Unlike the OAU, the 
African Union has taken a more proactive stance in preventing, managing and resolving 
African conflicts (Sesay and Omotosho 2011: 3).  
In situations that threaten peace and security such as border disputes, secessionist struggles, 
electoral violence, unconstitutional changes of government
67
, insurgency and civil war, the 
African Union seeks peaceful resolutions to conflict. The reaction of the African Union to 
conflict situations reflects in its condemnation of actions that threaten peace and security, its 
calls for peaceful settlement of conflicts and its proactive stance on establishing a host of 
diplomatic and mediatory interventions that sometimes extend to peace keeping operations. 
Commendably, AU’s response to conflict cases favours negotiated settlements to conflicts. 
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The Union makes remarkable efforts at including all stakeholders including rebel or 
perceived terrorist groups in the negotiation efforts (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and 
Okumu, 2010: 30).  
To enforce negotiated agreements, the African Union has established peacekeeping missions 
in conflict states when necessary. For instance, the African Union established a peacekeeping 
mission in Sudan in 2004 after it had engaged in diplomatic and mediatory efforts to quell the 
unrest in Darfur. The African Union’s peacekeeping operations often aim to protect civilian 
populations, stabilize conflict zones and create a conducive environment for a strong UN 
intervention. AU’s peacekeeping interventions have been witnessed in Burundi, Sudan, 
Comoro Islands and Somalia. Members of the African Union showed their commitment by 
contributing troops and resources to the foregoing mission areas. 
The first AU peacekeeping mission AMIB (AU Mission in Burundi) is commended for its 
successful endeavour in deterring the use of violence, stabilizing the country and creating the 
conditions for the deployment of a UN operation in 2003 and subsequent elections in June 
2005 (National Model United Nations, 2008: 20). To quell the crisis in Darfur, AU deployed 
over 7,000 African Union forces between 2004 and 2007 and backed a stronger UN 
peacekeeping force in the region from 2008 to the present (Scanlon et al 2007:21). The AU 
Mission in Somalia also came at a time when the UN was reluctant to intervene in the 
conflict-ridden and collapsed state of Somalia.  
AU intervention in Burundi, its missions in the Comoro Islands and its mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) are adjudged as successes despite their deficiencies (National Model United Nations 
2008: 7; Shinn, 2012:2; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). The African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) has gradually attained considerable achievements in recent years as well leading 
to the  establishment of a new Somali federal government since the collapse of President Siad 
Barre’s regime in 1991 (Shinn 2012: 2). With such efforts, AU’s interventionist role in the 
continent promises a peaceful Africa where issues are tackled by Africans in solidarity.  
However, the African Union is faced with many challenges that undermine its peace and 
security agenda. The African Union is faced with the problem of summoning the sufficient 
political will and commitment to adequately enforce conflict management operations. African 
states tend to be less committed to African Union’s peace operations in Africa in terms of 
contributing forces as well as resources. In terms of the supply of armed forces, during the 
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July 2010 AU Summit in Kampala, member states agreed to reinforce AMISOM by 
increasing its troops from the 6300 troops (mainly comprising of Burundian and Ugandan 
soldiers) to the  8000 targeted size that was mandated in 2007 (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). 
However, member states failed to commit their soldiers and fulfill their pledges of troops for 
the mission. Since 2007, AMISOM remained with a force strength that is less than the 8000 
required troops until the recent achievements of AMISOM forces which reignited the 
discourse on the reinforcement of AMISOM.  
Likewise, the African Union’s mission in Sudan (AMIS) faced a similar challenge as its 
3,320 force strength that was mandated in October 2004 only reached its full strength in April 
2005, six months after the decision was reached. When AMIS troop reached its reinforced 
force strength of about 7,000 troops in 2006, extra five thousand troops were needed in the 
region due to Darfur’s huge land mass. It became difficult for AMIS to respond to the 
challenge of reining in on the violence in Darfur. The African Union lacked the political will 
to mandate a further reinforcement of the force strength until the mission was transformed 
into a hybrid AU and UN mission UNAMID in 2008 (Evans 2006: 720). 
Moreover, few member states within the African Union have shown great commitment while 
others keep displaying poor commitments in relation to sending armed troops to support the 
AU cause.  Table 1.0 below illustrates this point by displaying AU peace operations and the 
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Evident from the table above, the support for regional peace operations in Africa are hugely 
uneven. Contributors such as South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Ethiopia seem to be the main pillars of AU peace operations. With such a small number of 
contributors out of fifty four member states, African Union peace operations suffer from lack 
of adequate support from member states (Williams 2011: 15).  
As diagnosed by Coleman (2011: 517), regional peace operations in Africa suffer from poor 
commitment due to the preference for UN/global peace operations. African states participate 
more in UN peace operations than in the continent’s regional peacekeeping operations. 
Between 2001 and 2009 African states have deployed more troops to UN missions in the 
continent than regional peace operations (Coleman 2011: 538). The range of troop supply 
from African states between 2001 and 2009 has been about 5,200 troops and military 
observers for regional peace operations and 14,200 troops and military observers for UN 
missions worldwide. Within Africa, sub-Saharan African states’ troop contribution for UN 
missions ‘rose from 8,441 military personnel in July 2001 to 20,677 in July 2009’ (Coleman 
2011: 537). Noticeably, after UN missions replace regional missions such as the case of 
UNAMID, UNMIL and UNOCI, African states commit more forces to the UN mission than 
they do for regional missions. For instance, in the case of AMIS transition to UNAMID, 
African states provided more troops that amount to about 71% UNAMID force strength by  
May 2011 (Luqman and Omede 2012: 60). 
Such uneven troop commitments are explicable from the fact that the demands and financial 
commitment required for peace operations preclude African states from dedicating their 
forces to regional peace operations because they, as member states, bear the responsibility to 
provide for their soldiers. But for UN peace operations, African states deploy more troops for 
the operation because the financial needs of the troops are catered for by the UN 
peacekeeping budget (Coleman 2011: 539). Moreover, the training, experience
68
, advanced 
logistics, better treatment and the prestige of contributing to a global peace mission entice 
African states to deploy more troops for UN peacekeeping operations. 
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 The experience of the UN in conflict resolution is broader and reliable than that of regional 
organizations. The UN has intervened in different conflicts across the globe. Hence, it possesses a 
wide range of knowledge and ideas on how to approach conflict situations. The decisions and actions 
of the UN are backed by the great powers who give weight to its decision and actions than that of 
regional organizations. UN provides comprehensive dispute settlement system under the backing of 
international law, International Court of Justice and the Security Council, etc. 
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A phenomenon that further raises concern for AU’s commitment to devise African solutions 
to African problems is that regional peace operations are conceived as interim - and not 
alternative - operations to be taken over by a stronger UN mission. African states prefer 
short-term peacekeeping missions while shying away from long-term missions. AU missions 
are designed as stabilization operations to be replaced by a UN peace operation from about 
90 to 120 days (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 41). The regional body’s 
missions to Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, except that of the Comoros Islands were all designed as 
interim missions to be replaced by a well-equipped, financed and stronger UN mission (Shinn 
2012:2). As such, African regional organizations as well as the African Union tend to 
conceive themselves as only being important when the UN Security Council is passive to the 
conflicts within their regions. 
Realistically, the arrangement to replace AU (stabilization) missions with a stronger UN 
operation is inevitable given the minimal financial and resource capacity of AU to engage in 
long term peace operations (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 15). However, 
regional peacekeeping does not necessarily derive its legitimacy from the UN and it may not 
be funded by it (Coleman 2011: 519). If the African Union is to go in line with its mandate of 
providing peace and security in Africa, it should be willing to take up the responsibilities 
involved in both short term and long term peace operations in the continent.  
Coleman (2011: 519) argues that due to the preference for UN peace operations by African 
states, the African Union as well as African sub-regional organizations do not control the 
mandating process for UN peace operations as well as the interventions of foreign powers in 
the African continent. The case of Libya where the UN-mandated NATO forces decided to 
intervene militarily without the consent of the African Union shows that the African regional 
body could easily be sidelined from decision making in international affairs. It remains mind 
boggling trying to comprehend why the international community intervened in Libya after 
some few months of violence while they are not determined to intervene in Syria that has 
been in conflict for over two years. Do the United Nations and other foreign powers 
undermine African states and the continent’s regional organization by easily intervening in 
the continent when they deem fit?  
Nevertheless, as argued by Apuuli (2012), if the AU had stepped up adequately to the 
challenges of the continent, the foregoing question could have been phrased differently. It 
would have only been a question of the necessity of a NATO intervention in Libya. The AU 
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continues to be stymied by poor political will, half-hearted measures and failure to reach 
crucial decisions. This dithering runs athwart to the mandate of the regional body to solving 
African conflicts (Apuuli 2012:135). Adding to the issue of poor political will and half-
hearted measures is the failure of the African Union to institutionalize the African Standby 
Force (ASF) since it was established in 2003. The ASF is expected to serve as the operational 
arm of the AU to enable the African Union to respond timely and perhaps efficiently to 
humanitarian crises across the continent.  Though the ASF was expected to reach its full 
operational force by 2010, AU has been unable to make any decisive move to 
institutionalizing the ASF
69
.   
Inauspicious to the African Union’s conflict management capabilities, there tends to be a lack 
of harmony between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union 
(Vines 2013:104). The RECs are expected to play significant roles in the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA) by addressing the conflicts in their regions under the 
leadership of the African Union (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 16). The 
African Union is privileged by the invaluable lessons learnt from the experiences of peace 
operations led by the RECs. Notably, ECOWAS and SADC have been prominent in engaging 
in peace operations in Africa particularly in West Africa and Southern Africa respectively. 
The peacekeeping operations led by these two RECs in particular and the experiences 
garnered from such operations set the stage for African Union’s endeavours in peacekeeping 
operations. Although, RECs are expected to be proactive in addressing the conflicts within 
their regions, their peace and security agendas are expected to be coordinated by the African 
Union.  
Yet, the RECs tend be less committed to AU’s leadership (Vines 2013:101). A good case of 
RECs discordant with the AU has to do with the establishment of the ASF. The RECs have a 
significant role to play in the institutionalization of the ASF by providing troops that would 
make up the ASF as well as making financial and resource commitment to operationalize the 
ASF. But, the RECs have failed to provide the resources needed or to show commitment to 
developing the ASF by recruiting troops from the different regions. As noted by Vines (2013: 
104), there will be no African Standby Force, Continental Early Warning System and the 
Panel of the Wise without the cooperation of the Recs.  
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 Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 19) observe that even the United Nations has not being able to 
successfully operationalize a Standby Force. 
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5.3  The AU’s Resource Capabilities 
The African Union is crippled by its lack of finance, expert personnel and relevant resources 
to match the challenges facing the continent. Finance is a major prerequisite for an effective 
African Union because it determines the number of troops to be deployed for a mission, the 
kind of equipment used by the troops and the duration of the mission. Kioko (2003: 822) 
notes that the ‘average cost of sustaining peacekeepers is estimated at US$130 per day, 
excluding ordnance, equipment and transportation’. Such a huge financial commitment 
required for peace operations is evident from the Nigerian-led ECOWAS peacekeeping 
missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is alleged that Nigeria spent over US$1 million a day 
during the peacekeeping operations in each of the two countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) to 
quell and resolve the conflicts. The African Union Mission in Burundi had an operational 
budget of $110 million per year for 3335 personnel. The cost of sustaining AMISOM on the 
other hand was estimated at $600 to $800 million annually. Thus, there are huge financial 
burdens involved in carrying out peace operations effectively (National Model United 
Nations 2008: 17). 
Most of the AU’s funding  is dependent on uncertain external support as the cases of Somalia 
and Sudan where  the generosity and support of external bodies such as the UN, EU, G8 as 
well as states such as the US, China and Canada
70
 was dominant. As noted by Vines (2013: 
107), African states have only provided for 2% of the AU Peace Fund while international 
donors provided the bulk of the funds. The UN, EU, G8, US and China have been very 
supportive of the African Union and have prioritized the Union as an important actor 
committed to the resolution of conflicts in Africa (Mathiasen 2006: 7)
71
. These international 
bodies continue to pledge their commitment to developing AU’s capacity for instituting 
regional peace and security initiatives (Coleman 2011: 518).
 
MØller (2009: 16) observes that 
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 The EU and U.S. contributed about 80 per cent of the cost of AMIS. They still contribute about 80 
per cent of the ongoing AU mission in Somalia AMISOM (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 
2010: 37). 
71
 The EU has been very instrumental in providing financial support and assistance to the 
establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (Lopez 2004: 7). Beside other financial 
support, China single-handedly built a multi-million dollars new secretariat for the AU. The UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon notes that ‘the UN is committed to helping build up the capacity of 
regional and sub-regional organizations to undertake conflict prevention, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping tasks in their respective regions’ (Coleman 2011: 518). Several regional peacekeeping 
capacity-building programmes have been launched by western actors to develop regional institutional 
capacities to plan, deploy, manage and sustain peace operations (Coleman 2011: 518). 
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‘it would be surprising if the world’s poorest continent were able to solve the world’s most 
frequent and widespread as well as most deadly conflicts’. 
However, external support is uncertain and based on charity to the African Union. The 
uncertainty of external support entails that the AU is restricted in making tangible and 
binding decisions unless its decisions are accepted and funded by external donors. Hence, 
without external donation, the African Union seems to be hamstrung in making any useful 
impact in Africa. In such a situation, external donors have the power to influence AU’s 
decisions to suit their interests.  
In addition to financial dependency, the AU is further beset by the lack of adequate expertise. 
Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011: 5) note that despite the progress and the experience gained 
by African troops during peace operations, they still require training and technical support 
from external bodies. AMIS, for instance, would have faced huge difficulties in Sudan 
without the help of NATO’s support and assistance. For AU’s mission in Sudan, NATO 
provided training for AU forces and provided logistic assistance for AMIS in 2005. Without 
external support and assistance, the AU’s present military capabilities and strategic expertise 
are limited in terms of conflict prevention, peace building, peacekeeping and civilian 
protection.  
Nevertheless, the over reliance on external financial, military and expert assistance runs 
contrary to AU’s rhetoric and commitment to finding African solutions to African problems 
(Williams 2011: 15). How can the Union be committed to solving African problems using 
African solutions when they are dependent on external powers for peace and security 
initiatives and operations? The idea of African solutions to African problems tends to be a 
mere catch phrase or a future goal that does not reflect the implementation endeavours of 
Africans. Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 1) argue that to actualize the notion of African 
solutions to African problems, the African Union needs to ensure sustainable local funding 
and ownership as well as ensure that conflict management efforts are feasible, affordable and 
sustainable. 
Another major limitation of the African Union is its limited material resources (Mathiasen 
2006: 7). The paucity of resources to engage in military missions undermines African 
Union’s efficiency in terms of the responsibility to protect. In reference to AU’s mission in 
Darfur, Scanlon et al (2007: 8) note that the difficulties faced by AU’s missions are indicative 
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of the regional organization’s lack of military capacity. The AU does not have the necessary 
sea and airlift capacity, training facilities, management structures, weapons, information 
technology and mobile carriers to engage in an effective peace operation (Williams 2011:15). 
As observed by Evans (2006: 720), the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2006 
was manned by only ‘seven thousand inadequately mandated, insufficiently mobile, and 
otherwise militarily incapable personnel on the ground’.  
Most significant is the AU’s lack of airlift capacity such as armoured helicopters, jet-powered 
aircraft, turboprop aircraft, drones, etc. Airlift resources would have been useful in 
transporting troops and equipment in a timely manner to operation areas. For instance, AMIS 
forces had to undertake dangerous journeys into Darfur stalked by the risk of ambushes by 
warring parties. It also took UNAMID almost 2 years to reach 68% of its mandated force 
strength due to the lack of airlift resources to transport troops from their respective countries 
to the conflict zone (Diop et al 2012: 1).  
With airlift capacity, AU forces would also be able to bypass regions that warring parties 
deny them from passing. This will also prevent AU forces from being vulnerable to 
landmines, ambushes and attacks from irregular forces (Diop et al 2012). Moreover, AMIS 
could have avoided the numerous attacks on its personnel if it had been supported by airlift 
resources as these could have been used to reinforce troops under ambush or attack (Diop et 
al 2012: 2). AU forces could also use the airlift capacity to strategically target the resources 
of defaulting parties. UNAMID forces as well have blamed their inability to defend civilian 
populations on the lack of helicopters to transport troops and target defaulting forces (Diop et 
al 2012: 2). With airlift resources, civilian casualties would be reduced and AU could 
function more effectively without delays
72
. If the African Union does not wield necessary 
capacity to intervene in conflict situations, how could they be taken seriously by warring 
parties? 
Williams (2011: 5) further observes that despite the paradigm shift from non-intervention to 
the non-indifference to the internal conflicts of member states, the AU is yet to invoke Article 
4(h)
73
 and launch military intervention against a member state despite the presence of 
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 Airlift resources would go a long way to enable the regional organization to contend to issues of 
illicit trade that take place in the seas and by air and prevent criminal and terrorist networks from 
easily occupying ‘ungoverned’ areas in Africa. 
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 Article 4(h) mandates AU to respond to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as well 
as threats to legitimate order (Kioko 2003: 807). 
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plausible circumstances to do so. The AU PSC has rather shown strong preference for 
interventions carried out with consent of the state as evident in its missions in Burundi, 
Comoros Islands and Sudan, as well as in Somalia where the consent was from a transitional 
government because Somalia had no central government
74
 (Bergholm 2010: 10). The AU had 
been expected to act proactively – with considerations of all forms of intervention – in states 
like Cote d’Ivoire and Libya where mass atrocities took place. Regrettably, the AU failed to 




According to Williams (2011:5), the strength and influence of states of certain states and their 
rulers militates against AU’s ability to invoke Article 4(h). This could have been the case in 
Libya. Evans (2006: 711) notes that the criteria of the responsibility to protect, holding that 
military intervention should have reasonable prospects of success, automatically rules out 
intervention against states where chances of success are remote, even when the intervention is 
justified. This may be adduced to explain why the African Union failed to consider military 
action in Libya due to limited resources beside the fact that Gaddafi had been a major actor in 
the African continent. As noted by Franke (2006: 4), the willingness to intervene in a conflict 
situation is parallel to the capacity to do so. Given the AU’s limited resources, the 
consideration of military intervention in Libya would seem futile because the prospect of 
success – a crucial criterion – was slim
76
. AU is still battling to rise above member states and 
gain a bold stature to confront its member states. The African Union ought to develop a 
supranational capacity to intervene anywhere in the continent. 
5.4  Status of the AU Member States  
The African Union’s ability to develop the relevant power to make effective influence in the 
continent is contingent on the status of its member states. Inauspiciously, most of the African 
Union’s member states are weak and crisis states. Howard (2010) observes that ‘Africa is 
undoubtedly plagued by systematic state failure in that the region lacks strong governance, 
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 This raises concerns about the Union’s commitment to move beyond regime security to the security 
of Civilians. 
75
 However, it is important to underscore the primacy of seeking political and diplomatic solutions to 
conflict. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect is not a justification for AU’s military 
adventurism. Nevertheless, states that engender their civilian population to untold suffering and gross 
atrocities ought to be confronted when their actions defy diplomatic and mediatory efforts. 
76
 More so, the Union would hardly consider military intervention for regional hegemonies such as 
Nigeria and South Africa even if it is warranted. 
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comprehensive economic development, and fails to provide security to its citizens and order 
in its territories’. By being composed of weak and crisis states, African Union inevitably 
reflect some form of weaknesses in its institutional bodies and operations. It is in view of the 
limitation of the states in Africa that Sesay (2008) contends aptly that ‘how can weak states 
generate the resources necessary to create domestic cohesion on matters of political power 
and economic distribution; and at the same time pursue regional or continental goals?’ Most 
states in Africa have been unable to contend with their internal issues let alone to tackle the 
problems of other states.  
The state failure, insecurities and human right abuses that have marred most African states 
have a bearing on the African Union’s agenda for peace and security. Countries torn apart by 
civil war such as Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Central African Republic, and the DRC cannot 
effectively contribute to matters that have to do with upholding human security, order and 
peace in another state. In addition, regimes notorious for human rights abuses in Africa would 
also be reluctant in promoting human security and would show poor political will in AU’s 
preventive and reactive initiatives towards conflict management (Tieku 2007: 33).  
To its discredit, the African Union as an institution has also failed to develop supranational 
capacity to properly challenge African states guilty of human right abuses. After it was 
formed in 2001, the African Union has not been able to effectively reprimand African leaders 
that are responsible for human rights abuses or that came to power via unconstitutional means 
in the past. The African Union did not challenge the political systems of its member states. 
For instance, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, having usurped power in 1969 through a coup, 
clung to power for 42 years until he was removed during the Libyan revolution in 2011. 
Gaddafi’s regime was characterized by state terror and human right abuses and he had been a 
military dictator since 1969. Further tarnishing the AU’s image, Gaddafi held the 
chairmanship of the PSC – which is responsible for promoting human rights, peace and 
security – in 2009 and he had held important  positions in AU as well as its predecessor, 
OAU. During the Libyan revolution in 2011, the AU was caught in an unwarranted dilemma: 
it was confronted by the invidious position of either supporting the influential Gaddafi or his 
detractors who, without doubt, enjoyed the support of non-African forces  
Beside the Libyan example, the case of Sudan posed a huge test for AU’s ability to display a 
supranational capacity to challenge its member states. With the leverage of being a member 
of the PSC between 2004 and 2006 the Sudanese government was able to influence and 
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determine the PSC mandate under which AMIS was founded. The AU PSC also gave the 
government the veto power in situations that call for the amendment of the mandate of AMIS. 
Coupled with the fact that the government was responsible for high handed attacks on its 
people, civilians and rebels nurtured the impression that AMIS was biased towards the 
Sudanese government. The impression was further encouraged by the failure of the AU to 
enforce the arrest of President al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity as mandated by the ICC.  
Moreover, the Sudanese government had on several occasions interfered with the operations 
of AMIS thereby undermining the power of the African Union. The government delayed the 
delivery of AMIS resources into the Darfur region. It also imposed curfews on AMIS which 
was supposed to be overseeing and enforcing peace processes in Darfur. Thus, the mission 
tended to operate under the dictates of Khartoum. This challenges the African Union’s 
capacity to intervene in its member states. 
On the list of regimes with bad records is that of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal who 
clung to power for twelve years abdicating power only in the face of mounted domestic and 
international pressure. President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast clung to power until he was 
ousted through military force in 2010. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe who is currently a 
member of the PSC continues to cling to power since he became president in 1987. His 
regime has committed several human rights violations including the use of state terror to 
maintain power. The incumbent Kenyan President and his deputy were recently arraigned by 
the ICC for crimes against humanity while the government is also a member of the AU PSC.  
From the examples cited, it is clear that the African Union tolerates the membership of 
governments with such dictatorial and repressive tendencies in its Peace and Security 
Council. How can the PSC be relied on to address African conflicts if members and potential 
members of the PSC are lacking in having a clear record of good governance, rule of law and 
security in their respective states? In fact, even if it wishes to confront its member states, 
there is virtually no member state with a good moral standing and relevant influence and 
power capacity to advance such an agenda. This makes it difficult to comprehend how the 
AU PSC, composed as it is of questionable governments can carry out the mandate of 
promoting and enforcing human security and enforcing peace and security? 
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Discouragingly,  more powerful states – that are expected to play significant role – such as 
Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Libya
77
 are also bedevilled by internal 
weaknesses (MØller 2009: 3). Particularly, South Africa and Nigeria have proven to be 
probable hegemonies in Africa that can bolster the ability of AU to meet its objectives. With 
its economic and military capacity and stable democracy relative to other African states, 
South Africa tends to be a strong power in Africa and plays leadership roles in the African 
Union. South Africa has been involved actively in AU and UN peacekeeping deployments in 
Comoros, Sudan, Burundi and DRC.  
However, South Africa is also challenged by its internal challenges at post-conflict 
reconstruction given the huge margins between the rich and the poor. Besides, most African 
countries are suspicious of South Africa’s role in Africa as indicated during the 2005 Cote 
d’Ivoire crises. South Africa was construed as being partisan, and driven by its quest to 
expand its economy and create business opportunities for South African firms like Randgold 
(Scanlon et al 2007: 29). Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan academic, has also accused South 
Africa of having ‘an inflated sense of authority and influence in foreign relations’ (quoted in 
Scanlon et al 2007: 29). Suspicions around South Africa’s operations in the continent 
challenge the role which it could play in strengthening the AU.  
Nigeria, on the other hand, has proven to be a de facto regional hegemony in West Africa
78
. 
With its economic and military power, Nigeria has played integral roles in ECOWAS, OAU 
and AU. It has been involved in more than 40 UN peacekeeping operations across the world 
and over 150,000 Nigerian soldiers have served on various peacekeeping missions (Scanlon 
et al 2007: 29). Moreover, the two Nigerian-led peacekeeping interventions in the 1990s were 
instrumental in resolving the conflicts in Liberia (1998) and Sierra Leone (1997). These make 
Nigerian forces an asset to the African Union in terms of peace and security. However, 
Nigeria has been accused of paternalism and arrogance in its foreign relations due to its 
willingness to intervene and play leadership roles in the continent (Scanlon et al 2007:29). 
Besides, the country faces internal challenges in terms of mal-governance and internal 
conflicts. There remains a need for the country to solve its internal problems so as to gain 
legitimacy with regards to its leadership endeavours in the continent.  
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 These countries are considered to be sub-regional hegemonies in Africa. 
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 Nigeria’s economy is 75% of West Africa’s economic strength. Its population also account for 50% 
of West African population. 
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Yet, African missions rely immensely on the commitment of the abovementioned ‘lead 
nations’, South Africa and Nigeria (MØller, 2009: 15; Kangwanja, 2006). For the African 
Union as well as any intervener to effect change in conflict situations, there ought to be a 
strong backing of the intervener’s resolution (Crocker 2001: 242). South Africa and Nigeria 
should be committed to support the development and efficiency of the African Union’s peace 
and security agenda. The African Union could gain much more from the active backing of its 
missions by Nigeria and South Africa (Scanlon et al, 2007: 29). Sesay (2008: 26) notes that 
with proper leadership, political will and motivation, South Africa and Nigeria 
could change the current and rather humiliating perception of Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a continent devoid of credible regional leaders(s) or ‘change makers’, 
although much would depend on whether or not they are ready to play the role 
of ‘defenders and ‘enforcers’ and make the necessary human and financial 
sacrifices.  
 
Given the weaknesses of other African states, successful African countries are expected to 
take the lead in the African Union so as to ensure that there is enough muscle to back AU’s 
decisions. To allay the fear of the domination of weaker states by powerful ones, the African 
Union, as an institution, could serve to check the power of powerful states and sub-regional 
hegemons and prevent them from dominating smaller African states (Franke, 2006: 8).  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the prospects and challenges of the African Union’s peace and 
security agenda in Africa. The first section examines AU’s commitment and political will at 
conflict management. Despite its efforts, the poor commitment in terms of inadequate troop 
contribution from member states and the failure to operationalize the ASF undermines AU’s 
effort at conflict management. The second section acknowledges the limited resource 
capabilities for the African Union’s peace and security agenda. This has led the regional body 
to be greatly dependent on external bodies, a phenomenon that controverts the African 
Union’s quest to provide African solutions to African problems. The succeeding chapter 
culminates the discussion with a summary of the research and a recommendation on the 




Summary and Conclusion 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the research findings and proffers some recommendations for the 
improvement of the African Union’s capabilities for conflict management. The last section 
offers a general conclusion on the research. 
6.2  Summary 
Since the end of colonialism, violent conflicts characterize most African states. Intra-state 
conflicts which became more rampant in Africa since the demise of the Cold War prompted 
the collapse of some states in Africa and exposed  civilian populations to wanton deaths, loss 
of properties and gross human right abuses. Apart from the horrendous impact of intra-state 
conflicts to civilian populations, the internal crises of individual states in Africa also threaten 
regional and international peace and security. Intra-state conflicts have engendered 
international problems like refugee flows, spread of diseases, arms proliferation, organized 
criminal activities, and international terrorism and trafficking. Conflicts in Africa have 
further stymied the socio-economic and political development of the continent and have 
tarnished its image in the globe.  
Due to the inability of African states to contain the insecurities in their respective countries, 
the United Nations and foreign powers such as the US, EU, France, China and Russia have 
often interfered in the internal affairs of African states to restore peace and security. 
Nevertheless, the United Nations’ commitment across the globe and the strategic interests of 
foreign powers preclude them from successfully restoring peace to the crisis situations in 
states involved. Moreover, Africa’s regional organization, the Organization of African Unity 
which was established in 1963 could not address the post-Cold War insecurities of its 
member states because of its out-dated objectives and strict adherence to the principle of non-
intervention.  
It is against this backdrop that African leaders found it crucial to establish a stronger and a 
more efficient regional organization, the African Union in 2002. In line with the political 
ideal of African solutions to African problems, the African Union, as a pan-African 
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institution, is expected to diligently respond to the multifarious challenges of Africa. This 
goes in line with the theoretical framework of liberal institutionalism used for the 
understanding of the significance of the African Union’s role in Africa. Liberal 
institutionalism emphasizes the importance of cooperation especially in an institutional 
environment so as to confront common challenges. The institutionalization of the cooperation 
between states encourages the commitment of member states to multilateral projects and 
promotes a perpetual and close attention to common challenges. 
Faced with the challenge intra-state conflicts and the resultant consequences, African leaders 
through the continent’s regional institution (African Union) have formed several institutional 
bodies and mechanisms to promote, enhance and enforce peace and security. The African 
Union seeks to address Africa’s conflicts in tandem with the principle of human security 
which accords greater concern for the security of individuals. Based on the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect, the African Union aspires to protect civilian populations and 
contain the deleterious effects of conflicts.  
Since its establishment, the African Union has adopted a host of diplomatic and mediatory 
interventionist mechanisms to respond to the conflicts in the continent. Interestingly, when its 
diplomatic and mediatory interventions fail, the African Union adopts military interventionist 
mechanisms to contain conflicts and to protect civilian populations in its member states in 
pursuant of Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. The regional body has employed   
military alternatives and sent peacekeeping missions to Burundi, Comoros Islands, Sudan, 
and Somalia. The African Union’s interventions depict its commitment to respond to the 
myriad conflicts that have been the bane of development in the continent.  
Still yet, the regional organization’s efficiency remains a subject of concern for Africans who 
have vested so much anticipation on its ability to address Africa’s security problems. The 
African Union’s capacity for conflict management and the quality of its interventions remains 
a subject of concern. The AU is envisioned to be effective enough to create a safe and stable 
environment for Africa to realize its political, economic and social aspirations. In line with 
the ideal of African solutions to African problems, the African Union’s efficiency at 
addressing African conflict issues would curtail the wanton suspicious external interventions 
in the continent and enable Africa to drive its goals and development. 
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Situated within the context of conflict management particularly, the research assesses the 
efficiency of the African Union in enforcing peace and security in Africa. Conflict 
management involves efforts at defending civilians and lessening the deleterious effects of 
conflict. The study places interest on the African Union’s effort at achieving the 
aforementioned goals specifically through its military approach. The cases of the African 
Union’s interventions in Sudan and Somalia and its response to the Libyan revolution are 
particularly instrumental in examining the regional body’s role, efficiency and capability to 
enforce peace and security in Africa. 
In the case of Sudan, the African Union in 2004 established a peacekeeping mission in the 
Darfur region of Sudan when violence erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of 
Sudan in alliance with its proxy the Janjaweed militia and two rebel groups; the Sudanese 
Liberation Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Murithi, 2009: 
99). The armed insurrection led to the loss of thousands of lives and grave atrocities against 
civilians in Darfur. Given atrocious nature of conflict coupled with the regional and 
international concern over the crisis, the African Union stood up to the challenge by taking up 
a mediatory role that eventually led to a peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan 
(AMIS) in 2004. The peacekeeping mission which lasted between 2004 and 2007 was 
charged with the mandate of protecting civilians as a priority, facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, monitoring the ceasefire agreement, and restoring peace and stability in 
Sudan. 
Initially, AMIS was hailed for its efforts that led to the reduction of violence in Darfur. The 
AU was also praised for its proactive measures to resolve the conflict (Franke, 2006: 10; 
NMUN, 2008: 7; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). Situations later deteriorated when the warring 
factions failed to recognize the deterrence power of AMIS due to AMIS’s limitations in terms 
of arms and resources. The lack of a binding agreement in Darfur further complicated the 
efforts of AMIS. Fighting and violence against the civilian population continued unabated. 
Aside from being unable to adequately protect civilians, AMIS troops and personnel fell 
under grievous attacks from belligerents.  
The failures and limitations of AMIS led to the establishment of a stronger joint AU/UN 
hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which began since 2008 to the present.  The African 
Union continues to play a major role in the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. UNAMID 
relatively stabilized the Darfur region. Yet, despite its force strength, UNAMID also face 
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similar challenges faced by AMIS such as continued unrest, indiscriminate attacks on 
civilians as well as UNAMID and humanitarian aid personnel.  
The AU Mission in Somalia on the other hand came at a time when the international 
community was reluctant to intervene in the conflict-ridden and collapsed state of Somalia. 
The US-led UN intervention in Somalia that ended in a debacle in the mid-1990s discouraged 
the international community’s political will to intervene again in Somalia’s crises. The 
insecurities of the anarchic state dragged neighbouring countries into the conflict and 
engendered the emergence and growth of fundamental Islamic militant movements with 
domestic and international terrorist intents.  In line with its mandate of providing African 
solution to African problems, the African Union stood up to the Somali crisis by establishing 
a peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) in the country in 2007. 
In the first three years of the mission, AMISOM was assessed negatively as it failed to 
protect the civilian population and contain the unrest. AMISOM virtually restricted its 
peacekeeping mission to the protection of the Transitional Federal Government’s officials 
(Shinn 2012). However, in 2011, AMISOM began a successful campaign against the Al-
Shabaab militia in the Mogadishu region. Under immense pressure from AMISOM, Al-
Shabaab forces abandoned the Mogadishu region. Gradually, AMISOM restored relative 
security in the Mogadishu region and facilitated the establishment of a new Somali 
government since the 1991 state collapse (Shinn 2012: 2).  
The 2011 revolution in Libya however, challenged the capacity of the African Union to meet 
up to the problem of conflict in Africa. The 2011 peaceful protest against Gaddafi’s 42 years 
dictatorial regime quickly turned into an armed rebellion due to the regime’s intransigencies 
and indiscriminate crack down on peaceful protesters. AU’s half-hearted measures and rather 
shaky proposal for a political solution in Libya was neither embraced by Gaddafi’s regime 
nor the rebel movement which was organized under the name National Transitional Council.  
The atrocities committed indiscriminately against the civilian populations led the UNSC to 
adopt resolution 1973 which established a no-fly zone in Libya. This paved way for NATO’s 
intervention in Libya, an intervention that turned into a campaign of regime change. The 
African Union became a spectator and mere reactors to NATO’s intervention that eventually 
led to the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime in October 2011. After the overthrow of Gaddafi, 
the African Union still remained incapable of guiding the future of post-Gaddafi’s Libya. 
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AU’s impotence in the crisis raises crucial questions around its credibility, legitimacy and 
capability to enforce its agenda of peace and security in the continent. 
Extrapolating from AU’s interventions in Sudan, Somalia and its response to the Libyan 
revolution, the African Union has shown a huge commitment relative to OAU in terms of 
actually making efforts to address the conflicts in the continent. While at its nascent stage, the 
regional body has made strides to respond to conflict scenarios in Africa without waiting to 
fully develop its institutional bodies and mechanisms. With limited finance and resources, the 
African Union has intervened militarily in conflicts that require enormous financial and 
resource commitments. The African Union has also been instrumental in responding to 
conflicts in Africa that were ignored by the UN. For instance, civil war has raged on in Sudan 
since 1983 without the UN’s intervention. The UN also failed to take a proactive stance in the 
face of the 2003 outbreak of violence in the Darfur region leaving the newly formed AU to 
rise up to the challenge by sending a peacekeeping mission into the region.  
In addition, since the debacle of the US-led UN intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 
1995, the international community had abandoned Somalia in its state of anarchy for twelve 
years until the African Union embarked on a peacekeeping intervention in the country from 
2007 to date.  These interventions depict the regional body’s commitment to the ideal of 
providing African solutions to African problems and betoken the possibility of a continent 
that forges solidarity between African states in a bid to solve the conflicts in the continent. 
AU’s interventionist role also promises a continent that would experience lesser and 
controllable conflict as well as fewer ulterior external interventions. 
Despite the promises of the African Union’s interventionist roles, the organization is wanting 
in terms of its capability to earnestly drive its agenda of peace and security. The African 
Union is faced with the challenges of:  
1) Summoning the political will to engage decisively with the conflicts in the continent. 
2) Poor planning and ambiguous mandates for its missions. 
3) Lack of adequate force-strength and troop contribution for its peace operations. 
4) Poor resources to carry out peace operations. 
5) Poor credibility due to the poor moral standing of its member states. 
6) Dependency on external assistance and support 
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The subsequent section shall consider these limitations and proffer some recommendations 
on how to develop the AU’s conflict management capabilities. 
6.3  Recommendations 
This section looks into some of the challenges faced by the African Union’s military efforts 
and proffers some recommendations for the development of the AU military interventionist 
role in Africa. 
6.3.1  Conflict Prevention and well-planned Intervention  
In line with the injunctions of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the African Union 
ought to underscore the importance of conflict prevention in Africa. As noted by Williams 
(2011:7), the AU PSC has been preoccupied with contending with armed conflicts in the 
continent than devising conflict prevention strategies which form a vital part of its 
mandates
79
. The African Union’s initiative of early warning action through the Continents 
Early Warning System (CEWS) is supposed to be an integral effort of the regional 
organization in preventing conflicts and promoting peace and security. The CEWS in Africa 
still has a long way to go in terms of developing appropriate information technology, 
infrastructure and well-trained analysts to arrest risks and early crises before they deteriorate. 
Moreover, the AU should also be proactive enough to send fact finding missions
80
 to regions 
experiencing mounting tensions in order to assess the situation and make informed decisions 
about what to do. It is argued that if the African Union had sent a fact finding mission to 
Libya at the dawn of the Libyan crisis, the regional body could have responded properly to 
the crisis and spearheaded the change that took place in Libya. The AU should also be bold 
enough to send early deployments of peacekeepers to conflict regions that could experience 
even greater carnage without some form of intervention to encourage nonviolent negotiations 
and deter the use of aggression. 
Furthermore, the African Union has been accused of poor planning and making ambiguous 
mandates for its missions. For instance, the African Union has been criticized for establishing 
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 The PSC has also been unable to pay attention to other forms of security threats such as 
environmental degradation, organized crime, terrorism, famine and diseases. 
80
 As part of its Early Warning System, the African Union is supposed to send a fact finding mission 
composed of military operatives to assess risk levels in conflict regions to enable them make informed 
decisions on how to intervene. 
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a peacekeeping mission in Somalia where there was no peace to keep and no peace 
agreement to enforce (Murithi, 2009: 101). Contrary to the conditions stipulated by the 
Lakhdar Brahimi Panel of 2000
81
, AU embarked on a mission of peacekeeping in Somalia 
without a peace to keep or the resources and means to carry out the task (Cilliers et al 2010: 
4-5). The mission mainly concentrated on the protection of TFG officials until recently when 
it began a mission of driving out Al-Shabaab militants. It remains unclear if the mandate is 
the protection of officials or a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission. This highlights 
the Union’s limitations in terms of articulating a proper military strategy to combat such 
security challenge.  
AMIS on the other hand tended to have accorded the power to control its mission to the 
government of Sudan. The government of Sudan at times imposed curfews and restricted the 
operations of AMIS. Worst still, AMIS was accused of being partial in favour of the 
government. Such limitations in AU operations demands a carefully planned mandate and 
modus operandi so as to ensure that AU have full control of its mission in host states, to 
ensure that the regional body remains impartial to warring parties and is able to meet up to its 
objectives. 
As noted by Butler (2009:13): 
attempts at managing, containing and limiting the use of armed violence by third parties can 
have positive, even transformative outcomes, in the form of order, stability and even peace. 
At the same time, ill-conceived, inappropriate, poorly timed, or half-hearted efforts at 
conflict management can worsen a conflict, generating even more danger, destruction, and 
death for even more people.  
Given the complex nature of third party intervention which may either facilitate peace 
processes or worsen conflict situations, the African Union ought to make careful planning 
before engaging in intervention. It should also ensure that its resources match its operations. 
The AU PSC should also make clear objectives and realistic timeframes for its missions to 
ensure efficiency. Most importantly, drawing from the lessons of its previous peace 
operations, the regional body could improve its future missions in the continent. The 
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 Extrapolating from several years of UN peacekeeping experience, the Lakhdar Brahimi Panel of 
2000 holds that peacekeeper ought not to be deployed in post-conflict environments without peace to 
keep. If the mission is expected to create peace and keep the peace, the mission ought to be a robust 
mandate with political, financial and material support to protect the mission and attain the success 
required (Cilliers et al, 2010: 4). 
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challenges of fulfilling the mandates of the foregoing missions could help to enable AU’s 
future missions to be better in terms of planning, deployment, expertise and duration.  
This entails denoting the pivotal role of the AU Military Staff Committee (MSC) in matters 
relating to the planning and implementation of AU military operations. As noted by Williams 
(2011: 13), the MSC, which is supposed to play a paramount role in advising the AU PSC on 
military matters, rarely has meetings and it has so far been ineffectual. This notwithstanding, 
the MSC is rightfully suited for the planning and coordination of military operations and the 
provision of the required expertise in operation fields. Hence, the MSC should be reinforced 
and empowered to occupy its rightful place in the African Peace and Security Architecture 
 
6.3.2  Force Mobilization 
For the African Union to perform effectively in conflict situations, the regional body ought to 
possess a strong military power to coerce as well as coax stakeholders to take its 
interventions seriously. But in terms of mobilizing troops, the AU member states have shown 
less commitment and political will to mobilize and commit their soldiers for AU peace 
operations. Only few African states demonstrate considerable willingness to commit their 
troops for the regional body’s peace operations. Hence, AU peace operations suffer the lack 
of necessary force strength to deter warring parties from violence and to achieve its mandate 
effectively.  
The African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for example, faced the challenge of troop 
mobilization as its 3,320 force strength that was mandated in October 2004 only reached its 
full strength in April 2005, six months after the decision was reached. When AMIS troop 
reached its reinforced force strength of about 7,000 troops in 2006, extra five thousand troops 
were needed in the region due to Darfur’s huge land mass. It became difficult for AMIS to 
respond to the challenge of reining in on the violence in Darfur. The African Union lacked 
the political will to mandate a further reinforcement of the force strength of AMIS until the 
mission was transformed into a hybrid AU and UN mission (UNAMID) in 2008. 
Likewise, AMISOM was mandate to reach a force strength of 8000 at its inception in 2007. 
But the mission operated with only 6300 troops in the volatile and collapsed state of Somalia. 
During the July 2010 AU Summit in Kampala, member states agreed to reinforce AMISOM 
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by increasing its troops from the then 6300 troops to the 8000 targeted size.  Still yet, 
member states failed to commit their soldiers and fulfil their pledges of troops for the mission 
until the recent achievements of AMISOM forces which led to the reinforcement of the 
mission.  
Nevertheless, generating adequate numbers of troops to match conflict situations is 
quintessential in any peace operation that hopes to succeed. Peace operations ought to have 
the necessary force strength at the initial and on-going stages of intervention to deter warring 
factions from violence and to provide a stable environment for negotiations and agreements 
to happen. Hence, the African Union ought to ensure that adequate forces are generated to 
effectively carry out its military operations. AU member states should show more 
commitment and political will by supporting and committing troops for AU missions.  
As enunciated in the earlier discussion on conflict management, the internal insecurities of 
particular states in Africa are threats to regional and international peace and security. The 
conflict in the DRC for instance has spread its tentacles to neighbouring states in Africa 
especially Rwanda, Uganda and the Central African Republic. The Somali conflict as well 
affects the security situation of Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This entails that no African state 
could extricate itself from the insidious impact of internal armed conflict in the states within 
the African region. In accord with the rewards of liberal institutionalism, African states could 
gain greater security benefits by seeking to confront the challenge of conflict in the continent 
through Africa’s regional organization – the African Union. This demands an immense effort 
at troop commitment by the AU member states in support of regional peace operations. 
Most importantly, the African Union could make useful impact in conflict scenarios by 
displaying the power capabilities of its multinational bodies. This requires that any 
intervention by the African Union should have the necessary backing and authority to avoid 
being undermined by conflicting parties (Crocker 2001:242; Williams 2011: 21). To ensure 
that AU missions achieve the required results, the commitment and support of AU peace 
operations by successful and powerful nations in Africa like Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, Libya, etc. could help the regional body to display the necessary force in conflict 
regions. Nevertheless, troops for AU missions should be generated from as many African 
states as possible. AU peace operations could gain much legitimacy in the eyes of the 
conflict-states if the troops involved come from different parts of the continent. This would 
118 
 
highlight the multinational element of the African Union and show a huge commitment of the 
African Union to attend to the problems of its affiliates.  
In cases where one or few states dominate peace operations via troop contribution, the 
credibility of such intervention is called into question (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and 
Okumu, 2010: 18). This is because the main troop contributing countries could be harbouring 
ulterior motives or could be accused of such. For instance, the fact that South Africa was the 
‘lead nation’ and major troop contributing country for the AU mission in Burundi as well as 
the only troop contributing country for the AU missions in the Comoros Islands portrays  
South Africa as having a secret agenda in these states. It also contradicts the fact that the 
African Union is a continental and supranational organization aimed at contending with the 
security issues of its member states, rather than a single state’s hegemonic effort to address 
the security challenges of the continent. With such issue, the multinational nature of AU as an 
institution is undermined and its operations tend to be less credible. Hence, more AU member 
states should be willing to send their troops for AU peace operations.  
 
6.3.3  Provision of Logistics 
Apart from the problem of limited weaponry and facilities, AU peace operations have 
suffered from poor logistics. Significantly, the regional body’s lack of airlift capacity to 
transport troops and supplies to buffer zones has slowed down AU’s operations and has made 
AU troops vulnerable to ambushes. Due to the lack of airlift capacity, UNAMID took 2 years 
to reach 68 per cent of its force strength. AMISOM has also been hampered in terms of 
gaining and consolidating grounds gained from Al-Shabaab militants.  
The lack of airlift capacity also made AU forces vulnerable to ambushes from hostile warring 
parties. AMIS and UNAMID are known to have been ambushed severally by Darfur’s 
warring factions and the AU lacked the airlift capacity to avert or halt such attacks. Beside 
securing itself, for AU forces to effectively achieve the mandate of the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect which entails protecting civilians, the African Union ought to have 
the means to reach and protect civilians under attack in a timely manner. Hence, The African 
Union ought to invest in airlift capacity such as armoured helicopters, jet-powered aircraft, 
turboprop aircraft, drones, etc. to engage in its missions. This will ensure that AU’s 
deployments to conflict regions are timely; that AU troops are prevented from ambushes that 
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may occur via road transportation; and that civilians as well as AU troops under attack are 
reinforced. 
 
6.3.4  Operationalizing the African Standby Force 
To attain AU’s ideal of providing African solutions to African problems, AU member states 
as well as the RECs ought to trust and commit themselves to AU’s leadership and its peace 
and security initiatives. So far there tends to be little coordination between the AU and RECs. 
At times the quest to gain funds from external donors has led the RECs to seek incompatible 
peace and security initiatives that go athwart to the AU’s initiatives and agenda (Franke 
2006:13). The lack of coordination and poor commitment to the AU’s agenda of peace and 
security reflects in the failure of the RECs to aid in the operationalization of the African 
Standby Force (ASF).  
As noted earlier, the ASF was created to serve as the operational arm of the AU. The ASF is 
supposed to be composed of five brigades from each of Africa’s sub-regions. The five 
brigades are expected to be composed of 5000 personnel each bringing the total force 
strength of ASF to 25,000 personnel. Though the ASF is expected to reach its full operational 
force by 2010, the ASF remains a fantasy in Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture.  
Nevertheless, the establishment of ASF would enable the regional body to respond to 
conflicts on time. It would enable the African Union to solve the issue of deploying 
inadequately trained troops to conflict regions. The ASF would be better placed to have 
undergone extensive training in peace operations before engaging in a mission unlike the 
current case where soldiers are hurriedly recruited for missions without adequate training 
An issue with the formation of the ASF has to do with the imbalances amongst RECs. The 
Southern and Western parts of Africa have stronger RECs compared to the North, East and 
Central Africa whose RECs are weak and lacking in adequate structures to enable the 
formation of the ASF regional brigade. This imbalance makes it difficult to operationalize the 
ASF in a balanced manner. To surmount these challenges, the African Union ought to 
coordinate the formation of the ASF under the aegis of RECs.   
Furthermore, the current design of ASF is problematic because the 25,000 maximum force 
strength expected of the ASF can only manage to engage in two missions concurrently 
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(Dersso 2011: 126). Yet, conflicts in Africa are often beyond two conflicts on a yearly basis 
and the ASF with the envisioned force strength can hardly tackle multiple conflicts. Besides, 
half of the 25, 000 force strength of ASF can hardly handle the huge land mass of the 
individual states in Africa. Thus, beside the imperative of institutionalizing the ASF, the force 
strength of the ASF needs to be reviewed to provide room for the increase of its force 
strength. The establishment of the AU Standby Force will require coordination, funding, 
political will and commitment of African leaders. In this regard, there remains a need for 
creating a synergy between RECs and the AU so as to ensure that the African Peace and 
Security Architecture is harmonious and efficient. Such synergy should enable the AU to 
champion the security agenda of the continent in a coordinated and efficient manner. 
 
6.3.5  Improving the Status of Member States 
Inauspicious for the African Union, most of its member states have poor records of good 
governance and human security. For instance, President Gaddafi of Libya was a prominent 
member of AU PSC which is charged with the continent’s peace and security, while he was 
responsible for human right abuses and dictatorial rule in his state. With the leverage of being 
a member of the PSC between 2004 and 2006, the Sudanese government was able to 
influence and determine the PSC mandate under which AMIS was founded while the 
government engaged in high handed attacks on its people. The seeming favouring of 
incumbent state regimes by the AU also challenges the regional body’s transition from 
OAU’s state-centric conception of security to human security, a security paradigm that places 
more concern on the wellbeing of individuals rather than the government. The AU ought to 
try harder at approaching conflict cases with impartiality and with the motive of maximizing 
the interests of citizens rather than the narrow interests of the ruling elites. 
Apart from the cases of Sudan and Libya, many African states have poor records of 
governance and these states are either members or potential members of the AU PSC. The 
membership and active role of dictatorships, autocratic and repressive regimes in AU’s PSC – 
which is supposed to champion democracy, justice, equality, peace and security – affects the 
credibility of AU PSC’s mission in conflict states. The efforts of AU through the PSC could 
be continually undermined if the members and potential members of the PSC are lacking in 
having a clear record of good governance, rule of law and security in their respective states. 
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Therefore, it is necessary for the AU to develop a mechanism to ensure that its members as 
well as the members of its subsidiary body the PSC have a record of good governance and 
human security.  
Besides, AU’s overall legitimacy to contend with the security threats in the continent is 
contingent on the nature of domestic governance of its member states. If AU member states 
have good records of governance and rule of law, the African Union would be investing itself 
in addressing other pertinent issues in Africa which has been clouded by security concerns. 
This is because citizens of member states would have fewer reasons to challenge the 
government of their respective states if the government is adept at providing basic services 
and if everyone is equal before the law. Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011: 4) observes that 
‘Africa’s security challenges are the unfortunate result of the governance choices some states 
have adopted’.  
Some African leaders pay lip-service to democratic principles while practicing tyrannical and 
dictatorial governance. African leaders who had earlier denounced colonial oppression and 
exploitation turned into oppressors and exploiters of their own people (Ayittey, 1994). They 
ran the state as their own personal fiefdoms. As observed by Brown (2001), violent 
oppositions are likely to erupt if a state adopts oppressive or violent measures against its 
people. The attempt to ruthlessly suppress opposition in troubled African countries has done 
nothing more that reinforce the resolve of the opposition to topple what they consider odious 
regimes. Because of the violent ways in which opposition has been suppressed, many of those 
who want to replace oppressive regimes had to use combative strategies.  In Somalia, the 
quest for the survival of his regime led Barre to engage in violent and indiscriminate 
repression of opposition groups and unfavourable clans (Reilly 2008: 26). This led to 
widespread resentment against Barre’s regime, a resentment that led to fierce opposition and 
the eventual demise of the central government and protracted state collapse.  
To resolve the governance conundrum in Africa, the African Union ought to promote the 
genuine adoption of the principles of good governance and democracy in Africa. Immanuel 
Kant contends rightly that tyrannical and dictatorial regimes that are deficient in democracy 
create avenues for social discontent and conflict (cited in Anyanwu, and Njoku 2010: 24). 
Based on the notion of democratic-peace, Kant insists that, unlike dictatorships, democracies 
are peace loving. Democratic states are inclined to peaceful resolution of conflict. The 
bureaucracies of democratic institutions and the numerous checks and balances in the system 
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preclude democratic leaders from pursuing selfish interests and using indiscriminate force on 
people
82
. Hence, adhering to the principles of democracy and good governance is of upmost 
importance for peace and security in Africa.  
For AU to promote peace, it needs to develop mechanisms to ensure that member states 
adhere to the principles of democracy and good governance. Irrespective of an African 
leader’s contribution to AU and individual African states, African states and AU should not 
hesitate to condemn a leadership that errs or turns violent on its people. AU should develop 
the supranational capacity to ensure that member states comply with decisions, treaties and 
declarations that promote the norms and values of democracy, good governance and human 
security in the continent. This requires commitment and a zero tolerance to oppressive 
regimes irrespective of their status or history in the organization. Given the virtual absence of 
a moral and powerful state to push the agenda of ‘good governance’ in AU, the AU 
Commission composed of credible staffs could play an immense role in promoting the 
agenda of good governance and insisting on the adherence of democratic and human security 
norms. 
 
6.3.6  External Assistance and Self-Reliance 
Presently, the African Union on its own lacks the finance to carry out its peace and security 
missions. Peace operations require huge financial commitment that undermines the meager 
contributions made by AU members. Despite the increasing call for AU to take the bulk of 
the financial and resource responsibility of its operations, the regional body’s missions 
continue to be heavily dependent on external financial support. External organizations such 
as the UN, EU, G8 and states such as China, France, US and Canada continue to invest 
enormously in AU peace missions. Besides financial support, the AU also depends on non-
African logistic and expert assistance to a great extent. These challenge the AU’s ownership 
of peace operations, its capacity to initiate peace operations independently and its 
commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. 
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 Ayittey (1994) argues that Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, Angola and other African 
countries could not have faced strife if they were democratic. The lack of democratic transition of 
power have led to civil wars in states like Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Sudan and Libya.  
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The involvement of the international community in helping to resolve the conflicts in Africa 
is necessary given that African conflicts are precipitated not only by internal factors but by 
external factors as well. Apart from the problem of border disputes, secessionist and 
irredentist struggles caused by the colonial legacy, conflicts in Africa are also engendered by 
the problem of arms proliferation and external meddling in Africa. Moreover, instabilities 
within the continent have deleterious effect on international peace and security. These entail 
that non-African states cannot use the notion of African solutions to African problems as an 
escape point to the challenge of preventing, managing, and resolving African conflicts.  
MØller (2009:16) observes that with the level of economic development in Africa, it would 
be unrealistic to expect Africans to provide the necessary financial commitment required for 
dealing with the deadly conflicts in the continent. Thus, the involvement of the non-African 
states in partnership with African regional organizations is quintessential for solving the 
complex conflicts in Africa. This entails a burden-sharing mechanism between the AU and 
other international bodies. Particularly, the hybrid mission of AU and UN troops in Sudan’s 
troubled Darfur region is a welcome development in burden-sharing approach to attend to the 
continent’s conflicts.  
However, the fact that most of the resources, logistics, funds and expertise required for 
solving African problems are derived from, and dependent on, external bodies raises a huge 
concern about the ownership of AU missions that are geared towards providing an African 
solution to African problems. To materialize the values embedded in the notion of African 
solutions to African problems (which hinge on self-reliance) as spearheaded by the African 
Union, African states ought to take considerable responsibility of the challenges involved in 
solving African problems. This requires making financial, resource, expertise and logistic 
commitments to tackling African conflicts beside the diplomatic and mediatory 
commitments.  
Most of the time, the failure to secure funds and resources from African states is not merely 
because African states are poor. Rather, it could be considered from the fact that some 
African leaders have mismanaged their countries’ economies. Given their unwillingness to 
develop their respective countries, some member states also lack the commitment to invest in 
a multilateral African project. Having aided in the establishment of AU, African states ought 
to show commitment to, and confidence in AU’s leadership and efforts to resolve African 
conflicts. Pertinent to the tenets of liberal institutionalism, harnessing the power capabilities 
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of cooperating member states is the root of the success of institutions in solving common 
challenges. Hence, without the commitment of member states to AU’s initiatives, the African 
Union lacks the ability and legitimacy to operationalize the pan-African call for African 
solutions to African problems. If African states via the African Union are to look towards an 
African based solution to African conflicts, the AU needs to be self-sufficient and only 
minimally reliant on external assistance for much of its operations (Vines 2013: 109; 
Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 1). This would help the regional body to be proactive when it 
needs to be without waiting for external approval. It could also ensure that the continent 
avoids wanton ulterior interventions and influences that undermine the sovereignty and right 
to self-determination of African states. When AU takes much of the leadership and 
responsibility in tackling African problems, external bodies should play the role of providing 
support and assistance when required to enable the AU to meet the challenges in the 
continent.  
In line with Mathiasen (2006: 4) ‘establishing a new pan African cooperation to handle peace 
and security in a troubled continent is a very complex and demanding endeavour’. The 
regional institutions in Europe, Asia, and Latin America took so many years to establish 
themselves. Likewise, the African Union needs time to become a matured institution. 
Moreover, the peace and security efforts of the United Nations, NATO, EU and other foreign 
powers in Africa and across the globe have also been fraught with challenges and they have 
been unsuccessful in many peace operations. Thus, the African Union should not be 
scapegoated as an incompetent organization in view of its current challenges.  
Besides, the AU is faced with greater challenges than other organizations due to the severe 
problems of poverty, underdevelopment and armed conflict which it faces. Particularly, the 
plethora of conflicts in the continent and their complex nature pose a huge challenge to the 
nascent African Union. Given the right support, moral political certitudes and authority, the 
AU can continually make huge progresses in its efforts at conflict management. It is 
envisioned that with time, the African Union will gain the required capabilities to promote, 






6.4  Conclusion 
Thus far, the thesis has examined the efficiency of the African Union in enforcing peace and 
security in Africa. The research situates the discourse on the framework of conflict 
management which entails containing conflicts and protecting civilian populations. Drawing 
on the principles of human security and the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the 
research sets the criteria for an effective African Union in terms of conflict management. The 
study explored some extant literatures on AU’s conflict management record and capabilities. 
These literatures conflated AU’s diplomatic, mediatory and military interventions and 
capabilities. This research however restricts its focus of analysis on the African Union’s 
military approach towards conflict management.  
For the purpose of this study, liberal intuitionalism was used as the theoretical framework. 
Liberal institutionalism considers how states, in an institutional environment, could tackle 
common challenges. The tenets of liberal institutionalism was instrumental in setting the 
relevance, significance and overarching framework for the consideration of the African 
Union as a regional body committed to African peace and security. Via a case by case 
evaluation, the research evaluates the AU’s responses to conflict scenarios in Sudan, Somalia 
and Libya. It is observed that the African union has attempted to respond to some conflicts in 
Africa. However, the quality of such responses is wanting. The regional body’s limited 
resources, lack of expertise, inadequate funds, as well as poor commitment, inadequate 
political will and internal problems of member states continue to undermine the efficiency of 
the regional organization.  
The assessment culminated with the findings of the research and some recommendations on 
how to improve AU’s capabilities to meet up with the security challenges in the continent. 
The African Union is envisioned to develop a supranational authority and power to respond 
to the challenge of conflict in Africa. In sum, the African Union is envisioned to improve its 
conflict management capabilities in the following ways: conflict prevention and early 
response; commitment in troop mobilization; operationalization of the ASF; improvement of 
the status of member states; and growth in securing local funding, resources and self-reliance. 
It is expected that the improvement of the African Union’s capability to respond to African 
conflicts will help reduce the insecurities that have stymied the socio-economic and political 
development of Africa.  
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